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I.  INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2007, a brawl  erupted at the Federal Communi-
cations  Commission (FCC) and in Congress  over what rules should apply
to an  auction of licenses to  use  a  narrow swath  of electromagnetic  spec-
trum.  The auction,  which took place  in January  2008,  allocated commer-
cial wireless  licenses for spectrum  in the  700 MHz  band that is being  va-
cated as a result of the  nation's transition to  digital television. This  spec-
trum was considered highly  valuable "beachfront property"  because  it al-
lows  for the  transmission  of signals  through  objects  and  over  long  dis-
tances (and thus requires  a fraction  of the  number of cellular  towers  that
are necessary  for the use of higher  frequencies).  Indeed, because  the  auc-
tion was  likely to reap  $20 billion  in revenue  for the U.S. Treasury,  con-
gressional interest was  high. All of the  current players in the communica-
tions industry  were involved  in the fight, making  strong  arguments  about
the  conditions under which this  spectrum  should be  licensed.  The  size  of
the spectrum licenses (local, regional, or national?), the business model of
the licensee (wholesale, open access or retail, discriminatory  access?),  and
the  obligations of the  licensee  to public  safety  officials  (build a  network
for public  safety,  or make  some  services  available  at a  low price?)  were
subjects of extensive commentary.
Reports  about  this  auction  (the  "700  MHz  auction"),  which  was
probably the last competitive  auction for a substantial amount of spectrum
for the next few decades,1 prompted a vigorous debate  in the press and the
blogosphere  about the goals and expectations of U.S. communications  pol-
icy.  Opponents  of license  conditions  typically  focused  on  the revenue  to
be  gathered through  the  auction,  and  argued that  any  limitation  on what
could  be  done  by licensees  would  diminish  the  market value  of these  li-
1.  At the open Commission meeting during which the 700 MHz auction rules were
announced,  Commissioner  McDowell  described  the  proceeding  as  the  "auction  of the
century." In re Serv. Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 & 777-792 MHz Bands, 22 F.C.C.R.
15289,  15571  (Aug.  10,  2007)  (second report  and order) [hereinafter Second  Report and
Order]  (statement  of Commissioner  Robert  M.  McDowell,  dissenting  in  part).  The  700
MHz auction took place because digital television was forcing the release of spectrum; no
other large auctions of spectrum are currently planned. See generally infra Part IV.
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censes.2  Defenders  of license  conditions  made different  points.  Many  ar-
gued  that  the  market  for wireless  highspeed  Internet  access 3 was  highly
concentrated,  and  that  license  conditions  requiring  licensees  to  make
transport services  available  on an open4 wholesale  basis could spark addi-
tional competition.5 For example,  the Los Angeles Times  said in an edito-
2.  See,  e.g.,  Letter  from  Robert  W.  Quinn,  Jr.,  AT&T,  to  Marlene  H.  Dortch,
Sec'y, FCC (July  12,  2007)  (ex parte communication  regarding In re Serv.  Rules  for  the
698-746,  747-762 & 777-792  MHz  Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150)  (on file with author)
(stating that "open access"  conditions  on auction would "deprive  taxpayers of billions of
dollars");  see  also  Kim  Hart,  FCC Majority Backs  Open-Access Plan for Airwaves,
WASH.  POST,  July  25,  2007,  at  D2 (noting Republican  congressional  representatives  are
unhappy with conditions  on licenses because  of possibly adverse  effect on  auction reve-
nues).
3.  The FCC defines "broadband"  as anything over 200 Kbps; I use the term "high-
speed to describe  the  same range  of speeds.  The  word "broadband"  is loaded with asso-
ciations that are used  to answer policy questions rather  than add precision. See  Susan P.
Crawford,  What Is  Broadband  Good  For?  (May  17,  2007)  (unpublished manuscript,  on
file with author) (explaining difference between "broadband"  and "highspeed access").
4.  Comments  of Consumer  Federation  of America,  Consumers  Union,  &  Free
Press, In re Broadband  Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 140  (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n  June  15,  2007),  available at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
nativeor_pdf=pdf&iddocument=6519529519  [hereinafter  CFA  Comments].  The  Con-
sumer  Federation of America  (CFA)  and their co-signers  of the  Comment  to the  FCC
stated that:
Open access  simply means that the licensee sells access to the network
on  a wholesale  basis  at  commercial  rates.  Any number  of ISPs  that
choose  to do  so  may come  and  buy bandwidth  and  compete  for cus-
tomers.  Everyone  shares  the  same  transmitter  and  connectivity;  they
compete  on customer  service and price  ....  [An open access]  network
is neutral towards  the devices  and applications running on the network.
Provided  they  do not  harm  the network,  any  innovative  piece  of soft-
ware or hardware  a company  can dream up may connect to the network
and sell  to consumers.
Id. at  136.
5.  A group  calling itself the Public Interest  Spectrum Coalition  (PISC) argued  that
the FCC should designate 30 MHz  of the 60 MHz available for commercial  auction in the
700 MHz proceeding  for "open access"  wholesale  use. See Ex Parte Comments of Public
Interest Spectrum Coalition, In re Serv.  Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 & 777-792  MHz
Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150,  at 5 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Apr. 5, 2007), available  at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf=pdf&iddocument=6519108
262 [hereinafter Comments of PISC]. See also Ex Parte Reply Comments of Public Inter-
est  Spectrum  Coalition,  In  re Serv.  Rules  for  the  698-746,  747-762  & 777-792  MHz
Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  July  6,  2007),  available at
http://fjailfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf-pdf&iddocument=6519540
425 [hereinafter Reply Comments of PISC]. PISC consists of the Consumer Federation of
America,  Consumers Union,  Free Press,  Media  Access  Project, New  America  Founda-
tion, and Public Knowledge.
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rial that  "the point isn't to  raise the most money  for the Treasury,  it's to
generate  the  broadest  public  benefit  from  these  valuable  public  air-
waves....  The FCC should..,  require winning bidders to provide whole-
sale  access  to  their  networks." 6 Others  argued  that  the  most  important
element of the auction should be a requirement that the winner build a na-
tional  public  safety  network. 7  Still  others  maintained  that  the  auction
should be focused on facilitating the development of new uses for wireless
spectrum,  including  the  introduction  of new  devices  and  new  models  of
dynamic  spectrum allocation.8 Google's stated intent to bid $4.6 billion for
a portion of the  spectrum, if and only if the  terms of the winner's  license
were written in the way Google wanted, made front-page headlines. 9
The  airwaves may be the most valuable  natural resource that the gov-
ernment  perceives  itself as  managing.' 0 Both  the  FCC  and  Congress  are
6.  Editorial, Frequencies  for Sale, L.A. TIMES,  July  12, 2007, at A22.
7.  Mark  Fowler,  Op-Ed.,  Wireless Nation: FCC's Chance for a  Great Network,
WASH.  TIMES,  July  5,  2007,  at  A15.  Fowler,  a former  FCC Chairman,  was a founding
partner  in  Frontline  Wireless,  a company  led  by  former  FCC  Chairman  Reed  Hundt,
which was one of "the most vocal advocates"  of such a public safety network. Kim Hart,
How  to  Sell the Airwaves?: FCC Must  Choose Between  Competing Network  Visions,
WASH.  POST, July  13,  2007, at  D1 ("Fundamentally,  the FCC will  have to decide how  it
can drive wireless innovation and economic growth  and if it's important to achieve a na-
tional public safety network. One has enormous economic  implications for investors,  and
the other is important for policy."  (quoting Blair Levin, an analyst with Stifel Nicolaus)).
8.  Letter from Richard S. Whitt, Wash. Telecom  & Media Counsel, Google Inc., to
Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC  (May  21,  2007)  [hereinafter Google  May 21  Letter]  (ex
parte  communication  regarding In re Serv.  Rules  for the  698-746,  747-762  & 777-792
MHz Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150) (on file with author).
9.  Miguel  Helft  &  Stephen  Labaton,  Google Pushes for Rules  to  Aid  Wireless
Plans, N.Y.  TIMES,  July 21,  2007,  at Al.  AT&T  quickly responded, with  Jim  Cicconi,
AT&T  Senior  Executive  Vice  President,  External  and  Legislative  Affairs,  saying
"Google  is demanding  the  Government stack the deck  in its favor, limit competing  bids,
and effectively  force wireless  carriers  to alter their business models to Google's  liking."
Posting  of Om Malik  to  Gigaom, AT&T  Responds  to Google  Bid,  http://gigaom.com/
2007/07/20/att-responds-to-google-wireless-bid/#more-9856  (July 20,  2007).
10.  LINDA  K.  MOORE,  CONG.  RES.  SERV.,  SPECTRUM  MANAGEMENT:  AUCTIONS  2
(2007)  ("Spectrum  is considered  to be a natural  resource  .... ");  J.H. SNIDER, NEW AM.
FOUND.,  AN EXPLANATION OF  THE CITIZEN'S  GUIDE TO THE AIRWAVES (2003), available
at http://www.newamerica.net/files/airwaves.pdf  (assessing  value  of spectrum  and com-
paring spectrum value to value of other economic goods); see also id. at  15  ("[Spectrum
is]  the most valuable natural  resource  of the information  age."  (quoting  William  Safire,
Spectrum Squatters, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  9,  2000, at A21));  J.H. SNIDER, NEW AM.  FOUND.,
THE  ART  OF  SPECTRUM  LOBBYING:  AMERICA'S  $480  BILLION  SPECTRUM  GIVEAWAY,
How  IT HAPPENED,  AND  HOW  TO PREVENT  IT FROM RECURRING  38 (2007), available  at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/art-ofspectrumjlobbying.pdf  [hereinafter  SNIDER, ART
OF  SPECTRUM  LOBBYING]  (suggesting  that the  management  of spectrum  assets  be  inte-
grated into systems for managing other natural resources and made more visible).
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confronted  with  multiple  demands  in this  area,  including:  (1) Congress's
own  budgetary  needs;  (2)  the  demands of existing  communications  com-
panies;"' and (3) the  demands  of would-be  new entrants. The  debate  over
the  rules  to  be  applied  to  the  700  MHz  auction  provides  a  useful  case
study of the role of the regulator in confronting the current central problem
in  communications  regulation.  That central  problem  is  this:  What  is  the
"public  interest" to be  served by telecommunications  regulation at a time
when  all  formerly  separate  communication  technologies  (telephone,
broadcast,  cable,  satellite)  are  converging  into  packet-switched,  Internet
Protocol  (IP)-based  online  media?  What problem  should the  FCC be  try-
ing to solve?
During the  1920s, the FCC's predecessor, the Federal Radio  Commis-
sion, swept hundreds  of thousands  of amateur radio  enthusiasts  and other
small operators  into spectrum Siberia  in order to placate  large commercial
operators,  and claimed to be protecting the "public interest"  by doing  so. 12
The FRC  apparently saw itself as able  to dictate rules for use of spectrum
that would be  welcomed  by the  large  commercial  operators,  despite  con-
cerns  about the  consequences  of those rules.  The FCC remains  interested
in  protecting  traditional  communications  stakeholders,  but  the  Commis-
sion's role as an institution has changed  substantially since the  1920s. It is
now attempting to position itself as a rule-creator in the converged  ecosys-
tem  of communications,  and  its task  has become  much  more  complex. 13
Satisfying  one  well-organized  set  of well-established  companies  (in  the
700 MHz  auction setting, the  incumbent wireless  carriers)  will not neces-
sarily create benefits for the FCC's role that outweigh the burdens of being
attacked by all the other players.
This  changed  institutional role has been prompted by  several  key de-
velopments.  First, the Commission  recognizes that the  technological  land-
scape  has changed  dramatically. The Internet  is the  Black Swan  of com-
munications:  a wildly unexpected event that is having  an enormous effect
on the world.' 4 Access to the Internet  is now extremely  important to social
11.  Existing  telecommunications  companies  contribute  heavily  to  candidates  and
lobby extensively.  According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the telephone utilities
industry,  which  includes both wireline  and wireless  telecommunications  companies,  has
contributed $110  million to federal candidates  from  1990-2008 and spent $381  million on
lobbying  from  1998-2007.  See  Open  Secrets,  Industry  Totals:  Telephone  Utilities,
http://opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=B08  (last  visited  Apr.  16,  2008);  Open
Secrets,  Lobbying Spending  Database,  http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists  (last visited
Apr.  16,  2008).
12.  See infra Part II.
13.  See infra Section V.C.
14.  NASsIM TALEB,  THE BLACK  SWAN  (2007); see JOHN B.  HORRIGAN,  PEW  INTER-
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welfare.15 Internet access,  like clean water and electricity,  provides  a sub-
strate  for  innumerable  valuable  developments,  including  economic
growth,  collaborative  production,  generation  of new  scalable  ideas,  and
democracy-to  name just  a  few.  The  economic  and  social  effects  of the
Internet ethos of openness  and flexibility are  nudging the  Commission to
act differently. 16  Second, the Commission is paying attention to Congress,
as it must. Congress,  in turn, is paying more  attention to communications
issues, and has held key hearings questioning the FCC's approach to spec-
trum policy.' 7 (At the  same time, Congress has been anxious  for the U.S.
Treasury to receive  the  funds from the  700 MHz  auction that it has been
expecting  for many  years.)' 8 Third, the FCC's  own bureaucratic  impera-
tives mandate that  it retain and  expand its role  in the converged  era.  The
Commission  cannot  risk alienating  the  entire (well-funded)  online  policy
world by obviously  favoring wireless carrier incumbents over online com-
panies.
Yet the Commission's vision of the "public  interest" remains  incoher-
ent, and the Commission still appears to believe that it is best for dominant
private wireless  carriers  (the high-power radio broadcasters  of our day) to
be able to dictate  in detail how the airwaves  are used. Indeed, FCC Chair-
man Martin's rhetoric  during the summer of 2007 about the importance  of
the  Internet  ethos of "choice"' 19 did not result in  auction rules that would
necessarily  have  made  such  choices  available.  Although  the  Chairman
pushed  for  limited  "edge"-related  rules  (requiring  that  devices  not  be
"locked"  to  the  winning  licensee's  spectrum,  and  that  consumers  be  al-
NET & AM.  LIFE PROJECT, BROADBAND:  WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS ABOUT  (2007), available
at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/BroadBand%20Fuss.pdf.
15.  See,  e.g.,  ORG.  FOR ECON.  CO-OPERATION  & DEV.  [OECD],  OECD COMMUNI-
CATIONS  OUTLOOK  (2007),  available  at  http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfsibrowseit/
9307021E.pdf. ("Increasing  emphasis  is being  placed  on broadband  as  an  important  in-
frastructure for economic growth and social development");  Joelle Tessler, Re-Examining
Broadband Using a Democratic  Lens, CONG. Q. WKLY.,  July  30, 2007 ("Broadband  is no
longer a luxury  item.... It is an essential component of a strong America in an  informa-
tion age."  (quoting Senator Daniel Inouye)).
16.  See infra Section V.A. 1.
17.  See, e.g.,  Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection  and the Internet: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm.  on  Telecomm.  of the H. Comm.  on Energy and Commerce,
110th  Cong.  (2007),  available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs/  110-ti-
hrg.071107.ConsumerProtection.shtml  (the July  11,  2007 "iPhone hearing").
18.  See infra Section IV.B.2.
19.  See, e.g.,  Frank Rose, It's Silicon Valley vs. Telcos in Battle for Wireless Spec-
trum,  WIRED,  May  16.  2007,  http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2007/05/
uhf spectrum (quoting Chairman Martin:  "It is important to use the upcoming auction to
make  sure there  are more than just two competitors.").
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lowed to use online  applications  without  being blocked),  the idea that  li-
censees would be required to offer access on a wholesale, open-access  ba-
sis-a proxy for common  carriage 20 and the  "Internet  model"  of Internet
access-was  abandoned.21 Because  the two  dominant wireless  carriers  in
this  country,  AT&T  and  Verizon  Wireless, 22 already  held  the key  spec-
20.  See infra Section  III.A. Title II  of the Telecommunications  Act of 1996 defines
common  carriers  (in  a circular  fashion)  as companies  "engaged  as  a common carrier for
hire, in interstate or foreign communication  by wire or radio of interstate or foreign  radio
transmission  of energy."  Telecommunications  Act of 1996,  Pub.  L.  No.  104-104  (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C.  153(10)  (2000)). A common carrier is  a company that  "makes  a public
offering  to provide  [communications  facilities]  whereby  all members  of the public  who
choose  to employ  such facilities may  communicate  or transmit intelligence  of their own
design  and  choosing."  FCC  v.  Midwest  Video  Corp.,  440  U.S.  689,  701  (1979).  47
U.S.C.  § 202(a) prohibits  common carriers  from engaging  in unjust or unreasonable  dis-
crimination,  including making or giving any undue or unreasonable preference,  or impos-
ing any undue or unreasonable  prejudice  or disadvantage, on any person,  class of persons
or  locality.  "Common  carriage"  is  an ancient  concept.  In  a  nutshell,  common  carriage
principles  "guarantee  that no customer  seeking  service  upon reasonable  demand, willing
and able to pay the established price, however  set, would be denied lawful use of the  ser-
vice or would otherwise  be  discriminated against."  Eli Noam,  Beyond Liberalization  II:
The Impending Doom of Common Carriage (Mar.  15,  1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file  with  the  Columbia  University  Working  Papers  Server  Project),  available at
http://www.columbia.edu/dlc/wp/citi/citinoaml  1.html. Mandating that the auction winner
(1) not discriminate  against  providers  using  its facilities  to provide  competing  Internet
access  services;  and (2)  not discriminate against  any particular use of its network would
have been the modem-day equivalent of common carriage.
21.  See infra Part IV. Wholesale,  open-access  licensees would have been required to
build out the wireless network,  own and operate cell  sites  and other equipment,  and pro-
vide  neutral,  nondiscriminatory  access  to  the  Internet  backbone.  Simon  Wilkie,  Open
Access for the 700 MHz Auction:  Wholesale Access Licensing Promotes Competition and
Could Increase License Revenue,  NEW  AM.  FOUND.  ISSUE  BRIEF  No.  21  (July  2007),
available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/openaccess700mhz.pdf.
Some commentators  also proposed  a "no-retail"  rule, which  would constrain  the
licensee  from offering  any retail services  whatsoever  to end users; the  licensee  would be
limited  to  providing  basic  transport  to  retail  service  providers  on  a  nondiscriminatory
basis. See Comments of Frontline Wireless, In re Serv. Rules for the 698-746,  747-762 &
777-792  MHz Bands,  WT Docket  No. 06-150  at  17-18  (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n May
23,  2007),  available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf
&id_ document=-6519415226.
22.  AT&T  and  Verizon  Wireless  are  the No.  1 and No.  2  wireless carriers  in  the
country. See Marguerite  Reardon,  Verizon and AT&T Compete  for Wireless Subscribers,
CNET NEWS.COM,  July 30, 2007,  http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9751805-7.html.
The two companies  "do not  compete  at  all  in  the residential  phone market."  Id. AT&T
has about  70 million wireless  subscribers  and  Verizon  Wireless  has about 64  million (as
of Dec.  2007),  of a total  of 250 million  subscribers  nationwide.  These  two  carriers  to-
gether account for more than half the wireless subscriptions in the country and are the top
spectrum-holders.  Larry  Avila,  A  Wireless  Nation,  THE  POST  CRESCENT  (Appleton,
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trum assets that are used for wireless  access to the  Internet, were commit-
ted to  the  "cellphone  model"  of Internet  access, 23 and were  likely to  win
(and  did  in  fact win)  the  large-scale  commercial  licenses  that were  auc-
tioned  in the  700 MHz  proceeding,24 there  is no real opportunity  for any
experimentation  with  the  Internet  model  for  wireless  highspeed  Internet
access. The Commission  appears  to  see its  institutional task as balancing
the  political  interests  of self-described  key  stakeholders,  and  apparently
thought  that  by  providing  minor  concessions  to  online  policy  voices  it
could  resolve  their  concerns  without  troubling  Verizon  and  AT&T  un-
duly.
25
This Article provides  a snapshot of communications  policy in the U.S.
at  a  particularly  interesting  time.  But  it  has  a  larger  normative  point  to
make.  The  Commission  needs  to  solve  its  "public  interest"  problem.  It
needs  to recognize that the communications  ecosystem of which it is a part
is increasingly  adopting the Internet ethos of open, no-permission-needed,
neutral transport-pushed by a variety of events,  including both the advent
of a huge variety of mobile web  devices (like the Amazon Kindle) and the
creation of the Open Handset Alliance,  a multinational group of manufac-
turers  and  service  providers  planning  to  promote  Google's  open-access
"Android"  platform 26-but  is  being held  back  by  the  actions,  spectrum
control,  and  market  power  of the  dominant  wireless  carriers,  who  are
committed to beating back the  idea of common carriage,  or neutral  trans-
Wis.),  Dec.  16,  2007,  at  lE;  see also Memorandum  from  Frontline  Wireless,  L.L.C.  to
Antitrust  Div.,  U.S.  Dep't.  of Justice,  2007  Telecommunications  Symposium-Voice,
Video  and Broadband:  The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consum-
ers (Nov.  13,  2007),  available  at http://149.101.1.32/atr/public/workshops/telecom2007/
submissions/227840.pdf.
23.  See infra Section  IV.B.4. As  Section  V.A. 1 notes,  following  the  release of the
auction  rules both  Verizon  and  AT&T  made  gestures  toward  openness  that have  very
little substance.
24.  Grant  Gross,  Verizon  Wireless  Wins Large Chunk of 700 MHz Spectrum, IDG
NEWS  SERV.,  Mar.  20,  2008,  http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/03/20iVerizon-
Wireless-wins-large-chunk-700MHz-spectrum_l.html;  Posting  of Chris  Ziegler  to  En-
gadget,  FCC  Releases  700  MHz  Details,  Verizon,  AT&T  Big  Winners,  http://www.
engadget.com/2008/03/20/fcc-releases-700mhz-auction-details-verizon-atandt-big-
winners  (Mar. 20, 2008) (Verizon won the 22-MHz  C Block save in Alaska, Puerto Rico
and the Gulf of Mexico, bidding $4.7 billion; AT&T won much of the B Block; together,
Verizon and AT&T accounted  for about $16  billion of the  approximately $19  billion bid
in the entire  auction).
25.  See infra Part V.
26.  See Dana Gardner, Android: Changing the Mobile Game, LINUXINSIDER,  Dec.
28,  2007,  http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/60957.html;  Brad  Reed,  Mobile  Internet
Will  Open Wide  in 2008, IDC Says, MACWORLD,  Dec.  7,  2007, http://www.macworld.
co.uk/ipod-itunes/news/index.cfm?newsid=  19877.
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port,  at  any  CoSt.27 These  carriers  have  no  interest  in  cannibalizing  their
current vertically integrated retail revenue streams. The Commission is  (so
far) acting to assist these carriers in their quest to avoid the Internet model
of access, even as marketplace realities point in the opposite direction.
But the Commission  should choose  spectrum policy actions by weigh-
ing the benefits of facilitating long-term improved open highspeed Internet
access  against  the  short-term  incentives  of these  particular  incumbents.
These  incumbents  have  every  incentive  to  pursue  short-term  economic
goals that are not necessarily  consistent with long-term  improved  Internet
access. 28 The problem  with the  cellphone  model of Internet  access, given
the market realities that prevail today, is that it establishes a few gatekeep-
ers with ample market power to decide  which online activities will be suc-
cessful and  which will  not. These gatekeepers  have  every  reason to favor
their  own  online  content over  that of other  actors.  The  cellphone  model
may  favor the  short-term interests  of these  dominant  incumbents, but will
not result over the long term  in either an innovative  environment for Inter-
net use or improved Internet  access  for underserved populations-because
it avoids direct competition in the provision of Internet access.29 Tying this
normative point back to the events of 2007-08,  a wish to maximize  overall
improved  open  highspeed  Internet access might  have  triggered  the  adop-
tion of 700 MHz auction rules that limited the involvement of oligopolist 3°
incumbents  and mandated open,  wholesale provision of access. Wholesale
provision of access was the  key to  direct competition for Internet  access;
indeed,  wholesale  open access  was  the  only  way  to  make this  spectrum
allocation  into  a  truly  competitive  proof-of-concept  market  for  Internet
access, online applications,  and devices for online use.
This  normative  scaffolding  should be  helpful  when  the  Commission
faces  its  next  spectrum  policy  decision  in  the  so-called  "white  spaces"
proceeding,  in which the  Commission  will  be reallocating  unused televi-
27.  See infra Section IV.B.4.
28.  See Net Neutrality and Free Speech  on  the Internet: Hearing Before  the H.
Comm.  on the Judiciary, 110th  Cong.  (2008)  (prepared  statement  of Susan  Crawford,
Visiting  Assoc.  Professor of Law,  Yale  Law  Sch.), available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/media/pdfs/Crawford080311  .pdf  (making this argument).
29.  More  open broadband policies in other countries  have prompted  those countries
to experience  greater competition,  lower prices,  better service,  and higher penetration  of
highspeed Internet access. See Comments of PISC, supra  note 5, at 3, 7 (citing WIRELINE
COMPETITION  BUREAU,  FCC, HIGH-SPEED  SERVICES  FOR  INTERNET  ACCESS:  STATUS  AS
OF  JUNE  30,  2006  (2007),  available  at  http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-270128A 1.pdf).
30.  Wilkie, supra note 21  (describing oligopolistic marketplace).
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sion broadcasting  spectrum.  In that proceeding, there will  be  a different
incumbent  (television broadcasters  rather than telephone  companies),  but
the  same  basic set of policy questions  will be  presented:  Whose  welfare,
that of incumbents  or that of the  general  public, should be taken into  ac-
count?  A future  Commission  can avoid  another  bare-knuckled  political
brawl by making clear that it intends to support highspeed, open, competi-
tive, mobile  Internet  access  as its top priority,  and that it understands that
creating  unlicensed portions of the white  spaces spectrum  can further this
goal. Given advances in transmission and reception technology, there is no
real "scarcity"  of white  spaces  spectrum,  and thus no particular reason to
propertize  it;  at  the  same time,  we have  a  great need to  experiment  with
unpropertized uses of spectrum for highspeed Internet  access. The "public
interest" calculations of the  1920s, which  favored the private property in-
terests of large commercial  broadcast  entities above  all other  goals,  need
to be adjusted.  The  institutional changes the FCC has undergone have put
it in a position to make these adjustments.
This Article contributes to an extensive  debate about the desirability of
propertizing  spectrum. 32 For  the  purposes  of the  700  MHz  auction,  the
question  of propertization  was  answered  by  Congress;  the  FCC  was  re-
quired to auction off this spectrum, and the only open questions concerned
the  details  of the  auction  rules.  However,  propertization  of the  white
spaces spectrum  is still an open issue. Unlicensed uses of the white  spaces
spectrum  could allow  for the  experimentation with the  Internet  model  of
Internet  access  (in  essence,  common  carriage,  or  separation  between
transport and  content) that arguably was not permitted by the  rules for the
700 MHz auction.
This Article proceeds  in seven parts. Part II describes  the  institutional
role  of the FCC's  predecessor  agency  in  early  radio  regulation.  Part  III
provides  the  competitive  context  for the  700  MHz  auction,  and  Part  IV
presents the auction perspectives of the major players. Part V analyzes the
Commission's response to those interests  during the summer of 2007, and
compares  its  institutional response  to the  1920s  spectrum policy contests.
Part VI takes on the inherently normative and highly contested question  of
the  "public  interest" that the  future  Commission should  serve.  In light of
the  central role Internet  access to  converged communications  will play in
our collective  future, we will need to  move beyond  the  100-year-old  po-
litical  assumptions  and  40-year-old  technical  assumptions  that  currently
shape  telecommunications  regulation.  The  FCC as  an  institution  has  al-
31.  See infra Section VI.B.
32.  See infra note 306.
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ready begun to make this move, but has  a long road to travel yet. Part VII
discusses  how the  white  spaces proceeding  will provide  another  test case
of its maturity.
II.  EARLY RADIO REGULATION
At  the  conclusion  of the  Commission's  work  during  the  summer  of
2007  on the  700  MHz  auction rules, the  FCC emerged with  a negotiated
arrangement  that was generally  believed to  serve  the  interests of Verizon
and AT&T, companies  that together control more than 50% of the market
for wireless  subscribers. 33 There  is nothing  new under  the sun. The  Com-
mission, like its predecessors,  has often been interested in supporting well-
financed incumbents.
Between  1906,  when  the  crystal  detector  first  became  widely  avail-
able,  and  1912,  when  the  first  Radio  Act  was passed,  hundreds  of thou-
sands of amateurs learned how to use radio equipment and were enthusias-
tically communicating across  the "ether."34 Indeed, radio had its own "rich
web of cultural  practices  and ideas"  long  before  regulators  arrived.35 But
amateurs and new entrants  were shoved aside by early regulators,  in favor
of established  large commercial  interests and the military,  on at least three
separate occasions.
Access  to  the  "ether"  was  at first unrestricted:  anyone  with inexpen-
sive homemade radio  equipment could  set himself up to  transmit and re-
ceive signals.36 The amateur dominated the air as of 1910:
Hundreds of schoolboys in every part of the country have taken
to  this  most popular  scientific  fad,  and,  by  copying the  instru-
ments used at the regular stations and constructing  apparatus out
of all kinds of electrical junk, have built wireless equipments  that
in some cases approach the naval stations  in efficiency.37
Indeed,  by  1914  the  amateurs  had successfully  tested a coast-to-coast
38 relay  network.  But by  then  their  place  in  the  spectrum  hierarchy  had
been completely changed.
33.  See infra Section V.B.
34.  SUSAN J. DOUGLAS,  INVENTING  AMERICAN  BROADCASTING  1899-1922, 195,  198
(1987).
35.  Id. at xv.
36.  Id. at xxvii.
37.  Id. at  195  (quoting  Robert  A.  Morton,  The Amateur  Wireless Operator,  OUT-
LOOK,  Jan.  15,  1910, at  131).
38.  Id. at 206.
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The  Radio  Act  of  191239 established  a number  of key  principles:  all
broadcasters  would  need  a  license  from  the  Secretary  of Commerce,  no
one could broadcast without a license,  and spectrum would be allocated to
particular  uses.40  Essentially,  the  Act established  that "some  communica-
tion was more important than others," and made clear that the federal gov-
ernment would make  these decisions.4'  What established communications
merit in  1912 was "capital investment or military defense."42 In particular,
the  Act  instructed  amateurs  that  they  could  no  longer  roam  frequencies
transmitting  at will.  Rather, they could  listen  in anywhere  they liked, but
could transmit  only on very shortwave  frequencies  and at low power. 43 In
effect, the amateurs  were consigned to oblivion because  these  shortwaves
were considered technologically unusable at the time.44
A few years  later, in 1923,  Secretary  of Commerce Herbert  Hoover re-
allocated  most spectrum  use in  one  fell  swoop,  without  statutory  author-
ity.45 Major  commercial  stations  received  favorable,  high-power  assign-
39.  Act of Aug.  13,  1912, ch.  287,  37  Stat. 302  (1912)  (repealed by  Radio  Act  of
1927,  ch.  169,  44  Stat. 1162  (1927)).  The enactment  of the  Radio  Act was prompted  by
the Titanic  disaster, "when  'chaos  in the  spectrum'  was said to have confused  a potential
rescue  ship  'so  it missed the calls of help from the  sinking luxury  liner."'  JONATHAN  E.
NUECHTERLEIN  &  PHILIP  J.  WEISER,  DIGITAL  CROSSROADS:  AMERICAN  TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS  POLICY IN THE INTERNET 232 (2005).
40.  THOMAS  G.  KRATTENMAKER  &  LUCAS  A.  POWE,  REGULATING  BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING  6  (1994).
41.  Id.
42.  DOUGLAS, supra note 34, at 237. As discussed below, the  1912 Act "favored  the
Navy by awarding it a dominant position in the electromagnetic  spectrum and by specifi-
cally  protecting  its  stations  from  interference  by  private  companies."  PHILIP  T.  ROSEN,
THE MODERN STENTORS:  RADIO  BROADCASTERS  AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,  1920-
1934 (1980).  Major corporations  made investments in technology,  to the extent that "after
1912,  it was  [several  large-scale]  corporations, not  individuals,  who  controlled  continu-
ous wave technology."  DOUGLAS, supra  note 34, at 255.
43.  DOUGLAS,  supra note 34, at 234.
44.  See  KRATTENMAKER  & POWE,  supra note 40 at  6; DOUGLAS,  supra note  34,  at
316;  ROSEN, supra note  42,  at  21  (noting the  Act "relegated  amateur use  to frequencies
above  1500 kHz, which at the time were  considered unusable.").
45.  Herbert  Hoover,  Secretary  of Commerce  from  1921  to  1928,  called  for strong
federal  regulation  of the  airwaves  as  early as  1922,  and  was "a  staunch  and unceasing
advocate  of strong  federal  regulation  for  broadcasting."  Daniel  E.  Garvey,  Secretary
Hoover and the Quest for Broadcast  Regulation, 3 JOURNALISM  HIST.  67  (1976).  For  a
description  of Hoover's personal  role  in early radio regulation,  and particularly his will-
ingness to act without  statutory authority, see ROSEN, supra  note 42, at 57. Rosen writes:
He assigned channels, although the Radio Act of 1912 neither made nor
authorized  any  distribution  of frequencies  to  individual  stations.  He
placed  commercial  operators  in  the  band from  187.5  to  500  kHz,  al-
though both  domestic  and international  law protected  the government
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ments,  while  many  nonprofit  stations  "emerged  with  severely  truncated
frequency rights. 46
Hoover  had stated early on that "it  becomes of primary  public interest
to say who  is to do  the broadcasting,  under what circumstances,  and with
what type  of material,"  thus linking  radio  regulation to the  "public  inter-
est.' 47 He  was "somewhat  less favorably inclined"  to the  words "conven-
ience and necessity, '48  which the  1927 Congress used in creating the  gov-
erning statute for a Federal  Radio Commission that would be independent
of Hoover's control.49
In  1927-28,  the  newly  formed,  not  well-funded  Federal  Radio  Com-
mission  (FRC)  needed  to  decide  what  "public  interest,  convenience,  or
necessity"  meant. The  FRC,  shaped  by several  Hoover-run  radio  confer-
reservation.  He reallocated  channels, although the same laws  specified
wavelengths  for certain groups of radio users.
Id. Hoover has  been described  as the  "political  champion  of major  radio  broadcasters."
Thomas W.  Hazlett,  The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum,  33
J.L. & ECON.  133,  152  (1990).
46.  Hazlett,  supra note  45,  at  157.  Hoover assigned  the  most-preferred  and  least-
congested  wavelengths  to the  high-power stations, while  consigning  the  low-power sta-
tions  to  the  one  wavelength  that  was  already  overcrowded;  AT&T,  GE,  and  Westing-
house owned  high-power  stations  while universities,  churches,  and labor  unions  owned
low-power  stations.  DOUGLAS,  supra note  34,  at  316;  Hazlett,  supra note  45,  at  146;
ROSEN, supra  note 42, at 57.
47.  Garvey,  supra note  45,  at  67  (citing  Herbert  Hoover,  Sec'y  of  Commerce,
Speech to the first National Radio  Conference: Value of Radio Phones (Feb.  27,  1922), in
BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT,  May 4,  1922, at 5).
48.  According to Daniel E. Garvey, Hoover wrote:
[T]here is growing demand  for the  limitation of the number of stations
in a given area, and that such a limitation would be based on the service
needs of the community, just as public utilities are generally limited by
the  rule of public  convenience  and necessity. Again this  enters  a dan-
gerous field of recognizing monopoly and implied censorship.
Garvey,  supra note 45,  at 70 (citing Letter from Herbert Hoover,  Sec'y of Commerce,  to
Wallace  H. White,  Congressman).  Hoover  shied  away from  the  public-utility  phrasing,
preferring such terms as "public service to the listener." Id.
49.  The  1927  Radio  Act provided  that the  new Commission  shall,  "as  public con-
venience,  interest,  or necessity  requires"  classify  radio  stations, prescribe  the  nature of
the  service,  assign bands of frequencies  or wavelengths,  determine  the power,  time, and
location of stations, and regulate the  kind of apparatus to be used. Radio  Act of 1927,  ch.
169,  § 4, 44  Stat. 1162  (1927)  (absorbed into the Communication  Act of 1934). The  1927
Act's provisions were  absorbed into the  1934 Act, and these core provisions are still with
us,  largely  intact.  Communication  Act of 1934, ch.  652, 48  Stat.  1064  (later codified as
47 U.S.C  § 151  et secq;  ROSEN, supra note  42,  at  105 ("While the standard of public  in-
terest, convenience,  and necessity  lacked direct precedent  in any  federal  law, its  interpre-
tation  constituted  the fundamental  requirement  for  securing  a  permit  for many years  to
come.").
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ences  and seven years of Department of Commerce control  of spectrum,
decided  that  applicants  with  "superior  technical  equipment,  adequate  fi-
nancial  resources, skilled personnel,  and the ability to provide continuous
service" should be given preference.51 In effect, the FRC found that prior-
ity and market  success were the  appropriate measures of the "public inter-
est.",52 The  new  Radio  Commission  decided  that  the  "public  interest"
would favor licensees that were serving the general  public rather than any
narrower  interest.  "Using  this  logic,  it  labeled  facilities  operated  by col-
leges  and  universities,  religious  institutions,  and  city  and  state  govern-
ments  'propaganda  stations.'  ...  By such special interpretation  of already
ambiguous  [public  interest,  convenience,  and  necessity]  guidelines,  the
FRC favored the corporate giants. 53
In  November  1928,  in  an  echo  of Hoover's  1923  steps,  the  Radio
Commission  changed the  assignments of 94% of all  broadcasting  stations
as part of a comprehensive reallocation  scheme.54 One of the  commission-
ers later reflected:  "We  had to make some moves  in a rather high-handed
way  . . . . We took a lot of hearsay  and I fear we did a lot of injustices." 55
The  FRC rewarded with further free spectrum applicants  who had already
held large  assignments of spectrum and had achieved financial  success  in
operating  stations.56 Thomas Hazlett  has pointed out that this implementa-
tion of a "right of user" or "priority-in-use"  method for assigning licenses
was  a  shrewd political  move  that  shored up  support  for the  FRC  among
the  large companies  whose support  the FRC felt it needed.57 Susan Doug-
las argues that the federal government's "preferential  treatment toward the
technologically  most  powerful  (and  richest)  commercial  stations,  and
50.  See  Yochai  Benkler,  Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment,  11  HARV.  J.L. & TECH.  287,  299  (1998);  see also
Hazlett, supra note 45, at  152,  154  ("The Commission favored applications  with superior
technical  equipment, adequate finances, experienced personnel, and the ability to operate
without  interruption.  These  were  Hoover's  policies,  and they  favored  established  com-
mercial  broadcasters.").  The annual Washington Radio  Conferences organized by Hoover
from  1922  to 1925 were an expression of these  policies and comforted  the large commer-
cial broadcasters that Hoover had their interests at heart. DOUGLAS,  supra  note 34, at 315.
These  conferences  were "organized  to recommend possible  legislative  solutions  to Con-
gress after examining the problems confronting radio users."  ROSEN, supra note 42, at 39.
51.  ROSEN, supra note 42, at  133.
52.  Hazlett, supra note 45, at  157; ROSEN, supra note 42, at  133.
53.  ROSEN,supra note 42, at  133-34.
54.  See id. at  134; KRATTENMAKER  & POWE,, supra note 40, at 21; see also General
Order 40, Minutes,  11  September  1928, NARG  173,  FCC, reel  1.1.
55.  KRArTENMAKER  & POWE, supra note 40, at 21.
56.  Id. at 22.
57.  Hazlett, supra note 45, at  168.
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regulatory  marginalization  of smaller,  noncommercial  stations,  persisted
through the  Radio Act  of 1927  and the  Communications  Act of 1934. "58
While  speaking  in  terms  of the  public  interest,  the  Radio  Commission
chose to further the ends of well-financed  incumbents.59
It is striking how little spectrum policy has changed.
III.  CONVERGENCE AND  (LACK OF) COMPETITION
The stakes for the 700 MHz auction were high. We are at an inflection
point  in  communications  history.  Although  all  earlier  communications
modalities  (cable,  broadcast,  telephone)  are  collapsing  into  one-packet-
switched  online  communications-the  existing  communications  incum-
bents have  sufficient  market power to keep their desired business  models
in  place.  This  Part  describes  the  "Internet"  model  of communications
(open, nondiscriminatory,  allowing  for innovation  at the  edge  of the  net-
work)  and  contrasts  it  with the  "Cellphone"  model  (controlled  network,
manager  able  to  charge  for  and  discriminate  with  respect  to  particular
communications).
A.  Models  of Internet Access:  History
The  700  MHz  auction  occurred  at  a  particularly  interesting  time  in
communications  history.  Traditional  telephone  use  is  shrinking  and  the
cultural  sway  of broadcasters  is diminishing, while  Internet  use  and cell-
phone use are growing quickly.60 Although the telecommunications  indus-
try has long been  divided up into different silos  (cable, broadcast,  teleph-
ony, data), all of these segments  are arguably converging  into one packet-
switched 6'  communications  realm.62 Highspeed  packetized  communica-
58.  DOUGLAS,  supra note 34, at316.
59.  Hazlett, supra note 45, at  158.
60.  See generally  OECD, supra note  15.  Informa, a market research  firm, found that
"global revenues  from  fixed-line voice  calls  were around  $600  billion  in 2005,  and data
revenues were $202 billion.  By 2010 ...  fixed-line calls will  account for less than half of
operators'  revenues  in  the  developed  world.  Instead,  their  new  core  product  will  be
broadband Internet access."  JIM  KOHLENBERGER,  UNIVERSAL  AFFORDABLE BROADBAND
FOR  ALL  AMERICANS  11  (Benton  Found.  2007).  A  late-2007  Deloitte  & Touche  report
found that usage of cell phones as entertainment devices  increased by 50% over just eight
months  of 2007-from  24%  of U.S.  consumers  to 36%.  Gail  Schiller, Americans More
Wired:  Survey,  REUTERS,  Dec.  28,  2007,  http://www.
reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSN2844258220071231  (reporting  results  of
Deloitte & Touch "State  of the Media Democracy"  survey). About 62% of 13-to-24-year-
olds  use  their  cell  phones  as  entertainment  devices,  and  47%  of consumers  25-to-41-
years-old.  Id. About  45%  of those  surveyed  said  they  were  creating  their  own  public
online content through editing photos, videos, or music. Id.
61.  Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Commu-
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tions  are becoming  the key  communications  medium.63 The central  ques-
tion  is  which  model of packetized  communications  will  prevail:  will  we
converge  on  a  set of proprietary,  walled-garden  networks,  in  which  the
network provider acts as a gatekeeper by deciding which communications
(in terms of content, application used, protocol used, how  expensive they
are)  move easily across  its network and onto the  (authorized)  handsets  of
users (the cellphone model), or will we converge  on the Internet model,  in
which  the  network  provider  makes  available  an  interconnected,  nondis-
criminatory,  commodity  transport  service  (essentially,  a  utility  connec-
tivity  product)  on which  competitive  communications  travel  that  can  be
introduced  without  the knowledge  or permission of the  network provider
and can be accessed  via any handset?
The birth of the "Internet  model" (perhaps counterintuitively  for many
readers) relied heavily on extensive government intervention requiring that
telephone  companies  provide  services  on  a  "common  carriage"  basis. 64
Until very  recently,  the  telephone  companies  ("telcos")  were required  to
provide  telecommunications  services  on this basis,  which meant  that they
could  not discriminate  against  anyone  wishing  either to  connect  to  their
network  or to  use  their facilities  to  compete  with them.65 Starting  in the
1960s,  the  telcos  were  also  required  to permit  competitors  to  attach  de-
nication, 82  TEX.  L. REV.  863,  869  n.21  (2004)  ("Packet-switching  means  that informa-
tion  is split  into  small data  'packets,'  which  are  routed independently  through  the net-
works  and reassembled  on  the receiving  end.  This  contrasts  with the  'circuit-switched'
model of the telephone network, which holds open a dedicated channel for each call.").
62.  See generally RICHARD  D.  TAYLOR,  TIME FOR  CHANGE:  TRANSFORMING  FUND-
ING  FOR  BROADBAND  UNIVERSAL  SERVICE  (Benton  Found.  2007)  (arguing  that  soon
voice,  video, and all other communications  will be delivered over IP networks);  see also
Press Release, Int'l Telecomms. Union, ITU  Announces First Global Set of Standards  for
IPTV  (Dec.  18,  2007),  available  at  http://www.itu.int/newsroom/
pressreleases/2007/40.html  ("A combination of voice, Internet and video services  over a
single broadband  link  and from  a single  provider is foreseen  as  the ultimate  goal  of the
broadband revolution.").
63.  OECD, supra note 15,  at 19.
64.  The next three paragraphs  are  based on  Susan  P. Crawford,  Network Rules, 70
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  51  (2007).
65.  See generally ITHIEL DE  SOLA POOL,  TECHNOLOGIES  OF FREEDOM  75-79  (1983)
(discussing  history of common carriage  in the United States); JoAnne Holman & Michael
A. McGregor,  The Internet as Commons: The Issue of  Access,  10 COMM.  L. & POL'Y 267,
279-80  (2005) (relating that as early as ICC regulations created pursuant  to the  Interstate
Commerce  Act of  1897,  regulations  have  classified  the  telephone  industry  as  a  public
utility and a common carrier). Internet access providers  were classified as common  carri-
ers until 2005,  when  the Supreme Court ruled  in Brand  X that they instead may be  regu-
lated as  "information  services" providers.  Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.  Ass'n.  v.  Brand  X
Internet Servs.,  545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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vices to these networks,  as long as the  devices were certified not to cause
harm  to  the  network.66 This  open  network  made  growth  of the  Internet
possible in the U.S. because consumers could get flat-rate,  dial-up Internet
access  and  attach  modems  to  telephone  connections  that  allowed  their
computers to act like phones. By contrast, both cable  and wireless  compa-
nies have  been  permitted  (largely)  to  act  as private, vertically  integrated
networks without a great deal of FCC regulation. 67
Although telephone  companies were  initially unenthusiastic  about act-
ing as Internet service providers (ISPs) and connecting their subscribers to
the Internet, they  prospered  when subscribers  bought extra  lines to  allow
them to  go  online  through  other  ISPs.  The  phone  companies  prospered
again  when  subscribers  bought  their  proprietary  DSL services,  enabling
Internet  access at  even higher speeds  (one to  two Mbps).68 The explosive
growth of the Internet  took these  phone companies  by surprise, however,
and they became  unhappy with requirements  to provide flat-rate, open ac-
cess to online resources. Their dissatisfaction increased when use of online
voice services  (VoIP) began to undermine  their traditional telephone reve-
nues.
66.  See Kevin Werbach,  The Federal  Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REv.  1, 18-
19 (2005) (describing  Carterfone  history and Part  68 rules); Jason Oxman,  The FCC  and
the Unregulation of the Internet (Office  of Plans & Policy, FCC, Working Paper No. 31,
1999), available  at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp31  .pdf
67.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.  § 541(c)-(d)  (2000) (cable  systems not subject to regulation
as common  carriers;  states may not regulate cable  systems when they provide  communi-
cations services other than cable services).
68.  Both  dial-up and digital subscriber line (DSL) access run  across traditional tele-
phone  copper wires. See CISCO  SYSTEMS, Digital  Subscriber  Line, in INTERNETWORKING
TECHNOLOGY  HANDBOOK,  at  21-1,  http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/
itodoc/dsl.pdf. DSL  is  a  modem  technology  that  converts  existing  copper  telephone
lines into two-way  highspeed data  conduits. Id. See also ANGELE  A. GILROY & LENNARD
G.  KRUGER,  CONG.  RES.  SERV.,  BROADBAND  INTERNET  REGULATION  AND  ACCESS:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES  2  (2007). This technology only works within about three miles
of a central office facility. Id. at 2. DSL devotes certain frequencies on traditional  copper
phone  lines  to data  transmission  and  is faster than  dial-up  because  (in  part) it does  not
need to go  through a circuit switch but  instead goes  directly to the packet-switched  net-
work.  Each end of the phone  line must  have  a DSL modem,  which will  transmit and re-
ceive  all data (without  conversion)  as  a digital  signal.  GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY  OFFICE,
PUBL'N  No.  GAO-06-426,  TELECOMMUNICATIONS:  BROADBAND  DEPLOYMENT  Is  Ex-
TENSIVE  THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES,  BUT IT Is DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT
OF  DEPLOYMENT  GAPS  IN RURAL  AREAS  22  (2006),  available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06426.pdf. DSL  speeds in  the United  States are  about  1.5  to 3 Mbps (about
50 to 100  times the speed of a 28 Kbps dial-up modem), while ADSL speeds may reach 8
Mbps.  Id. at 8. The FCC defines  highspeed  Internet access  as anything  over 200 Kbps,
which  is  alarmingly  slow. FCC,  What  Is Broadband?  (Apr.  11,  2007),  http://www.fcc.
gov/cgb/broadband.html.
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The  telcos  initially  made  strong  "level  playing  field"  arguments
against  cable  modem69 providers,  arguing  strenuously  that  cable  compa-
nies providing Internet access  should be  subject to the same common car-
riage and other burdens under which the telcos were operating. 7 0  But as  of
March 2002, the cable companies had obtained from the FCC the promise
that  the  highspeed  Internet  access  service  they  provided  would  not  be
regulated  as  a  "telecommunications  service"  by  the  FCC-so  neither
common  carriage  (nondiscrimination)  nor  "open  access"/"unbundling"
obligations  would be imposed on them.71 Between  2002 and 2005 the tel-
cos switched gears and fought hard to remove their own regulatory  obliga-
tions,  pointing  out  that  new  investment  in  fiber  networks 72 would  be
69.  Highspeed Internet access  service provided by cable companies  is called "cable
modem"  service.  Cable  modem service,  which competes  directly  with DSL, uses home
cable  network pipes  (hybrid  fiber  coaxial  networks)  that are  connected  to  ethernet net-
work cards  inside computers.  Cable  facilities are  connected  via highspeed  links directly
to the Internet.
70.  See, e.g.,  MSOs Sued on Open Access, TELEVISION DIGEST,  Nov.  1, 1999  (de-
scribing  suit  by Bell  company GTE  against cable  modem  service  provider  and quoting
GTE  executive  William  Barr  as  saying  "You  shouldn't  let  the  person  who  owns  the
driveway  dictate  where  people  go.");  BOB  JACOBSON,  BROADBAND-CABLE:  THE  OPEN-
ACCESS  DEBATE  (1999),  http://www.netaction.org/broadband/cable/cable.pdf  (cable-
industry-side  white paper  describing  Bell  arguments)  ("Led by regional  monopolies  like
SBC Communications  and GTE, the  local telephone companies  are asking policy makers
to impose onerous carriage conditions on cable broadband service.").
71.  See generally In re Inquiry  Concerning  Appropriate  Regulation  of High-Speed
Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities,  17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (Mar.  14, 2002)
(holding  that  cable  companies  are  not  subject  to  common-carriage  obligations).  "Open
access"  and "unbundling"  mean roughly the same thing,  as a practical  matter. The  1996
Telecommunications  Act  directed  incumbent  local  telephony  carriers  to  unbundle  ele-
ments of their networks  for lease to providers  of competitive  local exchange  services  at
FCC-mandated  wholesale  rates.  This allowed multiple  ISPs to  offer  service  and defeat
the telco monopoly.  Since  the Act  came  into  force twelve  years  ago, the FCC has  been
mired  in litigation over what precisely their unbundling  rules are-which  elements have
to be unbundled,  and at what prices. See AT&T  Corp.  v. Iowa  Utils. Bd.,  525 U.S.  366
(1999).  (vacating and remanding key  unbundling rules from Implementation of the Local
Competition  Provisions  in  the  Telecommunications  Act  of 1996,  61  Fed.  Reg.  45,476
(Aug. 29,  1996) (to be  codified at 47 C.F.R. pts.  1, 20,  51,  90 )); U.S.  Telecomm.  Ass'n
v.  FCC,  290  F.3d 415  (D.C. Cir.  2002)  (remanding  the  FCC's  new  network  elements
rules, announced  at 65  Fed. Reg.  2367,  and its new  rules for sharing the  local loop,  an-
nounced at  65  Fed. Reg.  1331);  Review  of the  Section  251  Unbundling  Obligations  of
Incumbent Local  Exchange Carriers,  68 Fed. Reg.  52,276 (Sept. 2,  2003)  (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51  ) (final rule) (setting out more rules).
72.  "Optical  fiber  cable,  already  used by  businesses  as  high  speed  links  for long
distance  voice  and  data  traffic,  has  tremendous  data  capacity,  with transmission  speeds
dramatically  higher than  what  is  offered by  cable  modem  or DSL  broadband  technol-
ogy."). GILROY,  supra note 68, at 3.
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stunted  if they did not have  control  over their networks  similar to  that of
the  cable  companies.  As of February  2003,  the FCC  made  clear that nei-
ther common  carriage  nor unbundling requirements  would be imposed  on
new fiber to  the home (FTTH)  installations  by the telcos,  and in October
2004  the  Commission  eliminated  these  obligations  for  fiber  to  the  curb
(FTTC)  projects.73 Immediately  following  the  summer  2005  decision  in
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v.  Brand X Internet
Services,74 which  deferred  to  the FCC's determination  that cable  modem
services  were  not subject to  common carriage  or unbundling  obligations,
the  telephone  companies  demanded  that  DSL  services  be  similarly  re-
leased  from any  requirement  to  connect  to  all  ISPs  or  carry  all services
without  discrimination. In August  2005,  they  achieved this  goal  with the
issuance  of the  FCC's  Wireline  DSL  order. 75 Thus,  network  operators
providing DSL, fiber, and cable packetized  communications  have over the
last  few years  obtained  regulatory  approval  allowing them  to provide  the
managed,  cellphone  model of packetized  communications  (non-common-
carriage),  whether in connection with selling their own content (e.g.,  sub-
scription  cable  channels)  or selling  access  to the  Internet.  All  major pro-
viders of Internet access in this country are vertically  integrated, providing
retail online "services"  as well as transport.76
As  the  distinctions  between  previously  separate  communications  net-
works disappear, what might have seemed  like a request  for an exception
from a general  rule  ("we  want new private  highspeed networks  not to  be
treated  like traditional  telephone networks")  may  actually  be  a  complete
shift ("no  network  access used  for communications  should  be  subject  to
nondiscrimination rules").  Public pressure  has  kept DSL,  fiber, and  cable
Internet  access  providers  from  blocking  many  Internet  communications,
73.  Review  of the  Section  251  Unbundling  Obligations  of Incumbent  Local  Ex-
change Carriers, 68 Fed.  Reg. at 52,279;  Review of the Section  251  Unbundling Obliga-
tions  of Incumbent  Local  Exchange  Carriers,  69  Fed.  Reg.  77,950,  77,952  (Dec.  29,
2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt.  51).
74.  Nat'l  Cable  & Telecomm.  Ass'n.  v.  Brand  X  Internet  Servs.,  545  U.S.  967
(2005).
75.  Appropriate  Framework  for  Broadband  Access  to  the  Internet  over  Wireline
Facilities,  70  Fed.  Reg.  60,222,  60,223-25  (Oct.  17,  2005)  (to  be  codified at  47  C.F.R.
pts.  51,  63,  64)  (classifying  wireline  broadband  Internet access  service  (DSL) as  an  in-
formation service  under the Communications  Act, and thus no longer subject to common-
carrier regulations under Title 1I  of the Act).
76.  See  Net  Neutrality and Free Speech  on  the Internet: Hearing Before  the H.
Comm.  on  the  Judiciary,  10th  Cong.  (2008)  (prepared  statement  of  Caroline
Fredrickson, ACLU  Washington  Legislative  Office),  available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/media/pdfs/Fredrickson080311  .pdf (describing  history of net neutrality  and  relevant
regulatory changes).
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although there have been some instances of degradation and interference.77
B.  Wireless Carriers
The wireless  carriers have always had the  cellphone  model,  and have
had no compunctions  about using their control over their authorized hand-
sets to limit users'  Internet activities and exact 40 to 50 percent of applica-
78 tions developers'  revenues for access to these users.  Wireless  companies
to  date  have  been very  careful  about  what they  let cellphone  subscribers
do  online.79 Access  to  online  applications  (like  map  services  and e-mail)
and the ability to use  a device of one's own choice are both sharply limited
by wireless  carriers. 8 0 A  phone sold in a Verizon  store will work only  on
77.  For example, in  August 2007, during the live Lollapalooza Webcast of the  Seat-
tle  band Pearl  Jam,  AT&T  muted  lead  singer  Eddie  Vedder just as  he  began  to  sing a
lyric attacking  President Bush. Nate  Anderson,  Pearl  Jam Censored By AT&T, Calls for
a Neutral  'Net,  ARS  TECHNICA,  Aug.  9,  2007,  http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/
20070809-pearl-jam-censored-by-att-calls-for-a-neutral-net.html.  In  October  2007,  an
Associated  Press  investigation  demonstrated  that  Comcast  was  throttling  or  blocking
peer-to-peer  file-sharing programs like BitTorrent, Gnutella, and Lotus Notes. Chris  Sog-
hoian,  Comcast To Face Lawsuits Over BitTorrent Filtering,  CNET NEWS.COM,  Oct. 23,
2007, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9802410-7.html.  See also PETER ECKERSLEY,
FRED  VON  LOHMANN  &  SETH  SCHOEN,  ELEC.  FRONTIER  FOUND.,  PACKET  FORGERY  BY
ISPs: A REPORT  ON THE  COMCAST AFFAIR  (2007), http://www.eff.org/files/eff  comcast_
report2.pdf  (explaining why  what Comcast  did amounted  to  blocking of these  applica-
tions). Comcast  takes the  position that  its blocking is  reasonable  network  management.
Id.
78.  The  700 MHz Auction: Public Safety and Competition: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on  Commerce, Science and Transportation, 110th  Cong. (2007)  (prepared  state-
ment of Amol R. Sarva, Wireless  Founders Coalition for Innovation), available  at http://
commnerce.senate.gov/public/_files/TestimonyAmolSarva  SarvaWrittenStatement0.pdf,
at  8-9  (describing barriers  created  by  incumbent wireless  companies  to new  devices  or
services  that entrepreneurs  wish  to  introduce);  Wilkie,  supra note  21,  at  2  (describing
history of wireless companies'  control over their networks and current market realities).
79.  See  S. DEREK  TURNER,  FREE  PRESS,  'SHOOTING  THE  MESSENGER'  MYTH  VS.
REALITY:  U.S.  BROADBAND  POLICY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  BROADBAND  RANKINGS  25
(2007)  ("[Tlhe  offerings  from  [wireless  providers]  are  slow,  expensive,  and extremely
restrictive, making  them unattractive as a true competitor to the current duopoly.").  All of
the major mobile  carriers  are  vertically  integrated,  acting  as  retail  providers  of content
and application  as well as transport providers.
80.  See  Tim  Wu,  Wireless  Net  Neutrality:  Cellular Carterfone  and  Consumer
Choice in Mobile Broadband  (New Am. Found. Working  Paper No.  17,  2007), available
at http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaperl  7_WirelessNetNeutralityWu.pdf.
Until the FCC's 1968  seminal Carterfone decision, which allowed non-AT&T equipment
to be connected  to the  telephone  network,  consumers  were not free  to buy  and  use  de-
vices of their own choice for telephone communications.  In re Use of the Carterfone De-
vice in Message Toll Tel.  Serv.,  13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).  Carterfone led to the broad use
of the modem, and  arguably the birth of the commercial  Internet. See Oxman, supra note
66.  But this  open attachment  regime  has  not to  date  applied  to the  wireless  world. See
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the  Verizon  network.  The  incumbents  also  often  require  two-year  con-
tracts with heavy termination penalties.
81
C.  The Internet Model
Meanwhile,  however, the Internet model is gathering steam in terms of
user  preferences  and  visible  economic  benefits  for  society.  The  Internet
(as it is currently architected)  is indifferent  to the nature of the packets that
use its protocols; it is the first communications medium that allows  separa-
tion  of "content"  from  "transport." 82 Although  the  "highway"  metaphor
for the Internet  is both  overused and misdescriptive  in  some  ways, it  is a
useful  one in  the  following  sense: just  as  a  highway does  not  act differ-
ently  based on the  brand of car using  it, the  Internet  does not now  trans-
port packets  differently  based on the content (voice,  video, data) of those
packets.
By  contrast  to (1) the  cellphone  world,  in which a  decade  of "walled
gardens"  of innovation  and content have given us nothing  more advanced
than  expensive  ringtones,  and  (2)  the  traditional  telephone  network,  in
which more  than  a hundred years  of control have  given  us nothing more
Jessica E.  Vascellaro, A  Fight  Over What You  Can Do on a Cellphone, WALL ST. J.,  June
14, 2007, at A1;  Marguerite  Reardon,  Unlock the Cell Phone? It's  A  High-Stakes Debate,
CNET  NEWS.COM,  July  16,  2007,  http://www.news.com/Unlock-the-cell-phone-Its-a-
high-stakes-debate/2100-1039_3-6196718.html;  Kim Hart, FCC  to Rule on Wireless Auc-
tion: Lobbying Intense As  Google Seeks  To Open Market, WASH.  POST, July 30, 2007, at
Al  ("Currently, the major U.S.  wireless carriers,  including AT&T and Verizon  Wireless,
largely  decide which  Web  sites, music-download  services  and  search  engines  their cus-
tomers can access  on their  cellphones .... [W]ireless  companies  determin[e]  which cell-
phones  will  receive  their services:  AT&T,  for example,  is  the only  carrier  available  to
users of Apple's  iPhone."); see also Letter from Wireless  Founders Coalition for Innova-
tion, to Marlene  H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC (June  7,  2007)  (ex parte communication  regard-
ing In re Serv. Rules  for the  698-746, 747-762 & 777-792  MHz  Bands, WT Docket No.
06-150),  available  at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf =
pdf&iddocument=-6519520321.  In  general,  "incumbent  wireless  carriers  ...  routinely
choke  bandwidth  to  users, cripple  features,  and control  the  user experience"  in order  to
protect their broadband offerings.  Comments of PISC, supra note  5, at  12.  For example,
Apple's  iPhone comes  with a two-year  contract  with AT&T, which  is  the exclusive  car-
rier for the  iPhone  until 2009.  The  iPhone  may not be  used on  any networks other than
AT&T's.
81.  Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, I  10th Cong.
(2007)  (prepared  statement of Christopher  Murray,  Senior Counsel,  Consumers  Union),
available  at  http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs/110-ti-hrg.071107.Murray-
Testimony.pdf (describing  locked  phones  that cannot be  switched  between  service  pro-
viders, and two-year contracts  with heavy penalties).
82.  Telephone  networks  are  optimized  for  voice services;  cable  and broadcast  net-
works are optimized  for one-way broadcasts. See generally Crawford, supra note 64.
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advanced than voicemail  and conference  calls, the interactive  Internet has
provided the  impetus  for startlingly quick  and  sweeping innovation.  It is
the  first medium  we have  that separates  form-of-transport  from form-of-
communication, removing the tie that made telephone networks optimized
for voice,  broadcast networks  optimized for television  broadcasts,  and ca-
ble  networks optimized for cable shows.  Users are greatly attracted to the
interactive and social resources available online.
Entrepreneurs  are  launching  new  Internet  ventures  that  can  attract
capital  from investors. But investors need to be willing to run the risk that
DSL, fiber, and  cable network providers will pull the rug out from under
these  new ventures  by, for example,  slowing,  charging  differentially  for,
or  otherwise  degrading  the  availability  of applications  that  the  network
provider views as  competing with its own services-no  law prevents such
activity on the part of network providers. 83
At  the  same  time, the  U.S.  is  falling  behind the  rest of the  world  in
highspeed Internet penetration at a rapid clip.84 As of November 2007, the
U.S.  ranked  15th  among  the countries  of the  world in highspeed  Internet
penetration (number of subscribers per hundred people)  and 21  st for high-
speed  access  price. 85 Although  speeds  of  100  megabits  per  second  are
common  in Denmark, Japan, Romania,  Iceland,  Slovenia, Dubai, Kuwait,
and in cities in Europe, we in the U.S. pay more than people in those coun-
tries  and cities  for less-than-2.5  megabits per second speeds. 86 According
to  the Wall  Street  Journal,  "[t]he  U.S. is ranked 25th  in broadband pene-
tration, behind countries including South Korea, where penetration is 89%,
and  Canada,  where  it  is  63%. ,,87 By  contrast,  in  2001  an  OECD  study
83.  This  has  long been  an issue prompted  by price-discriminating  monopolistic of-
ferors  of infrastructure  businesses.  See  Andrew  Odlyzko,  Network  Neutrality,  Search
Neutrality, and  the Never-Ending  Conflict Between  Efficiency  and Fairness  in  Markets,
at  9  (Jan.  8,  2008)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at http://ssm.com/abstract =
1095350  (noting with respect to 19th  century railroads that "[t]he  setting where a monop-
oly  infrastructure  business,  in pursuit  of its  own  ends,  could  take  arbitrary  steps  that
would ruin one business and make another  succeed, were regarded as inimical to a really
free market").
84.  Steven  Levy, True or False: U.S. 's Broadband  Penetration  is Lower Than Even
Estonia's,  NEWSWEEK,  July  2,  2007,  available  at  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
19389299/site/newsweek.  Many  argue that the U.S. highspeed Intemet access  market  is
slumbering because of anticompetitive behavior by telco and cable incumbents.
85.  Website  Optimization  L.L.C.,  November  2007  Bandwidth  Report  (Nov.  19,
2007), http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0711.
86.  KOHLENBERGER,  supra note 60, at 3.
87.  Jessica E.  Vascellaro, Is High-Speed Internet Growth Slowing? As Dial-Up Up-
grade Level Off  Operators  Offer New Services, WALL ST. J., Aug.  9, 2007, at B3.
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found that the U.S. was fourth in broadband penetration.88 In America, the
price of Internet  access is high and speeds are  slow. The  network provid-
ers argue that  if they are permitted  to "manage"  their networks  (the cell-
phone model of access),  charging  differently  for particular uses  and being
able to make  exclusive deals  of various kinds, they  will be able  to charge
users perfectly at rates the users are willing to pay. Wall Street will also be
pleased  by price  discrimination  abilities, the  providers  claim, and thus the
providers  will  attract  greater investment. They  also claim that this invest-
ment will then  enable them to invest more in infrastructure,  which will in
turn result in greater penetration of highspeed Internet access  in this coun-
try.89 At  the  same  time,  users  are  generally  happier  with  flat  rates  (the
Internet  model  of access)  rather  than  differential  pricing  (think  voice
calls); 90  competition  driven  by  "Internet  model"  access  mandates  has
pushed  highspeed  Internet  access  penetration  and  economic  growth  for-
ward  in other  countries;  and  we have very  little (if any) actual  empirical
evidence  to  support  the  network providers'  claims  that  building  Internet
infrastructure  will  be too expensive unless they are permitted to discrimi-
nate.
91
Nothing goes away, and these private operators  (wireline and wireless)
will operate  "walled  gardens"  of content  for some time  that have no  real
connection  to  the  Internet  (as  we  understand  "the  Internet"  today).  The
issue  is, however, whether these  same actors in their roles as  providers of
88.  DIRECTORATE  FOR  Sci.,  TECH.  &  INDUS.,  ORG.  FOR  ECON.  CO-OPERATION  &
DEV.,  PUBL'N No. DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2001)2/FINAL,  THE DEVELOPMENT  OF BROADBAND
ACCESS  IN  OECD  COUNTRIES  (2001),  available  at  http://oecd.org/dataoecd/48/33/
2475737.pdf.
89.  See, e.g.,  Comments of Hands  Off the Internet,  In re Broadband  Industry  Prac-
tices, WC  Docket. No.  07-52,  at  9-13  (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  Feb.  13,  2008), avail-
able at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=-
6519841089  (making these arguments).
90.  See Odlyzko, supra note 83,  at  13 ("Yet more  circumstantial evidence  that non-
discriminatory  communications  systems should be viable  comes from  the wireline  voice
network.  That  is still  the  big revenue  producer  on  the  wireline  side,  but  operates  in  an
exemplary net neutral  fashion, and is, to an increasing extent, paid for by flat fees ...  ").
91.  Id. at  14 ("Thus if the operators [ ]  feel  that they  need additional  revenues  [be-
yond  flat  fees],  they  should  present  some  detailed  data  to  support  their case.  Unfortu-
nately such data has  not been available,  and the whole  net neutrality debate has been car-
ried out in vague  and unquantified terms.").  Indeed, it may be cheaper to run a best-effort
network, and install  more  fiber, than  to impose  a cellphone-like  charging model on that
network. See William  Lehr, Economic  Case  for Dedicated  Unlicensed  Spectrum  Below
3GHz (May  17,  2004) (unpublished manuscript),  available at http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/
2004/wlehrunlicensed-doc.pdf  ("[I]t may continue  to be cheaper  to over-provision  ca-
pacity than  to implement a pricing  mechanism  to induce more  efficient utilization  at the
margin.").
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highspeed  access to the Internet  have sufficient market power to force us-
ers into the cellphone model  for Internet access  (as well as for the provid-
ers'  own proprietary content).  As more  Internet use becomes  mobile,  this
question  becomes  more  focused:  on  wireless  networks,  where  the  cell-
phone  model  already  operates,  will that model  become  the primary  envi-
ronment  for Internet access?  Will the dominant wireless  carriers have suf-
ficient market  power to mandate  that users'  use  of the  Internet  be "man-
aged"  in ways that serve the carriers'  bottom lines, no matter what the user
might prefer?
D.  Nature of the Marketplace
In  a  competitive  market  for highspeed  Internet  access,  the  price  for
such access  would  likely  be  driven  down  as  access  became  an  indistin-
guishable  commodity,  available  from a number  of sources,  and some ac-
cess would likely be nondiscriminatory.  But in the U.S.,  the wireline mar-
ket for highspeed Internet access is highly concentrated, and all of the ma-
jor providers  are committed  to being able  to discriminate  in the provision
of that access.
Cable  and  DSL  providers  control  96%  of all  residential  highspeed
Internet access connections  in the U.S.,  and "[i]n nearly every single local-
ity  where  these  two  platforms  are  available,  there  is just  one  company
providing  cable  and just one  providing  DSL.",92 Rural  highspeed  Internet
access  is particularly hard to come by.  Thus, regional dominant  duopoly
providers  have  a  tight  hold  on  residential  Internet  access.  Satellite  ac-
counts  for less  than  0.5%  of all highspeed  Internet access,  as  does  fixed
wireless,  and  mobile  wireless  accounts  for  about  2.5%  of all  highspeed
residential connections.
94
Verizon  Wireless  and  AT&T  are  the  dominant  providers  of mobile
wireless  services in most areas of the country. Accidents  of history,  com-
bined  with  multiple  mergers  and  the  path  of cellphone  diffusion  in  this
country, have led to this state of affairs.
First, the history. The commercial  wireless industry in this country be-
gan  in  1981  when the  FCC  issued  two  free  cellular  licenses  in  the  800
92.  See  TURNER, supra note  79,  at  19;  Tessler,  supra note  15  ("A  survey  by  the
Communications  Workers of America recently found that median download speeds in the
United  States stand at  1.9 megabits per second, considerably  slower than in other devel-
oped countries, particularly those in Asia and Scandinavia.").
93.  JOHN  B.  HORRIGAN  &  AARON  SMITH,  PEW  INTERNET  & AM.  LIFE  PROJECT,
HOME  BROADBAND  ADOPTION  2007  (2007),  available at http://www.pewintemet.org/
pdfs/PIPBroadband%202007.pdf (only 47% of American  adults have  a highspeed Inter-
net connection at home;  only 31%  of rural Americans have broadband at home).
94.  Comments of PISC, supra note 5,  at 3.
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MHz  range  for each  "cellular  marketing  area"  (or "CMA")  in the  coun-
try.95 There  are  734  CMAs  in  the  U.S.,  and  this regulatory  limitation  to
relatively  small  geographic  areas  for  the  licenses  (and  to  only two  com-
petitors  for each geographic  area) meant that cellular technology remained
expensive and not widely used.96But the operators that were handed these
early  free  "beachfront"  800  MHz  licenses  retained  them,  and  now
(through mergers  and sheer staying  power) Verizon  Wireless  and AT&T
have most of them.97
In this country, most of the people who want a cellphone  for voice use
have already  bought one.  In contrast to the market of the  1990s, when car-
riers  were  grabbing customers who  had never had a cellphone  before, the
2007-2008  market  is  saturated.98 Now  users  are  on  their  third or  fourth
phone and their second or third carrier. The most important  service  attrib-
ute for these experienced  cellphone  users  is coverage-the  availability  of
reliable  signals.99 Verizon  Wireless  and AT&T offer  the  best nationwide
coverage  because they held onto those "beachfront"  800 MHz licenses and
snapped  up  smaller carriers.100  As  a result,  Verizon  Wireless  and  AT&T
experience  both much  lower  "chum"  (dropped  subscriptions)  and  much
higher rates  of "net adds"  (new subscriptions)  than  the  third-largest  car-
95.  Ted  Hearn,  Guarding the Beachfront, MULTICHANNEL  NEWS,  June  18,  2007,
available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6452620.html;  Gregory L.  Rosston
& Andrzej  Skrzypacz,  The FCC's 700 MHz Auction, SIEPR POLICY  BRIEF,  Dec.  2007,
available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/briefs/policybrief  dec07.pdf
96.  See Memorandum  from Frontline  Wireless,  L.L.C.  to  Antitrust  Div.,  Dep't.  of
Justice, supra note 22, at 3.
97.  See  Rosston  &  Skrzypacz,  supra note  95.  For  example,  AT&T  recently  an-
nounced  that  it  was  buying  previously  auctioned  700  MHz  spectrum  from  Aloha  at a
price of $2.5  billion-12 MHz of spectrum covering  almost three-quarters  of the area  of
the United States. Grant Gross, AT&T Buys High-Speed Wireless Spectrum, MACWORLD,
Oct.  9,  2007,  http://www.macworld.com/article/60437/2007/lO/att.html.  This  move  by
AT&T  solidifies  its spectrum  holdings and prevents  its competitors  (as well  as any new
entrants)  from obtaining this  spectrum.  Additionally,  in just the  last six months of 2007,
AT&T (Dobson)  and  Verizon (Rural Cellular/Unicell)  each agreed  to acquire one of the
few  remaining  independent  cellular service  providers.  Narayan  Bhat, AT&T  Completes
Acquisition of Easterbrooke, TMCNET,  Jan.  4,  2008,  http://intemetcommunications.
tmcnet.com/topics/broadband-mobile/articles/17660-att-completes-acquisition-
easterbrooke.htm.
98.  Over  250  million  Americans  now  own  a  cellphone,  for  a  penetration  rate  of
82.4%.  See  MERRILL  LYNCH,  US  TELECOM  SERVICES  INDUSTRY  OVERVIEW:  US  WIRE-
LESS  MATRIX 3Q07 (2007);  Posting of Mark Hachman  to Gearlog, U.S.  Cell-Phone Pene-
tration  Tops  82  Percent,  http://www.gearlog.com/2007/  1/uscellphone-penetration_
tops.php (Nov. 13,  2007).
99.  See Rosston & Skrzypacz, supra note 95,  at 2.
100.  Id.
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rier, Sprint.'0' Indeed, Sprint is rapidly losing customers.I°2  The enormous
barriers to entry involved in providing nationwide service,  their vast spec-
trum holdings,  and the substantial  economies  of scale of wireless  service
generally, make  Verizon Wireless  and AT&T  almost unbeatable  oligopo-
lists.
1 0 3
When it comes to highspeed Internet access,  current wireless  offerings
from  Verizon  Wireless  and  AT&T  do  not compete  directly  in  terms  of
speed or cost with the dominant wireline (DSL, fiber, and cable) transport
offerings-which  explains  why  96% of all residential  highspeed Internet
access  connections  are sold by regionally dominant  DSL or cable  compa-
nies. 104 Existing  (pre-auction)  wireless  highspeed  Internet  access  connec-
tions cost at least twice as much as a DSL or cable connection, and operate
at  only  a  fraction  of the  speed. 1 0 5 Residential  highspeed  Internet  access
subscribers  simply do not cancel their subscriptions  in order to sign up for
101.  See Blair  Levin, Rebecca  Arbogast  & David Kaut,  What is the Black Swan of
Telecom? (Hint: It's Not the iPhone), WASH.  TELECOM, MEDIA  & TECH INSIDER (Stifel,
Nicolaus & Company,  Balt., Md.), June 29, 2007. Levin et al. state:
[T]he  power of the two  dominant wireless networks,  Verizon Wireless
and AT&T is growing. They already have about 51%  of the subscribers
and their share of net customer  additions is even larger,  64%. Further,
they have just started bundling  their wireless  services  with their other
services-a marketing  opportunity  that their major  competitors,  Sprint
and T-Mobile don't have.
Id. See also Peter Cramton, Andrzej  Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson, Summary: Revenues in
the  700 MHz Auction  (June  27,  2007)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at http://
www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/cramton-skrzypacz-wilson-e-block-plan-
increases-revenues.pdf  (economist report  filed on behalf of Frontline)  (finding that Veri-
zon and AT&T had  far higher revenues  per minute  and a much  higher number  of new
subscribers  in the  fourth quarter of 2006 than their two high-frequency  nationwide com-
petitors,  Sprint and T-Mobile). See also Memorandum from Frontline Wireless, L.L.C. to
Antitrust Div., Dep't. of Justice, supra note  22, at 3 (describing market power of Verizon
and AT&T).
102,  Steve  Lohr,  With  Sprint's Client Erosion, Fears of Wireless  Slowdown,  NY
TIMES,  Jan.  19,  2008, at C1.
103.  See Neil  Netanel,  Temptations of the  Walled Garden: Digital Rights Manage-
ment and Mobile Phone Carriers,  6 J. TELECOMM.  & HIGH TECH.  L. 77,  96 n.86  (2007)
(citing Eli M. Noam, Fundamental  Instability: Why  Telecom is Becoming a Cyclical and
Oligopolistic  Industry, 18 INFO. ECON.  & POL'Y 272  (2006)).
104.  WORKING  PARTY  ON  COMMC'N  INFRASTRUCTURES  &  SERVS.  POLICY,  OECD,
DEVELOPMENTS  IN  FIBRE TECHNOLOGIES  AND  INVESTMENT  (2008), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/8/40390735.pdf  ("The  current range  of wireless networks  is
not capable  of offering  high bandwidth  connectivity,  comparable to  wired  networks.");
Comments of PISC, supra note 5,  at 5  (DSL and cable modem hold 96% of the residen-
tial highspeed access market).
105.  Comments of PISC, supra note 5,  at 3-4.
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wireless  highspeed  access  via  handsets,  because  these  services  are  not
(currently) substitutable.
At  the  same  time,  the  dominant  existing  national  wireless  carriers,
AT&T and Verizon, (1) are  controlled by  the same incumbent actors  that
control DSL access through regional  monopolies across the country1°6 and
(2)  offer wireless  services  as part of packages  that tie together traditional
phone  services,  Internet  Protocol  Television  (IPTV)  access,  and  Internet
access. 1 0 7 In  a nutshell,  the  leaders  in  mobile  wireless  are  owned  by  the
same companies who control the DSL marketplace  and are, like their cor-
porate parents, choosing to avoid direct competition for highspeed Internet
access  by bundling three or four services  together (voice, video, data) and
differentiating  their  offerings  based  on  their  voice  or video  elements.'
0 8
Given this situation, in which 96% of residential wireline highspeed Inter-
net  access  is provided by regionally  dominant DSL  or  cable  companies,
and  wireless  communications  are  largely  provided  by  two  oligopolist
106.  See Alex  Goldman,  Top  23  U.S. ISPs By Subscriber: Q3, 2007, ISP-PLANET,
http://www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa.html  (overall  market  shares  of AT&T
and Verizon  18.2%  and 8.1%,  respectively);  YUANZHE  (MICHAEL)  CAI  & JAMES  KUAI,
PARKS  Assocs.,  NORTH  AMERICAN  BROADBAND  UPDATE  (2008),  available at http://
www.parksassociates.com/research/reports/tocs/2008/broadband-update.htm  (broadband
market  share  of AT&T  at  21%  and  Verizon  at  13%);  S. DEREK  TURNER,  BROADBAND
REALITY  CHECK  II:  THE  TRUTH  BEHIND  AMERICA'S  DIGITAL  DECLINE  (2006),  http:I/
www.freepress.net/files/bbrc2-final.pdf  (describing  regional  duopolies  controlled  by  ca-
ble  and telephone  providers).  Leichtman  Research,  as  of March  2008,  says  that  these
companies have the  following numbers of DSL subscribers:  AT&T  14,156,000;  Verizon
8,235,000;  Qwest  2,611,000;  Embarq  1,277,000;  Windstream  871,400;  CenturyTel
555,000;  Citizens  523,845.  All  of these  are  the local  incumbent  in their  territory,  and
none  has  significant  out-of-territory  subscriber  counts.  Press  Release,  Leichtman  Re-
search Group,  Over 8.5 Million Added Broadband  from Top Cable and Telephone  Com-
panies  in  2007  (Mar.  3, 2008),  available at http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/
030308release.pdf.
107.  Todd  Spangler,  Verizon  Debuts Quadruple Play, MULTICHANNEL  NEWS,  Jan.
30,  2007,  http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6411417.html  (Verizon  offering  bun-
dle of phone, Internet, TV,  and wireless).
108.  See, e.g., Posting of DC Truth to Gigaom, Competition Has  a Different Meaning
in  the  US,  http://gigaom.com/2007/07/12/competition-has-a-different-meaning-in-the-
us/#comments  (July  12,  2007  12:23 PT)  ("Cox and AT&T may  appear to be competing,
but they don't compete  head-to-head  on the Internet product, instead focusing on service
bundles.");  see  also James  S. Granelli,  Phone Bills Are Moving Back  Up;  Companies
Increasingly Are Steering Customers to  Bundled Services as a  Way  to Boost Revenue,
L.A.  TIMES,  Jan.  28,  2007,  at  Cl.  The situation  is  different  in Asia  and  Europe,  where
"mobile  wireless"  providers  (particularly in  Asia and  Europe)  have begun offering high-
speed transport  to  the  Internet  on  their  cellphone  networks.  See  OECD, supra note  15
("An OECD study  in  2006 found that  nearly 30% of mobile  operators offered  a flat-rate
third-generation  (3G)  data connection.")
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players who  are  in turn owned by wireline companies,  the  dominant pro-
viders  of Internet access  services  in this  country, both wireline  and wire-
less,  have  ample  market  power  to nudge  users  towards  the  proprietary,
cellphone,  managed  model  of  packetized  highspeed  communications.
These carriers, just like all makers of potentially commodified information
goods,  have  substantial  incentives  to  both  lock their  customers  in  with
high switching costs and to differentiate their informational offerings  from
those of other companies running  across their network.10 9 They obviously
also have  great incentives  to avoid cannibalizing  their own wireline  high-
speed Internet access market dominance.
E.  Risks of the Internet Model
The  Internet  model  poses  difficulties  for  the  network  operators  (in-
cluding wireless  carriers)  who  now provide  Internet  access. Network  op-
erators do not  want to be  in the position  of providing  highspeed  Internet
access to users on a commodity basis. They  do not want to be forced into
the  position  of providing neutral  highways  to the  Internet,  because  their
own  charged-for,  "optimized"  services  will  suffer  by  competitive  com-
parison.  10  Their  basic move  is to tie use of their  pipes, wires,  and  spec-
trum to use of particular charged-for services,  like IPTV, cable shows, and
proprietary  Voice  over  Internet  Protocol  (VoIP)  applications  for  which
their networks are optimized, and to charge separately  for those particular
services.' H  All of these network operators  are emphasizing  their vertically
integrated  offerings,  including  streaming  video,  music,  web  browsing,
gaming, and other similar activities.
The  wireless  carriers are  understandably  anxious to  avoid any hint of
common  carriage  regulation,  on  the  theory  that  it  will  undermine  their
ability to monetize  their networks.  They lock in their customers  by giving
steep  (or  complete)  discounts  on  handset  purchases,  requiring  that  only
their  authorized  handsets  be  used  on  their  networks,  and  then bundling
these  handsets  with  subscriptions  to  cellular  service.1 2  In  the  wireless world innovation is much slower because  carriers pick and choose among
109.  See Netanel,  supra note  103,  at 78-79; Wilkie, supra note 21,  at 2 (summarizing
economics  literature regarding the "incentives of vertically integrated providers to engage
in anticompetitive conduct").
110.  See  Susan P.  Crawford,  The Internet and the Project of Communications Law,
55  UCLA L. REv. 359, 395-398 (2007) (describing  carrier arguments).
111.  See,  e.g.,  Trish  Reed, Phone, Internet, TV,  Wireless... Comparing Bundled Ser-
vices,  EZINE  ARTICLES,  Feb.  17,  2007,  http://ezinearticles.com/?Phone,-Intemet,-TV,-
Wireless...Comparing-Bundled-Services&id=458373.
112.  Id. (citing  In  re  Bundling  of Cellular  Customer  Premises  Equip.  & Cellular
Serv., 7 F.C.C.R. 4028  1 (1992)).
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the  Internet  applications  that  will  be  accessible  over  authorized  hand-
sets. 
1 13
The desires of network  operators  to vertically  integrate  their offerings
and provide for different treatment of different  services (thus keeping non-
"optimized"  services  moving  at  slow  speeds)  would  not  raise  legal  or
business  issues in a competitive  marketplace.  In such a market, some car-
rier or network  operator would  emerge  who  would be  willing  to provide
non-prioritized,  commoditized-Internet  model-transport  services.  Such
a market, however,  does not yet exist here. The  cellphone model of Inter-
net access appears  destined to prevail because  of the market power of the
dominant providers of Internet  access and their (to date) successful  defeat
of regulation  or legislation that would nudge them into Internet-model  be-
havior.
IV.  THE 700 MHZ AUCTION
The  700  MHz  auction  was  designed  to  sell  off licenses  to  valuable
beachfront  spectrum  that television  broadcasters  have  been  forced  to re-
linquish. The  auction was born  in controversy  and created enormous  con-
troversy  in  every  corner  of the  U.S.  communications  industry.  This  Part
explains the  story behind the auction,  describes  the changed technical  and
business  background  against  which current  spectrum policy  is operating,
and briefly outlines the positions of key players.
A.  The Story Behind the Auction
1.  The Broadcasters  and Their Spectrum
In the  1980s,  large  commercial  television broadcasters faced  two ene-
mies:  cable  systems  and  two-way  radios.  Cable  systems  were  siphoning
off the  audience  for television broadcasts,  and manufacturers  of two-way
radios were pointing out to the  FCC that the broadcasters  were not using
much of their  allocated  spectrum. 14 The  broadcasters  came  up  with the
bright  idea  of demanding  even  more spectrum  in order  to provide  "high
definition"  digital  television  to  their  audience. 115  Congress  went  along
with this notion,  and decided  in the early  1990s  to allow every  television
station to apply for a second channel  for temporary use in the transition  to
high  definition  digital  transmissions.  116  Congress  also  determined  that
113.  See Wu, supra  note 80.
114.  JOEL BRINKLEY,  DEFINING  VISION:  THE  BATTLE  FOR  THE  FUTURE  OF  TELEVI-
SION 6-8 (1997).
115.  Id. at  10.
116.  Every  television broadcaster  was given a second  6  MHz spectrum  license.  The
20081BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
when the transition was  complete this second channel would be auctioned
off.117 For the last fifteen years  or so, Congress  has been counting on the
billions of dollars that will be generated from this auction. 118
Although this  story  sounds  simple,  there  have been  many  painful  de-
lays along the way. Broadcasters were delighted to fend off the anticipated
loss  of "their"  spectrum  to  land  mobile  operators,  but  they  were  less
pleased when they realized they would have  to buy expensive  equipment
in order to provide digital television transmissions. The  date of the  digital
transition  has  been  extended  again and  again,  as the  broadcasters  argued
that  not  all  consumers  were  ready  to  lose  access  to  over-the-air  analog
television transmissions.' 19
In  early  2006,  Congress passed the  Digital  Television Transition  and
Public  Safety  Act,  which  sets  a  hard  date  for  the  digital  transition-
February  19,  2009,  chosen in part because  it falls after the  Super Bowl is
over-and  provides  that some  of the revenues  from the  auction  of spec-
trum will be used to fund coupons for digital-to-analog converter boxes.' 20
On that day in February  2009, if there are no further delays, analog televi-
sion transmissions  will  cease and  all television  broadcasting  will be digi-
tal. The broadcasters  are obligated to "clear the band" and release  the  108
MHz of spectrum  (the  temporary  channels they were allocated to  accom-
Commission and Congress expected that broadcasters would offer both analog and digital
transmissions  during a transition period.  Then, when  enough consumers  were  receiving
digital  signals, the plan was that the broadcasters would cede their analog frequencies  and
move to enhanced digital programming. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Unli-
censed  Operation  in the  TV Broadcast  Bands, ET Docket No.  04-186, FCC 04-113,  4
(Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  May  25,  2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/FCC-04-113A  1.doc  [hereinafter White Spaces NPRM].
117.  Id. The  broadcasters have been  forced off channels  52  to 69, which  correspond
to 698-806 MHz-hence the nickname "700 MHz auction."
118.  BRINKLEY, supra note  114, at 321.
119.  Although  the  initial  deadline  for giving  back  the  analog  spectrum  was  2006,
Congress modified the deadline  to allow television stations to use both analog  and digital
transmissions  until  there  was  85%  penetration  of digital  signals  in  households  in  their
markets. It's Crunch Time for Congress on DTV Transition, TELECOM POLICY REPORT,
May  30,  2005  (describing  sequence  of events).  This  very uncertain  standard  triggered
several extensions of the auction.
120.  The  auction  must  begin by  January 28,  2008,  money  must be  deposited  in the
Treasury  by June  30, 2008,  and analog  transmissions  must cease  on February  19,  2009.
See Report and Order and Further Notice  of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Serv. Rules  for
the  698-746, 747-762 & 777-792  MHz Bands,  WT Docket No. 06-150,  FCC 07-72,  2
(Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Apr. 27,  2007),  available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/FCC-07-72A1.pdf  [hereinafter  Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing].  This  schedule,  and  the February  19  date  in particular,  is  often  referred  to  as  the
"digital transition,"  or the "DTV transition."
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plish the digital transition) by that date.
Thus, after more than twenty years of tumultuous  debate over how and
when  to  reclaim this  broadcasting  spectrum,  the  auction went forward  in
January 2008, resulting  in key large wins by Verizon and AT&T. 21  There
remain  key  uncertainties:  will  the  broadcasters  actually  vacate  the  air-
waves  by February  2009?  Will consumers  be  ready for  the  digital televi-
sion  transition? 22 Will a disappointed player sue  to enjoin the implemen-
tation of the auction's results?
2.  The Subject of the Auction
The spectrum  that will be returned, and was therefore  auctioned off, is
between  channels  52 and  69-previously  the "ultra  high frequency"  tele-
vision area. There  was great interest  in this spectrum in part because of its
characteristics.  Radio waves  at lower frequencies  like  these  are generally
thought  to  propagate  better,  across  greater  distances.' 23 In  particular,  the
121.  See supra text accompanying  note 24.
122.  The  digital  transition  has  been  spurred  on  by  the  digital  tuner  rule, which  re-
quires  all  new televisions  to  include  the  capability  of receiving  digital  broadcasts.  See
Werbach, supra note 66,  at  58-60 (describing  digital tuner mandate).  But many  Ameri-
cans (perhaps  70 million)  still  have analog  television sets;  if the owners  of these  sets are
not subscribers to  cable or  satellite  systems,  the sets  will  cease to receive  any  television
broadcasts  on February  19,  2009. See David Hatch, Media Expert Predicts  Digital 'Train
Wreck',  TELECOM  DAILY,  July  19,  2007  (noting  objections  to  "poorly-funded  outreach
effort" to consumers  about  converters).  As  J.  H.  Snider points out, however, "[t]he  vast
majority of TV sets are used  primarily for purposes  other than  watching TV  terrestrially
over-the-air."  SNIDER,  ART OF  SPECTRUM LOBBYING,  supra note  10, at 26.
123.  The claim  that any  one  frequency  is "better" than another for propagation  pur-
poses has been strenuously attacked on technical  grounds. See Posting of David P. Reed,
dpreed@reed.com,  to arch-econ@cookreport.com  (June  29,  2007)  (on  file with author).
Reed stated that:
[W]hat people  call problems with propagation at  5.8 GHz are really re-
sults  of receiver and system  design  choices:  small  antennas,  high-data
rate service,  wideband modulation,  very  low power limits, what people
call the  strengths of 700 MHz  are really the results of receiver and sys-
tem  design  choices:  large  antennas  way  up  high on  towers,  low  data
rate services, narrowband modulations, very high power limits.
Id.  The claim  that 700  MHz  is  inherently  "better," however,  unquestionably  reflects  the
current received  wisdom  (even if it  is incorrect).  See, e.g.,  Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Serv.  Rules for the 698-746, 747-762  and 777-792
MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket No.  06-150,  FCC  07-72  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Apr.  27,
2007)  (statement  of Comm'r  Deborah  Tate), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/FCC-07-72A5.pdf.  Tate stated:
The  inherent  propagation  characteristics  of the  700  MHz  band  could
make  it less expensive  to construct new networks  covering  larger geo-
graphic  areas,  making it  ideal  for expanding  the  availability of broad-
band in rural  areas. At the same time, the band potentially provides bet-
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700 MHz band is generally considered to be ideal for services  that need to
cover  a large  area  that may include trees  and walls, and is more  likely to
work  for transmission  services  in  adverse  weather  conditions.124 Current
cell phone and Wi-Fi services  cover  much smaller areas and rely on line-
of-sight transmissions.  This 700 MHz  spectrum might therefore be able to
support  long-range  provision of wireless  highspeed  Internet  access  (1) in
areas  where  faster  "wired"  DSL or cable  Internet  access is not available,
or  (2)  for personal, portable  wireless  uses.125 It might be  able  to  do this
while requiring far less capital expenditure  for the building of transmission
towers  than  higher  frequency  bands.' 26 Until  this  auction,  the  spectrum
was available  only  for analog  television  broadcasts;  now it is being  ear-
marked for broadly defined wireless "Commercial Mobile Radio Services"
(CMRS) uses. 1 27
There  was  enormous,  front-page-story  interest  in this  700 MHz  spec-
trum because nearly all the usable radio-frequency spectrum has been fully
allocated  by the  FCC. 128 Wide  ranges  of frequencies  are  assigned  to  the
military,  broadcasters,  emergency  services,  and  other users. Even  though
these  frequencies  may not be in use, they are unavailable  for new uses.
129
The FCC has also imposed restrictions on how particular frequencies may
ter in-building coverage  than higher frequencies,  which not only would
facilitate  the  provision  of advanced  services  in  urban  areas  but  also
could help improve  911 access and location system performance.
Id.
124.  Blair  Levin,  Rebecca  Arbogast  & David Kaut,  700 MHz:  A  Pivotal Auction,
WASH.  TELECOM,  MEDIA  & TECH  INSIDER  (Stifel,  Nicolaus  & Company,  Balt.,  Md.),
Mar. 2, 2007.
125.  See infra Section IV.A. I (describing  limitations of 700 MHz spectrum).
126.  Kanchana  Wanichkorn  &  Marvin  Sirbu,  The  Role of Fixed  Wireless  Access
Networks in the Deployment of Broadband  Services and Competition in Local Telecom-
munications Markets,  Telecommunications  Policy  Research  Conference,  2002,  at  23,
available  at  http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/86/FixedWirelessNetworks.zip
(system operating  at 2.6GHz would need twice  as many cell  sites as  system  operating at
700 MHz).
127.  See  Second  Report  and Order,  supra note  1,  .l  ("This  spectrum  currently  is
occupied by television broadcasters  in TV Channels 52-69.  It is being made available  for
wireless services,  including public safety and commercial  services, as a result of the digi-
tal television ('DTV') transition.").
128.  GENERAL  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-02-906,  BETTER COORDINA-
TION  AND  ENHANCED  ACCOUNTABILITY  NEEDED  TO  IMPROVE  SPECTRUM  MANAGEMENT
(2002), available  at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02906.pdf.
129.  See  Shared  Spectrum  Co.,  Spectrum  Occupancy  Measurements,  http://www.
sharedspectrum.com/measurements  (study showing that actual spectrum utilization in any
given geographic area averages only 5% of total available spectrum).
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be  used,  in  addition to  who  may  use  it.'  Thus, spectrum  is  scarce  as  a
practical  matter.'3'  The  700 MHz  auction was widely described as the  last
great  auction  of spectrum  for  the  foreseeable  future.' 32 Because  the  ten-
year  licenses  granted  by the  FCC  are  perpetual  as  a  practical  matter,  the
stakes were high. 33 This auction was thus  a central policy moment for the
United  States and a useful case study  for telecommunications  policy gen-
erally.
3.  The Statutory Scheme and the Band Plan
Section  301  of the  1934 Telecommunications  Act  states  that the  fed-
eral  government  controls  the electromagnetic  spectrum  in this  country.
134
130.  This  method of allocating  spectrum  is often  referred  to as  the  "command  and
control"  model,  under which the  Commission  "allocates  and assigns  frequencies  to lim-
ited categories  of spectrum  users for specific  government-defined uses. Service  rules  for
the band specify eligibility and service restrictions,  power limits, build-out requirements,
and other rules."  SPECTRUM  POLICY TASK  FORCE,  FED.  COMMC'NS COMM'N,  REPORT OF
THE  SPECTRUM  RIGHTS  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES  WORKING  GROUP  (2002),  available at
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A  1  .pdf [hereinafter SPTF-RR].
131.  Many have  argued that making  more  spectrum available  on an unlicensed basis
and  relying  on "smart"  devices  to  isolate particular transmissions  could  solve most per-
ceived  scarcity  problems,  and  that  in  fact  no  real  scarcity  exists.  See,  e.g.,  Yochai
Benkler,  Some  Economics of Wireless  Communications,  16  HARV.  J.L.  &  TECH.  25
(2002)  [hereinafter  Benkler,  Wireless Communications]; Benkler, supra note  50;  David
Weinberger,  The  Myth  of  Interference,  SALON,  Mar.  12,  2003,
http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/2003/03/12/spectrum/index.html  (quoting  David
Reed  saying that "There's  no scarcity of spectrum any  more than there's a scarcity of the
color green.").  Because Congress  has  decided that this  700 MHz  spectrum must be auc-
tioned off, dedicating it to unlicensed use  is not an option. The argument that more  spec-
trum should be made  available  on an  unlicensed basis  remains  relevant, however,  in the
context of the white spaces  proceeding described infra in  Section VI.B. In a larger sense,
as  Benkler  notes,  "cumulative  institutional  choices  [have]  caused  spectrum  scarcity,
rather than responded to it,"  and these  choices can  be changed in the context of the white
spaces. Benkler, supra note 50, at 300.
132.  See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note  124.
133.  See MOORE,  supra note  10,  at  7  ("Even though  licenses must  be renewed peri-
odically,  it is generally  understood  that  license  winners  will  be  able  to keep the  license
perpetually, as  long as they comply with FCC service rules."); see also Eli Noam, Spec-
trum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's Anachronism. Tak-
ing the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON.  765,  785 (1998).
134.  47 U.S.C.  § 301  (2000);  Robert Matheson & Adele Morris,  The Technical  Basis
for  Spectrum  Rights  (2007)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file  with  author)  ("The  term
'spectrum'  is used  colloquially  to  mean  several  things,  including  a  given  frequency,  a
frequency  band, or a set of rights  to access a set of frequencies  at a given time and loca-
tion."  ).
For the purposes  of this  Article, "spectrum"  is shorthand  for "rights to use par-
ticular frequencies."
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The government is to permit "the use of such channels, but not the owner-
ship thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted
by Federal  authority."' 35 The resulting  license  is for long-term  usage and
does not establish an ownership right, but as a practical matter it is perma-
nent.136 In  1983,  Congress  inserted into the  1934 Act the statement that it
is the policy of the United States  "to  encourage  the provision of new tech-
nologies and  services  to the public,"  and that anyone who opposes  a new
technology or service will have the burden  of demonstrating  that the pro-
posal is inconsistent with the public interest.
1 37
Spectrum  was initially handed  out through comparative hearings, with
their "heavy-handed political influence peddling"' 38 and "socially wasteful
and politically charged"  atmosphere. 1 39 The  next step  was towards  lotter-
ies, for which hopeful and deluded  applicants overloaded  the floors  of the
FCC  with paper  while  well-connected  Americans  received  windfalls. 140
After  a  flurry  of Clinton  Administration  interest in  auctioning  spectrum,
Congress  amended  Title  III  of  the  1934  Act  in  1993  to  authorize  the
Commission  to  assign  licenses  through  competitive  bidding.141  Auctions
135.  47 U.S.C.  § 301  (2000).
136.  See supra note  133.  The licenses at issue  in the 700  M1Ilz auction are nominally
for ten-year terms,  terminating  on February  17,  2019.  Second  Report  and Order, supra
note 1,  35.
137.  47  U.S.C.  § 157(a)  (2000); see also 47 U.S.C. § 303  (2000)  (if "the  public con-
venience, interest, or necessity requires[, the Commission] shall  ...  (r) ...  prescribe  such
restrictions  and  conditions,  not inconsistent  with law,  as  may be  necessary  to  carry  out
the provisions  of this chapter").  The  Commission  cites  Schurz Communications, Inc. v.
FCC for the  proposition  that the  "Communications  Act  invests  [the]  Commission  with
'enormous  discretion'  in promulgating  licensee  obligations  that  the  agency  determines
will serve the public interest."  Second Report and Order, supra note  1,  207 n.470 (cit-
ing Schurz Comm'cns,  Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d  1043,  1048  (7th Cir. 1992)).
138.  Nicholas  W. Allard, The New Spectrum Auction Law,  18  SETON HALL  LEGS. J.
13 (1993).  Comparative hearings were used between  1927 and 1984.
139.  Thomas  W. Hazlett, Assigning Property  Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why
Did FCC  License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON.  529, 530 (1998).
140.  See Allard, supra note  138, at 26.  Lotteries were used between  1984 and 1994 to
assign cellular licenses. Hazlett, supra  note  139, at 533.  Hazlett asserts that "public inter-
est" considerations  faded when licenses were  adopted, because  "[t]here  were no program
content issues at stake." Id. at 560; see SNIDER,  ART OF SPECTRUM  LOBBYING, supra note
10 (documenting  outrage  over  lotteries).  For  a description  of the  history of the  auction
requirement,  see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra  note 39, at 242-51.
141.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Act of 1993 (OBRA  1993), Pub. L. No.  103-66,
§ 6002,  107  Stat.  312,  387-92  (codified as amended at 47  U.S.C.  § 309(j)). In the  Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997,  Congress expanded  the Commission's auction  authority, pro-
vided for the transfer of additional spectrum from federal government use and granted the
Commission  explicit  authority  to  allocate  electromagnetic  spectrum  so  as  to  provide
flexibility  of use.  Balanced  Budget  Act  of  1997,  Pub.  L.  No.  105-33,  111  Stat.  251
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are said to move spectrum quickly to the players that value these resources
most highly and to create rational certainty and investment incentives,  and
were  adopted  to reduce  budget  deficits. 142 Indeed, Congress  has required
the FCC to use auctions if, among other things, the service to be provided
using  the  spectrum  involves  the  sale  of communications  services  to  sub-
scribers. 4 3 Initial Congressional  auction authority was  explicitly linked to
Personal  Communications  Services  (PCS)  allocations,  accompanied  by
heady claims of supplanting existing communications  modalities. 144
The  Commission's job  is  to  determine  "whether  the  public  interest,
convenience,  and  necessity  will  be  served  by  the  granting"  of particular
licenses  pursuant to  auction. 145 Over the  years, the  Commission  has  con-
sidered any number of "public  interest"  factors, and has been assailed  for
its  ad  hoc,  band-by-band  approach  to  spectrum  policy. 146 In  the  auction
setting, however, Congress  did provide guidelines  for the "public  interest"
standard for competitive  bidding  for licenses,  instructing  the FCC to pro-
mote  economic  opportunity,  competition,  and  development  and  deploy-
ment  of new  technologies;  to  avoid  excessive  concentration  of licenses
and  spread  licenses  among  a wide  variety  of applicants;  and  to  promote
efficient and intensive use of spectrum. 1 47
(1997).  See also In re Implementation  of Section 3090) of the Commc'ns Act, 9 F.C.C.R.
2348 (1994).
142.  See Noam, supra note  133, at  771.
143.  See  Peter  Passell,  Economic Scene; Auctioning Off The Airwaves  Will Be  a
Formidable Undertaking,  N.Y. TIMES,  Apr.  7,  1994,  at D2 (quoting  former FCC official
saying that "'[a]n  auction  is bound to be  better than  the alternatives'  of giving  away  li-
censes by lottery or awarding them to the best lobbyists").
144.  See Hazlett, supra note  139, at 560-61  (noting that PCS was  to be licensed  as a
competitor  to existing  cellular services  and "was  anticipated  to  be of substantial  social
value."); see also Edmund L. Andrews, America Unplugged: Entering  a Wireless Era-A
Special Report; F.C.C. Clearing Airwaves For Phones of the Future,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept.
20,  1993,  at Al.  Andrews reported that:
Using the  digital  electronics of computers,  the  new  'personal  commu-
nications  services'  will be capable  of sending  data, images and perhaps
even  video  to  an  expanding  family  of nomadic  computing  devices-
palm-size  computers,  electronic  notepads  and  what some  people  call
mutant  devices that combine  the features  of a telephone,  computer and
pager..  . "This will shake  the foundations  of the entire  telecommunica-
tions industry," remarked  Alfred C.  Sikes, who served  as the chairman
of the F.C.C. under President George Bush....
Id.
145.  47 U.S.C.  § 309(a) (2000).
146.  SPTF-RR, supra note  130, at 8.
147.  47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)-(B)  (2000).  Among the objectives  of Section  3090) of
the Act are  "the  development and rapid  deployment  of new technologies,  products,  and
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In connection  with the  700 MHz  auction,  Congress  had allocated  24
MHz  of the  available  formerly  analog-broadcast  spectrum  for  "public
safety" uses.148 The  rest of the spectrum  in this 700  MHz chunk had been
statutorily  allocated  for  broadly  defined  "commercial  wireless"  uses. 149
Congress  has not said what the  geographic  scope  of these  commercial  li-
censes  should  be,  so  the  FCC  had  discretion  to  decide  which  licenses
should be national  in scope and which should be of other sizes-regional,
cellular market area, etc.' 50  The FCC also had discretion to  set other rules
about  buildout  requirements  (how  much  area  a  licensee's  network  must
cover),  "open  access"  requirements,  wholesale  versus  retail  operations,
and cooperation (or not) with public safety officials by commercial  opera-
tors. 1 51
The statute states that the absolute auction revenue to be received may
not be the basis  of a Commission  finding that the public  interest  has been
served. 152 The Commission  has  said that  it  understands  this provision  to
mean that "[r]adio  spectrum is a public resource  of the United States that
Congress  has  authorized  and directed  the  Commission  to  manage  in  the
public  interest,"  with  the  Commission's  "most  basic  spectrum-
management  power  [being]  to  assign  spectrum  to  achieve  public  interest
benefits other than monetary recovery."'
153
In  connection with adopting the  specific  700  MHz  auction rules  that
are the subject of this Article, the Commission established  the "band plan"
for the spectrum to be auctioned-the  number of MHz for each  block and
services  for the benefit of the public,  including those residing in rural areas;"  "promoting
economic  opportunity  and  competition  and ensuring  that new  and innovative  technolo-
gies are readily accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive concentration  of
licenses  and  by  disseminating  licenses  among  a  wide  variety  of applicants,  including
small  businesses,  rural telephone  companies,  and businesses  owned  by  members  of mi-
nority  groups  and  women;"  and the  "efficient  and intensive  use  of the  electromagnetic
spectrum."  Id.
148.  See  Balanced Budget  Act of 1997,  Pub.  L. No.  105-33,  111  Stat.  251  § 3004
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2000)).
149.  47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(C)(i)(1I)  (2000).
150.  A few abbreviations used by the Commission for the geographic  size of licenses:
REAG  means  "regional  economic  area  grouping"  (there  are  only  12  of them);  MEA
means  "major  economic area"  (there are 52  of them);  EA means "economic  area"  (there
are  176  of them);  CMA  means  "cellular  market area"  (there  are  734  of them).  Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note  120,  18.
151.  47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3) (2000 & Supp.  IV).
152.  47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(7)(A) (2000).
153.  SNIDER,  ART OF  SPECTRUM  LOBBYING,  supra note  10,  at  12  (citing In  re Im-
proving  Public Safety Commc'ns  in the 800 MHz  Band,  19  F.C.C.R.  14969,  85  (Aug.
6, 2004)).
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the  geographic  extent of the  licenses to  be awarded for each  block., 54 As
shown  in Table  1, the  700 MHz band  is divided  into two categories-the
lower 700  MHz band  and the upper  700 MHz  band. This Article  focuses
on the  "service  rules"  for two  of the  upper band  blocks:  the  upper  band
"C"  block,  in which two nationwide  paired blocks of  11  MHz  each  were
auctioned off in very large geographic areas-12  licenses, each covering a
"Regional  Economic  Area  Grouping"-and the  upper band "D"  block,  in
which a single nationwide  license was to be auctioned off accompanied  by
an obligation to construct a public safety network.
Band  Frequency  Bandwidth  Geographic  Number of
Block  Area Type  Licenses
Lower 700  A  12 MHz  EA  176
MHz
Lower 700  B  12 MHz  CMA  734
MHZ
Lower 700  E  6 MHz  EA  176
MHz
Upper700  C  22 MHz  REAG  12
MHz
Upper 700  D  10 MHz  Nationwide
MHz
Auction Total  62 MHz  1,099
Table 1: EA-"Economic  Area"; CMA-"Cellular Market Area"; REAG-Regional Eco-
nomic Grouping"
The  Lower  700 MHz  band commercial  licenses  were  set up  in small
geographic areas and designed to facilitate  the entry  of smaller businesses
into  local  competition  in  wireless  provision.  The  C  and  D  commercial
blocks  in  the  upper band  were  the  focus  of attention  because  they  made
possible the entry of a nationwide competitor.
B.  Key Perspectives
This Section  describes  the positions of the FCC, Congress,  the incum-
bent  spectrum  holders (Verizon  Wireless  and AT&T),  and new spectrum
entrants  (including, most prominently, Google) with respect to the auction
of the Upper Band C block.
1.  FCC: The Purpose  of the Auction
What did the FCC think was the purpose of the 700 MHz auction? The
FCC's rhetoric  suggested  that the  Commission  actually  believed  that the
154.  Second Report and Order, supra note  1,  4 (setting out band plan).
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auction could provide an opportunity  for competitive  choice in the market
for highspeed  Internet  access-thus  facilitating  greater highspeed  access
penetration,  higher  speeds,  and  lower  prices.  For  example,  Chairman
Kevin Martin said that the auction "presents the single most important op-
portunity"  for  the  U.S.  to  facilitate  the  deployment  of  a  third  choice
(sometimes  called  the  "third  pipe"),  in  addition  to  cable  and  DSL  net-
works, for highspeed Internet access. 155 He repeatedly maintained that im-
proving  highspeed  access  to the  Internet was  a key priority  for the  Com-
mission. 156
It was not clear how a competitive nationwide  "third pipe"  could have
emerged  from  the  auction,  however, given  the data  limits  for the  limited
spectrum made available in a single block in the  700 MHz auction. High-
speed Internet access  using the two  11-MHz blocks of 700 MHz  spectrum
being auctioned off as "Block C" would not be very highspeed, and Block
C was the largest block being auctioned.1
57
It was  true, however, that the  favorable propagation  characteristics  of
this  spectrum  (long  distances,  penetration  through  foliage  and  building
walls)  could  have  been  very  useful  in  making  cost-effective  last-mile
155.  Notice  of Proposed  Rulemaking,  In re Development  of Nationwide  Broadband
Data, WC Docket No. 07-38, FCC 07-17 (April  16,  2007)  (statement of Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman),  available  at  http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-07-
17A4.pdf.
156.  See, e.g.,  id. at 49  (promoting broadband  deployment and penetration  is one  of
his highest  priorities);  Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Telecomm. and the Internet of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 110th  Cong. (2007)  (statement  of Kevin  J. Martin,  Chairman,
FCC)  (broadband  deployment  and  penetration  is  a  critical  link  to  economic  growth),
available  at  http://commerce.senate.gov/public/-files/MartinSenateTestimonyl21307
final.pdf, at 3.
157.  STEVE  METHLEY,  PUBL'N  No.  SES-2006-9,  WIRELESS  LAST  MILE  FfNAL  RE-
PORT  (2006),  available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/technology/research/ese/
lastmile  (follow  "Wireless  Last  Mile  Final  Report"  hyperlinks).  One  can  transmit  ap-
proximately  two bits  of information  (or  less)  per  each  Hertz.  So  11  MHz  (the  amount
available  in each  Block C  regional  license)  would  provide  about  15  Mbps of capacity,
which is spread over a cell. The actual speed experienced by a customer in that cell, how-
ever, will  be  approximately  2 Mbps  for downloads,  and probably  less. That  is approxi-
mately the  speed of DSL or cable  service now.  As DSL and cable providers  "eventually
increase  speeds  to  5-10 Mbps  of throughput  for each  user, that wireless service  will not
be  a true competitor.  It will  be a reasonable  broadband experience  for a wireless  device
used for limited applications, but it will not be a substitute for a residential wireline con-
nection."  See Posting  of John  to Lafayette  Pro Fiber  Blog,  Cheap  Wi-Fi  Is  Too  Slow,
http://afayetteprofiber.com/Blog/2007/06/cheap-wi-fi-too-slow.html  (June  19,  2007).  Cf
Second Report  and Order, supra note 1,  77 (stating that standards  groups do not expect
highspeed data rates with less than a 20MHz block).
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Internet access available to rural areas underserved  by wireline or wireless
Internet access  providers.  This  700 MHz  band  (Upper Band  Block  C) of
spectrum  could  have  provided  wireless  Internet  access  at  less  expense
(given  the  lower  numbers  of towers  needed)  than  existing  wireless  ser-
vices, in areas to which DSL and/or cable modem access had not yet been
extended-with  the  added  advantage  of  mobility.  For  rural  areas,  this
could have been a way around the DSL/cable bottleneck.
Nonetheless,  the  Commission's  broad rhetoric  continued,  with Chair-
man  Martin  in  particular  apparently  anxious  to  talk  about  the  possible
merits of a "third pipe"  wireless  solution stemming  from the  auction. The
reason?  To  the  extent  that the U.S.  has  a  policy direction  for facilitating
the continued penetration of highspeed Internet access, it has been focused
on supporting the idea that competition between the two existing dominant
platforms-cable  and  DSL providers-will  generate  a  competitive  mar-
ketplace.  Chairman Martin was extending the logic of this policy direction
to  include  a third option-wireless--on  the  assumption  that the  presence
of a third actor would make a difference.  His stated hope was that the op-
eration of market forces would obviate the need for regulation. 58
This  "intermodal"  approach  (facilitating  competition  between  plat-
forms)  to  encouraging  broadband  penetration  differs  from the  policies  of
many other countries.  In the  UK, for example,  British Telecom  has been
required to set up a separate organization  (Openreach)  which sells  whole-
sale  transport  services  to  independent  ISPs. 159  Broadband  speeds  have
158.  Verizon  and  AT&T  are  also  implementing  fiber-optic  communications  net-
works,  and Verizon in particular has made substantial  progress in this direction. But Ver-
izon's fiber-optic  network (FiOS), which delivers speeds of up to 20 Mbps, is available to
only about  8.5 million homes and businesses in  16 states,  out of approximately  110 mil-
lion households  nationwide,  a penetration  rate  of less than  10%.  The actual number  of
FiOS  subscribers  is far  lower.  See  Press  Release,  Verizon,  Verizon  Continues  to  Dra-
matically  Raise  Broadband  Upload  Speeds  in  FiOS  Internet  Service  Areas  (Nov.  20,
2007),  available at  http://newscenter.verizon.com/press-releases/verizon/2007/verizon-
continues-to.html;  U.S.  Census Bureau,  USA  QuickFacts  from  the  US  Census Bureau,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html  (Data  as  of 2000).  The  much-touted
FiOS  network  so  far reaches  only  515,000 homes  (instead  of the  12  million  originally
projected  for 2000), offers  usually  only  five-Mbps  service,  and  costs  about the  same  as
100Mbps  service  available  in  Korea.  Tessler, supra note  15.  Five-Mbps  speed  is not
enough  to  "reliably  deliver  high-definition  video  online."  Id. AT&T only  has  51,000
IPTV  customers,  although  it  claimed  it  would  have  18  million  by  2007.  E-mail  from
Bruce Kushnick, Chairman of Teletruth.org, to author (Aug.  1, 2007, 04:22)  (on file with
author).
159.  Press  Release,  Office  of  Commc'ns  [Ofcom],  Ofcom  Accepts  Undertakings
From Board of BT  Group pic  on  Operational  Separation  (Sept.  22,  2005), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/2005/09/nr_20050922  (describing  access  structure
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doubled,  and  the  number  of highspeed  Internet  access  subscriptions  has
climbed  sharply. 160  In France,  France Telecom  was  forced  to  open up  its
network  to rival operators.  That encouraged  competitors  to rent access  to
France  Telecom's  wires  and start  offering competing broadband  services.
And  that, in turn, encouraged  France  Telecom  to  improve  its own  prices
and  services. Now  France  is "one  of the  world's  most wired  nations."' 6'
Japan's  government required the largest phone company in Japan to open
up  its wires to competitive  Internet access providers.' 62 The ensuing  com-
petition  drove that company (Nippon Telegraph  and Telephone) to imple-
ment  its own highspeed  Internet access plans  and install optical  fiber net-
works  nationwide.  At  the  moment,  access  speeds  in Japan  are  up  to  17
times  faster than  those  in the  US. 163 Similarly,  in  Korea,  extensive  gov-
ernment  involvement in policy-setting,  investment,  and loan programs has
led to the fastest and most prevalent Internet access in the world.  1 64
In the  U.S.,  adding  (slow) "wireless"  to  "DSL"  and  "cable"  will not
substantially  change the  competitive picture for highspeed Internet access.
First, the reality is that the "intermodal"  approach has been a failure in this
country. Because both sets of existing Internet access providers-DSL and
cable-are  resisting  commodification  by  selling  bundles  of proprietary
services  (to which Internet  access is an add-on), they are not directly com-
peting  to offer  "naked"  highspeed  Internet access. 65 Both  sets of provid-
ers object to  any requirement that  they  sell wholesale,  nondiscriminatory
transport to competitive  retail providers of Internet  access.' 66 Both sets  of
providers  want  to be  able  to  extract all possible  consumer  surplus out of
their  cables and  wires by charging  differentially  for favored uses of their
to be operated by BT in the United Kingdom).
160.  Sarah Laitner, Reding Drops a Broadband  Bombshell, FINANCIAL  TIMES,  Aug.
30, 2007, at 6.
161.  Jennifer  L.  Schenker,  Vive  la High-Speed Internet!, BUSINESSWEEK,  July  18,
2007,  http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2007/gb20070718_387052.
htm.
162.  Nobuo Ikeda, How the 'Japanese  Miracle' of  Broadband  Came About, GLOCOM
PLATFORM,  Dec.  24,  2003,  available  at  http://www.glocom.org/specialjtopics/
colloquium/20031224_ikedahow/.
163.  Blaine Harden, Japan's Warp-Speed Ride to Internet Future,  WASH. POST, Aug.
29, 2007, at A02.
164.  Posting  of Karl  to Broadband  Reports.com,  South Korea Wants to  Stay Broad-
band  King,  http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/South-Korea-Wants-To-Stay-Broad
band-King-87926  (Sept. 27, 2007).
165.  See text accompanying notes  106-108  (describing Verizon bundled services.)
166.  See Ted Heam,  Court Agrees with FCC  on DSL Deregulation,  MULTICHANNEL
NEWS,  Oct.  16,  2007, http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6491979.html  (noting that
deregulation of telcos provides parity with cable companies).
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networks. 167 Second,  the  addition  of a  drip  of wireless  Internet  connec-
tivity, even if provided by  a new nationwide  entrant, will  not threaten the
dominance  of DSL  and  cable  or  encourage  the  penetration  of highspeed
Internet  access  services  through  competition.  Indeed,  the  comparatively
slow wireless  Internet  connectivity  made  possible  through the  auction  of
two  1  1-MHz blocks  cannot  compete with  DSL  and  cable  speeds  in areas
where wireline Internet access is already available.
But  the  idea  of "intermodal"  competition  fits  with the  Commission's
generally  deregulatory  stance.'68 The  Commission  gave the  appearance  of
facilitating such competition through its approach to the 700 MHz auction.
Even though the emergence  of a real "third pipe" through the workings  of
the  auction was highly unlikely, the Commission's rhetoric  suggested that
that was what they had wanted all along.
2.  Congress ' Budgetary Needs
In creating the rules for the 700 MHz auction, the Commission was re-
sponding  to a Congressional  mandate  and continuing Congressional  pres-
sure.  Congress's  plan was  that  the  auctioned  spectrum  would  go to  the
highest bidder, with the resulting auction proceeds subsidizing both digital
converter  boxes  for consumers  and a  national public  safety wireless  net-
work.169 In addition, over $7  billion  from the auction revenues will go to-
wards  deficit  reduction. 170  The  Congressional  Budget  Office  estimated
that the commercial  license of 60 MHz of spectrum in the  700 MHz  auc-
tion  will  bring  in  $10-$15  billion,' 7'  and  other  estimates  ranged  even
167.  See, e.g.,  Susan P. Crawford, supra note  110; see also Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r,
FTC,  Concurring Statement Regarding the  Staff Report Broadband  Connectivity Compe-
tition  Policy, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf.
Commissioner Leibowitz cautioned:
There is  a real reason  to fear that, without additional  protections,  some
broadband  companies  may  have  strong  financial  incentives  to restrict
access  to  content  and  applications.  . . . There  is little  agreement  over
whether antitrust, with its  requirements  for ex post case  by case  analy-
sis,  is  capable  of fully and in  a  timely  fashion  resolving many  of the
concerns that have animated  the net neutrality debate.
Id. at  1-3.
168.  See,  e.g.,  Jim  Hu,  New  FCC Chairman Bullish  on  Deregulation, CNET
NEWS.coM,  Apr.  5,  2005,  http://www.news.com/New-FCC-chairman-bullish-on-
deregulation/2100-1034_3-5655643.html.
169.  See Implementation  of Section  3090) of the Communications  Act-Competitive
Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253,  Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2348  (1994).
170.  Deficit Reduction  Act of 2005,  Pub. L.  No.  109-171,  120 Stat.  21  (codified  as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309).
171.  John Dunbar, Auction May Not Be a Boon for Consumers, ASSOCIATED  PRESS,
July 30, 2007, available  at WestLaw, 7/30/07 APWIRES 22:07:29.
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higher.1 72 Even  though  the  Iraq  and Afghanistan  wars  cost $16  billion  a
month, 173 Congress  is  always  interested  in publicizing  its abilities  to  find
additional  sources of funds-no matter how  insignificant. Two  Commis-
sion  staff  members  anonymously  told  the  Washington  Post  that
"[e]nsuring  that the deep-pocketed  carriers pay top dollar for the spectrum
is  a  high priority  for FCC  commissioners  because  the  auction proceeds
have already been allocated by Congress."'174 Notwithstanding its statutory
admonition  against  equating  the  "public  interest"  with  "revenues  re-
ceived,"'175 Congress  was  deeply  interested  in  getting  the  most  money  it
could out of this auction. In the event, the final auction revenue amounted
to approximately  $19  billion-with more than 84% of it coming from Ver-
izon and AT&T as winners of large blocks of spectrum. 176
3.  Access Entrants  'Needs
For new  entrants  into  the  wireless  Internet  access  industry, the  mere
presence  of Verizon Wireless and AT&T as bidders for upper band blocks
C and  D  posed  substantial problems.  For Verizon  and  AT&T,  the  argu-
ment went, the value of keeping  other bidders from winning this spectrum
would  exceed  the  spectrum's  market  value.  Economists  have  suggested
that  incumbents  in  such  a  situation  will  be  willing  to  pay  "whatever  it
takes"  to  win  the  auction,  because  their  top priority  is blocking  new en-
172.  See, e.g.,  Posting  of Harold  Feld  to  Wetmachine,  700  MHz  Endgame:  Has
AT&T  Asked  Bush To  Put Thumb  on  Scale?,  http://www.wetmachine.com/totsf/item/
850 (July  13,  2007) (mentioning a projection  of $20 billion in revenue).
173.  See Bill Adair,  The Iraq War,  for $100 A Month, POLITIFACT.COM,  Apr. 1, 2008,
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2008/apr/O  1/iraq-war- 100-month/  (con-
firming Obama claim that Iraq war costs $100/household/month,  or $16  billion).
174.  Kim Hart,  How to Sell the Airwaves, WASH.  POST,  July  13,  2007 (citing  "two
commission  staff members  who  spoke on  the  condition  of anonymity  because  they  are
not authorized to speak publicly on the matter."); see also Kim Hart, FCC Majority Backs
Open-Access Plan  for Airwaves, WASH.  POST, July 25, 2007  (noting that Republican  leg-
islators "say  the auction should be free of conditions-in part because  rules could reduce
the  revenue  it  generates,  which  is expected to be about  $15  billion.");  Grant Gross, Re-
publican Lawmakers Protest Spectrum Plan, INFOWORLD,  July  24,  2007,  http://www.
infoworld.com/article/07/07/24/Republican-lawmakers-protest-spectrum-plan_1  .html
("'Congress  has  already  spent  that  [spectrum  auction]  money,'  said  Representative
Charles  Gonzalez,  a Texas  Democrat.")  FCC  Chairman  Martin's  own  Top Ten  Predic-
tions  for the  700  MHz  Auction, jokingly  presented  at  the  December  2007  Chairman's
Dinner,  included  the  following  entry:  "#6.  Congress  will  spend  the  auction  receipts  10
times over before  we cash the  [winning bidders']  checks."  Blair Levin, Washington  Tele-
com, Media & Tech Insider 2007 Awards, Dec. 21,  2007, at 6.
175.  See 47 U.S.C. 3090)(7)  (2000).
176.  Posting of Kim Randolph  to BIA Perspectives,  Auction  73  Results-700  MHz
Spectrum, available  at http://blog.bia.com/bia/?p=24  (Mar. 28, 2008).
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trants rather than paying the market price for spectrum. '" The stakes were
particularly high for Verizon  and AT&T in the 700 MHz auction because
the central  choice between  models  for Internet  access  was  in play;  a  new
nationwide  entrant that was  successful  in providing  the  Internet  model of
Internet  access  (nondiscriminatory,  commoditized  transport)  would  pro-
vide  a  competitive  proof of concept  that  might  be  embraced  by  users-
thus  undermining  the  incumbents'  business  plans.  The  foreclosure  value
from these incumbents'  perspectives  for the 700 MHz spectrum was there-
fore  arguably  even  higher  than  it  might  have  been  in  another,  non-
nationwide  spectrum auction. 
1 78
Accordingly, prospective access entrants argued for bidding credits for
designated entities  and entrepreneur bidders,179 blind bidding, 1 80  spectrum
caps,  81  the  exclusion  of large  wireless  incumbents  from  the  auction  en-
177.  Gregory  Rose,  Spectrum  Auction  Breakdown:  How  Incumbents  Manipulate
FCC Auction Rules  to  Block Broadband Competition 16  (New  Am.  Found.,  Working
Paper No.  18,  2007) (noting that,  in prior auction, "the major incumbents were apparently
willing  to pay  a significant  premium  for  engaging  in  [a]  blocking  bidding  strategy:  on
average, they paid 2.5 times more for the spectrum which they acquired than bidders who
did not engage  in this strategy").
178.  "Foreclosure value"  is the loss of an incumbent's oligopoly rents were an entrant
to win that license. Cramton et al., supra  note  101,  at 3.
179.  See Comments of Frontline  Wireless,  LLC, In re Service  Rules for the 698-746,
747-762  and  777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150,  at  67  (Fed.  Comm'cns
Comm'n  May  23,  2007),  available  at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
nativeor..pdf-pdf&iddocument=6519415226.  The FCC provides that "designated  enti-
ties"  may  obtain  bidding  credits  in  auction  settings.  47  C.F.R.  § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A)
(2007); see Catherine J.K. Sandoval,  Director, Office  of Commc'ns Business  Opportuni-
ties, FCC,  Statement  Regarding  Closing  of PCS  Entrepreneurs'  Block  Auction (May  6,
1996), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OCBO/ocbospch.wp  ("Congress author-
ized the use  of installment payments to allow bidders  to pay for their licenses over time,
bidding  credits and other provisions to  lower the capital access barriers which keep many
small businesses from  competing."); see also Noam, supra note  133  at  777 n.32  ("[T]he
discount in the narrowband  spectrum auction  to designated entities was  up to 40%, plus a
preferential  payment schedule.").
180.  Media  Access  Project  published  studies  on  the  Advanced  Wireless  Services
(AWS) auction  completed in  2006 alleging that incumbent  wireless  companies used col-
lusive  bidding  to exclude  new  entrants  and  manipulate  the process.  See Gregory  Rose,
Tacit Collusion  in  the  AWS-1  Auction:  The Signaling Problem (Apr.  20,  2007), http://
www.mediaaccess.org/file-download/181  [hereinafter  Rose,  Tacit  Collusion];  Gregory
Rose,  How  Incumbents  Blocked New Entrants  In The AWS-I  Auction:  Lessons  for the
Future  (Apr.  20,  2007),  http://www.mediaaccess.org/file-download/180  [hereinafter
Rose,  How  Incumbents  Blocked];  see also Rose, supra note  177  at 4  ("[B]idders  have
used  [non-anonymous]  auction  rules  to  engage  in  behaviors  which hamper  competition
and  reduce  the  efficiency  of the  resulting  allocations,  and  which  threaten  the revenue
maximization.").
181.  See, e.g.,  Reply  Comments of PISC, supra note 5,  at  13-20 (arguing  for caps on
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tirely, 182 and  combinatorial  bidding,183 all  rules  that  would  have  limited
the ability of Verizon Wireless and AT&T to dominate the auction.
Additionally,  both device  and  applications  developers  argued  that the
vertically integrated incumbents had both (1) every reason to discriminate
against equipment and applications  developers  in favor of the incumbents'
services  and  (2)  the  market  power  to  implement  this  discrimination. 184
Under  the  current  wireless  carriers'  oligopolistic  dominion,  it  is  nearly
impossible  to market  a wireless  phone or mobile  device  without the per-
mission of the existing carriers, or have a wireless application  succeed for
use on an existing  network without  the permission  of that carrier. 185 Sev-
eral  prospective  entrants  argued  that  the  upper  band  C  and  D  Blocks
should  be licensed  on the condition that the winner's transport services be
made available on a wholesale basis.' 86
the amount of spectrum that could be acquired by incumbents through the auction).
182.  Id. at  18.
183.  Any new  entrant  seeking to  create a new national  wireless broadband  network
from  the  license  of Upper Band  Block  C would  face  the  substantial  risk  of buying  up
eleven  of twelve  geographic  regions,  only to  be blocked from  buying  the  twelfth  by a
determined  incumbent  whose  foreclosure  value  exceeded  its market  valuation  of the  re-
maining  regional  license.  For  this reason,  a  coalition  of new  entrants  of various  kinds
called  the  "4G  Coalition"  (Google,  Echostar,  DirecTV,  Skype,  Intel, and Yahoo!)  pro-
moted the  idea  of package  or  combinatorial  bidding. The Coalition argued  that package
bidding would be simple:  a bidder would bid for all regions as a package, and would drop
out if unable to obtain one of them.  This would avoid the problem  of a single incumbent
making one  market  very expensive  in order  to block the  creation of a national network.
See Comments of the Coalition for 4G  in America, In re Service Rules  for the 698-746,
747-762  and  777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150,  at  8-9  (Fed.  Commc'ns
Comm'n  May 23, 2007)  (on file with author).  Verizon Wireless, for its part, claimed that
package  bidding  would be very  complicated,  particularly  given the  limited time  before
the  auction had to be held. See Reply Comments  of Verizon Wireless, In re Serv.  Rules
for  the  698-746,  747-762 & 777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket No.  06-150,  at 3 (Fed.
Commc'ns  Comm'n June 4, 2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.
cgi?native  or_pdf=pdf&id  document-6519516267.
184.  See, e.g.,  The 700 MHz Auction: Public  Safety and Competition:  Hearing  Before
the S.  Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 110th Cong  (2007)  (statement
of Amol  R.  Sarva,  Wireless  Founders  Coalition  for  Innovation),  available at http:/I
commerce.senate.gov/public/-files/Testimony.AmolSarva-SarvaWrittenStatement0.pdf.
185.  See  infra note  239  for  a  description  of VerizonlAT&T  press  releases  about
commitment to openness  in the wake of the release  of the 700 MHz auction  rules. These
press releases did not represent a  move towards  true openness,  because  these  companies
continued  to  reserve  a great deal  of discretion  in permitting  devices  and applications  to
use "their" networks.
186.  See,  e.g.,  Letter  from  Richard  Whitt,  Wash.  Telecom  and  Media  Counsel,
Google,  Inc., to Marlene  H. Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, In re Service Rules
for  the  698-746,  747-762  and  777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150  (July  9,
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In particular,  Google  played a key role in the  2007 auction-rule  brawl
by promoting  the  Internet  model  of access.  Google  stated  bluntly  that it
did not want to have to rely on the incumbent  carriers'  permission  in order
to reach  its customers,  and suggested that winning bidders  for a portion of
the  auctioned  spectrum  should  be  required  to  provide  four  key forms  of
openness: (1) consumers  should be able to download and use any software
application;187  (2)  consumers  should  be  able  to  use  any  handheld  de-
vice; 188  (3) resellers  and  ISPs  should  be  able  to  acquire  services  on  a
wholesale,  nondiscriminatory  basis; 189  and  (4)  interconnection  of  other
networks  at technically  feasible  points  should  be  available  on  a  nondis-
criminatory basis.19 0
2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  or  pdf=-pdf&id_
document=6519548049;  Reply  Comments  of PISC, supra note 5, at 3 ("Significant  de-
mand  exists  for an  open  network  that  can  provide  spectrum  wholesale,  so that wireless
innovators  can provide customers with new services  that the existing oligopoly refuses  to
provide.").
187.  This condition is often referred to colloquially as "no blocking."
188.  This condition is often referred to colloquially as "no locking."
189.  Google  May  21  Letter,  supra note  8  (providing  further  detail  by  Google).
Google  also suggested that  the winner of a portion of the  700 MHz auctioned  spectrum
should be required to act as a wholesale provider, running auctions for access to  spectrum
on an as-needed  basis through  an  online clearinghouse.  Devices  equipped to act  "smart"
could  be part of such  a dynamic,  real-time  auction  for spectrum.  Google  told the  FCC
that "[w]hile  dynamic  auctions  can  take  many forms,  the central concept is  to utilize  in-
telligent  devices  to  resolve  spectrum  access  contention."  Id. at  3.  "[N]ew,  smart  tech-
nologies  can  sense  the  spectrum  environment  and  ...  have  the  agility  to  dynamically
adapt  or  adjust their  operations.  . . . [S]oftware-defined  radios  can  improve  utilization,
through more  efficient access,  of the  radio spectrum  without  detriment to existing spec-
trum users."  SPTF-RR,  supra note  130,  at  14.  Contention  over  spectrum  would  be  re-
solved  by the  wholesale  provider or  by the  user's  device  itself using  spectrum-sensing
techniques,  and power transmission  limits would be capped by the  user's device through
adherence to rules  imposed by the wholesale  provider. Google May 21  Letter, supra note
8.  The user's device  would be tied to a nominal airwaves registration  fee that would  grant
the user the  ability to gain unlimited use of available  spectrum at specified power  levels.
This opportunistic use  of spectrum,  managed  by way of the Internet by a central  auction
clearinghouse,  would  likely have  been  a substantial  improvement  over the current  com-
mand-and-control  spectrum  regime. This is similar  to the spot auction that Google  holds
for search  terms.  Every query using the Google  search engine triggers a real-time auction
to determine  the  market  price of a particular  advertisement  linked  to  a particular  search
term. Users do not see this auction, but it drives a more efficient and more tightly-focused
market  for advertising.  One  law  of spectrum  use  is  that  "relatively  deprived  users  are
virtually  forced  to  innovate  spectrum-economizing,  spectrum-developing  technology."
DOUGLAS,  supra note  34,  at  238  n.68  (quoting  HARVEY  J.  LEVIN,  THE  INVISIBLE  RE-
SOURCE 9,  18 (1971)).  Google's dynamic auction suggestion certainly fits this category.
190.  See supra notes 20-21  (explaining forms  of openness);  Letter of Richard  Whitt
to Marlene  H.  Dortch,  supra note  186  (describing  desired openness);  Blair  Levin et  al.,
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Google  signaled before  the  auction that it believed  that unless the  li-
censes  were  conditioned  on openness,  "the existing  national wireless  car-
riers  [were]  likely to prevail  in the bidding  process," 191 because  the  fore-
closure  value  of such  a  victory  to  an  incumbent  would  exceed  anyone
else's market value  for the  same  spectrum. Then, Google  threw down the
gauntlet, telling the Commission  that it was willing to bid $4.6 billion (the
likely  reserve  price)  for  700  MHz  spectrum  that  would  be  licensed  in
large, regional areas, if and only if the Commission agreed to condition the
license  to  be  "open"  along  all four  of the  key  vectors  (applications,  de-
vices, wholesale  access, interconnection).
192
The  Google plan as  a whole  was  aimed at having  an enormously  dis-
ruptive  effect  on  current  incumbent  wireless  Internet  access  models  be-
cause it suggested that the Internet model, rather than the cellphone model,
should be  the  construct  for  Internet  access  in  the  future.  Public  interest
supra note  101;  Kim  Hart, FCC to  Rule  on  Wireless Auction:  Lobbying Intense As
Google Seeks  To  Open Market, WASH.  POST,  July  30,  2007,  at Al  (describing  Google
requests).  Google  was also  likely  interested  in bolstering users'  upload speeds,  because
that  would increase the amount of content available  for Google to search  and aggregate.
See also CFA Comments, supra note 4,  at 88 ("The so-called  'third-pipe'  satellite and 3G
mobile wireless products sold by Verizon and AT&T offer upload speeds that are in some
cases  incapable  of originating  even  low-quality  VoIP  data.  At  these  levels  of upload
speed, users have no hope of originating high-quality video.").
191.  Posting  of Richard  Whitt to  Google Public  Policy Blog,  The Promise  of Open
Platforms  in the  Upcoming  Spectrum  Auction, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/
2007/07/promise-of-open-platforms-in-upcoming.html  (July 10, 2007).
192.  Letter  from Eric  Schmidt,  Google  Inc.,  to Kevin  Martin,  Chairman, FCC (July
20, 2007) (ex parte communication regarding In re Serv. Rules  for the  698-746, 747-762
and 777-792  MHz  Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150),  available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  orpdf-df&iddocument-6519559297  ("[S]hould  the
Commission expressly adopt the four license conditions requested in our July 9th letter-
with specific, enforceable,  and enduring rules-Google  intends to commit a minimum  of
$4.6 billion to bidding in the upcoming auction."). Why did Google do this? After all, if it
won  an  unconditioned license  it  could  have  implemented  all  of these  openness  rules
without the  Commission's permission. But asking that openness  be mandated served the
dual purpose of (1)  depressing the  amount that the telcos  or other players  would bid  for
the  spectrum while assuring the Commission that its reserve price would be met, and  (2)
putting the telcos in the uncomfortable position of having to commit even more money in
advance  of the  auction  in order  to  credibly  object  to  Google's  suggestion.  It  was  also
highly unlikely that the FCC would accede to Google's request for license  limitations,  so
Google had little to lose. On a meta level,  Google was interested  in shifting the ability to
monetize  online  user  activity  away  from  the  network  operators  and  to  the  application
layer actors-such as  Google itself. From the user's perspective, Google's approach  had
the potential to unleash great value  in the  form of unfettered communications.  See Craw-
ford, supra note 110,  at 405-406 (arguing that separating transport  from content will spur
economic growth).
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groups strongly backed the Google approach.193
4.  Incumbents 'Needs
Again,  only  Verizon  Wireless  and AT&T  had  the  spectrum  holdings
necessary  to  provide  nationwide  wireless  coverage  in  a  cost-effective
manner  as of late  2007.  Their control  of existing  under-lGHz  spectrum,
where  lower  frequencies  make  possible  more  resilient  communications
that rely  on  far  less  investment  in  infrastructure,  has  granted  these  two
players  the benefit of protection from competition, in the form of substan-
tial barriers to  entry. 94 For the purposes  of this Article,  these two players
are the  almost  unbeatable  wireless  incumbents.' 95 They  are  controlled, in
turn, by  companies  that  are  almost  unbeatable  regionally  dominant  DSL
players.196
193.  See Posting of Kim Maynard  to Public Knowledge Policy  Blog, Public Interest
Groups and High-Tech  Companies United Behind Four Principles  of Open Access  in the
Upcoming  700  MHz  Auction,  http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/l104  (July  18,
2007).
194.  See  Memorandum  from Frontline  Wireless,  L.L.C. to  Antitrust Div.,  Dep't.  of
Justice,  supra note 22, at  3. Lower-frequency  700  MHz transmissions can  travel three  to
four  times  the  distance and  cover  ten  times  the  area  of, say,  2.5GHz  communications
(where Sprint has substantial spectrum holdings).
195.  Timothy  Hay, Incumbents to Sweep  US Spectrum Auction, Analysts Say, Dow
JONES  NEWSWIRES,  Jan.  18,  2008,  available at http://www.cellular-news.com/story/
28705.php;  see also Memorandum  from  Frontline  Wireless,  L.L.C.  to  Antitrust  Div.,
Dep't. of Justice,  supra note  22,  at  1 (noting that  Verizon  Wireless  and  AT&T  "have
separated themselves  from the other purported national carriers,"  which are  "falling fur-
ther behind the  industry giants  every month as their plans  to introduce  cutting-edge  ser-
vices  using higher frequency spectrum  founder on the  crushing economics of nationwide
buildout.");  Letter from Gerard Waldron, Frontline  Wireless LLC, to Marlene  H. Dortch,
Sec'y, FCC  (June  22, 2007) (ex parte communication  regarding In re Serv. Rules for the
698-746,  747-762  and  777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150),  available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or..pdf=pdf&iddocument=6519534
453. Verizon  ($22.6 billion operating cash  flow) and AT&T ($17.8  billion operating  cash
flow)  combined have 64%  of the net additions to wireless  subscriptions and  120 million
subscribers. Id. at  3. Even before the  auction, AT&T  controlled  75  MHz of below-lGHz
spectrum  and Verizon  controlled  60 MHz.  Id. These  holdings dwarfed  the 22  MHz that
might have been required to be provided on a "wholesale access"  basis if the Google pro-
posal for the Upper Band C Block had been adopted by the Commission.
196.  These  legacy incumbents  on the wireline  side have, of course, every reason both
to resist the entry of new  wireless competitors and to keep  the cellphone  model of Inter-
net access  intact. See Posting  of Harold  Feld to Wetmachine,  700 MHz  PreGame  Show:
Reading  the Tea Leaves  on Verizon and AT&T's  Last Moves,  http://www.wetmachine.
com/item/958  (Dec. 7,  2007). Feld observed:
Until  AT&T  absorbed  BellSouth  (and  thus assumed  100%  ownership
of Cingular)  and Verizon assimilated  control  of its wireless unit,  wire-
less carriers acted primarily as wireless carriers.  They had similar inter-
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It is fair to say that both the wireless and wireline incumbents share the
view  that the deregulatory  policies  put  in place by  the FCC, and,  in par-
ticular,  the  regulator's  blessing  of  the  cellphone  model  for  highspeed
Internet  access,  are appropriate.  Verizon noted that it is investing billions
in highspeed  fiber optic connections that can deliver its bundled packages
of voice,  video,  and  data,  and  argued  that  any  form  of open  access  re-
quirements  would  burden  the  wireless  industry  unnecessarily  as  well  as
diminish the value of the  affected spectrum, to the detriment of the public
interest. 197 AT&T argued that the market is fiercely competitive and that it
should be  allowed to  continue  to  innovate  without  the  limitations of any
rules.' 98  CTIA,  the  wireless  carriers'  trade  association,  claimed  that  the
wireless  industry provides great benefits to the U.S. economy, through in-
vestments  in the  construction  and operation of wireless  networks,  and ar-
gued that these investments have only been possible because  of the  flexi-
bility that wireless licensees have had.' 99
The incumbents tried to persuade the FCC that auction revenues would
ests, competed against  each other,  and generally behaved  as  a unified
class.  That  has changed  in the  last year or  so. The  total  integration  of
AT&T Wireless and Verizon Wireless means that the unified corporate
entity is now seeing  the wireless aspect  as tied to  its wireline  interests.
This impacts  behavior.  For one  thing  ...  it means  that the  telcos  will
evaluate their actions  in this auction  on the basis  of their overall  strat-
egy  for  wireline  and  wireless,  not  merely  on  the  basis  of what  looks
good for their wireless business alone.
Id.
197.  Tessler, supra note  15 ("Verizon  expects to spend nearly $23 billion by decade's
end to  reach more  than  18  million houses  with  its  FiOS  fiber-optic  network.");  Letter
from  John  T.  Scott  III,  Verizon, to Marlene  H. Dortch,  Sec'y,  FCC  (July  24,  2007) (ex
parte communication  regarding In re Serv.  Rules for the 698-746,  747-762  and 777-792
MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150),  available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native.or..pdfhpdf&iddocument=6519560209.
198.  Letter  from  Robert  W.  Quinn,  Jr.  to  Marlene  H.  Dortch,  supra note  2  ("As
Chairman Martin has observed-and as many others have echoed-'wireless is the poster
child  for  competition."');  Letter  from  Robert  W.  Quinn,  Jr.,  AT&T,  to  Marlene  H.
Dortch,  Secretary,  FCC  (July  2,  2007)  (ex  parte  communication  regarding In  re Serv.
Rules  for the  698-746,  747-762  and  777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT Docket  No.  06-150),
available  at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf=pdf&id-
document=6519538883  ("AT&T believes that the Commission  should continue  to  allow
market  forces, and not regulatory  fiat, to  shape  the  development  of telecommunications
services.").
199.  Letter from Christopher Guttman-McCabe,  CTIA,  to Marlene  H. Dortch,  Sec'y,
FCC  (June  29, 2007)  (ex parte  communication regarding In re Serv. Rules  for the 698-
746,  747-762  and  777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150),  available  at  http://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or  .pdf=pdf&iddocument=6519537846.
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be decreased  if license conditions were applied.2 00  Even though the "open
access"  rules proposed by Google and others would have applied only to a
portion  of the  spectrum  available  for auction,  and  Verizon  Wireless  and
AT&T  already  had  very  large  spectrum  holdings,  they  fought  fiercely
against any change to the status quo auction regime in connection with the
rules to be applied  to the Upper Band C block.2 0 1 The incumbents  resisted
any  change  to  bidding  credit/anonymous  bidding/combinatorial  bidding
202 rules that had been used in the past.  Verizon also resisted the imposition
of any geography-based  buildout  requirements  on  the  winning bidder.2 03
200.  See  Letter  from  Christopher  Guttman-McCabe,  CTIA,  to  Marlene  H.  Dortch,
Sec'y, FCC (Apr. 20, 2007)  (ex parte communication  regarding In re Serv.  Rules  for the
698-746,  747-762 and 777-792  MHz Bands,  WT Docket  No. 06-150), available at http://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativer.pdf=pdf&id-document=6519307855
("Ultimately,  the [proposed  license  limitations]  so devalues  the  spectrum that it jeopard-
izes  auction  proceeds  already earmarked  for worthy projects  including public  safety  in-
teroperability.");  Letter from Robert  W.  Quinn, Jr.  to Marlene  H. Dortch,  supra note  2
("Google's approach is fatally at odds with the basic purpose of auctioning spectrum. The
Commission's  charge  here  is  to  identify-and  to  award  spectrum  to-precisely  those
companies  that Google  seeks  to exclude from  the  auction:  the  companies that value  the
spectrum  most and that  will put it to its most efficient use."); Reply Comments of Veri-
zon  Wireless, supra note  183,  at  18  ("Similarly,  auction rules  that  disadvantage  incum-
bent providers  to  the benefit  of potential  new  entrants  are  inappropriate  and  ultimately
harmful...  . Fundamentally,  auctioned spectrum  should  go to  the  party that  values  the
spectrum most highly and will  therefore put that spectrum to its highest and best use.").
201.  Letter  from Gerard  Waldron,  Frontline  Wireless  L.L.C.,  to Marlene  H.  Dortch,
Sec'y, FCC (June 28, 2007)  (ex parte communication  regarding In re Serv.  Rules  for the
698-746,  747-762  &  777-792  MHz  Bands),  available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeor..pdf-pdf&iddocument=6519537319  ("Verizon  and  AT&T
have an incentive to forestall  entry  in the  700 MHz band...  . [T]he  incumbent's  license
valuation  is  its economic  value plus the  foreclosure  value,  which  is the  loss  of incum-
bent's oligopoly rents were an entrant to win that license.").
202.  See,  e.g.,  Letter from  U.S.  Cellular  Corp.,  to  Marlene  H. Dortch,  Sec'y,  FCC
(July  10,  2007)  (ex  parte  communication  attaching  a  presentation  and regarding  In  re
Serv.  Rules  for the 698-746,  747-762  & 777-792  MHz  Bands) (on  file with author) (op-
posing  packaged  bidding  and anonymous  auctions); Reply Comments  of Verizon Wire-
less, supra note  183 (same).
203.  Reply  Comments of Verizon Wireless, supra note  183.  While the FCC had sug-
gested that winners be obligated to create networks that would serve 75%  of the region of
the license area  within eight years (or forfeit the spectrum),  Verizon complained that this
obligation to cover sparsely populated areas would place a capital  drain on them. Verizon
argued instead for population-based buildout requirements,  noting that  88%  of the popu-
lation of the U.S.  lives  in 8%  of the country.  Id. J.H. Snider points out that spectrum lob-
byists always promise  to quickly  build out telecommunications  facilities and then do not
do so-and the  FCC does not effectively  enforce  these promises.  SNIDER, ART OF SPEC-
TRUM  LOBBYING,  supra note  10,  at  39;  see also Fiona  Morgan,  What Happens When
Telecom  Companies Write State Legislation, Check Your Wallet, INDEP.  WKLY.,  July  14,
2007  (noting  that neither  AT&T  nor Verizon  has  any  immediate  plans  to  roll out  fiber
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Fundamentally,  the  incumbents  argued  that  only they  could  improve  the
nation's broadband penetration and that any  license conditions that dimin-
ished their  involvement  in  the auction  would inevitably  also  injure high-
speed Internet access nationwide.
2 04
Initially, Verizon, AT&T, and the Cellular Telecommunications  Indus-
try Association  (CTIA), which represents  the incumbent wireless  players,
claimed  that any  form  of open  access  license  limitations,  including no-
locking  and no-blocking rules  as well as no-retail and wholesale  reselling
rules,  would  reduce  revenue  and  endanger  public  safety. 2 0 5 The  incum-
bents argued that to the extent they engaged  in locking  and blocking prac-
tices,  such practices were reasonable  measures  to protect the  integrity and
efficiency  of wireless  networks.20 6 Just before the  700 MHz auction rules
were  released  by  the  Commission,  both  Verizon  and  AT&T  suddenly
changed their strong positions and agreed to the idea of limited no-locking
and  no-blocking provisions. 2 0 7 But the  Internet  model of Internet  access,
services  in North  Carolina)  ("No  private  company  is rushing  to provide  those  sparsely
populated communities  with any kind of communications  service, because the  infrastruc-
ture  is expensive to install.  That makes  it hard for rural communities  to adapt to a post-
tobacco, post-textile, post-furniture economy.").
204.  Letter from  Robert W.  Quinn,  Jr. to Marlene  H.  Dortch, supra note 2  ("There
can be  no  serious  dispute  that existing  wireless  providers,  having  already  invested  bil-
lions  in deploying  3G wireless  broadband  networks,  are  best situated to utilize  the  700
MHz band to further that deployment.").
205.  See supra notes  187-188  (defining  "no  blocking"  and  "no  locking"  with  refer-
ence to Google's July  2007 correspondence  with the FCC); see, e.g.,  Letter from  Robert
W. Quinn, Jr. to Marlene  H. Dortch, supra  note 2 ("[T]he handset and application  certifi-
cation processes that Google's proposal would foreclose  are vitally important to ensuring
the efficient utilization and the security of the wireless network.");  Comments of CTIA-
The  Wireless Association, In re Serv.  Rules for the  698-746,  747-762  & 777-792  MHz
Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150,  at 23 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n May 23,  2007), available
at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native- or-.pdf-pdf&id- document-651
9415111  ("[T]he  record unmistakably  shows that exposing  wireless networks  to untested
mobile handsets  and  applications  would  degrade  network  performance,  create  harmful
interference,  prevent  carrier  compliance  with  important  social  policy  obligations,  and
open  networks  to  greater  security  threats.").  Republican  legislators  agreed.  Kim  Hart,
FCC  Majority Backs Open-Access Plan  for Airwaves, WASH.  POST, July 25,  2007,  at D2
(noting Republican  congressional  representatives were  unhappy with any possible condi-
tions on license).
206.  E.g.,  Letter from  Christopher Guttman-McCabe,  CTIA,  to Marlene  H.  Dortch,
Sec'y, FCC (June 29,  2007)  (ex parte communication  regarding In re Serv. Rules for the
698-746,  747-762  and  777-792  MHz  Bands,  WT  Docket  No.  06-150),  available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or..pdf=pdf&iddocument=-6519537
846.
207.  See Letter from Robert W. Quinn to Marlene  H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, at 2  (July
20, 2007) (ex parte communication  regarding In re Serv. Rules  for the 698-746,  747-762
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including  wholesale  provision  of such access,  remained  off the  table.2°8
Even though the  incumbents  could simply have priced wholesale access at
a  high  level,  and  thus  discouraged  anyone  from  using  it,  avoiding  the
precedent  of such  a  requirement-and  retaining  the  cellphone  model  of
access-was their central goal.
V.  THE COMMISSION RESPONDS
On August  10, 2007, the FCC released its rules for the 700 MHz  auc-
tion.209  Somewhat  surprisingly,  the  Commission  imposed  several  condi-
tions that it argued were intended to facilitate the entry of new competition
and the emergence  of the mythical  "third pipe."  Yet the  deal embodied in
the  rules, taken  as  a  whole,  is strikingly  consistent with  the vision  of the
"public  interest"  that has  been  adhered  to  by communications  regulators
since  radio  regulation  first  began.  Given  the  dominance  of the  existing
wireless  carriers, their willingness  to pay  whatever  it takes  to  avoid new
entrants  and any  hint  of a  "common  carriage"  model of Internet  access,
and the inadequacy of the proposed rules  to change their current practices,
the  proposed rules will  have the  effect of freezing  in place the  cellphone
model  for  mobile  Internet  access-even  though  users  and  non-
communications  businesses would likely prefer the Internet model.
A.  The 700 MHz Auction Rules
1.  C Block Locking and  Blocking Rules
For the upper  band  C Block,  the  FCC mandated  that any winning  li-
censee  have  in  place  "no-locking"  and  "no-blocking"  provisions  condi-
tioning its use of this spectrum:
210
& 777-792  MHz Bands, WT  Docket No. 06-150)  (on file with author); Letter from John
T.  Scott III,  Verizon,  to Marlene  H.  Dortch,  Sec'y, FCC (July  24,  2007)  (ex parte  com-
munication regarding In re Serv. Rules for the  698-746, 747-762 & 777-792  MHz Bands,
WT  Docket  No.  06-150),  available  at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
nativeor..pdf=-pdf&iddocument-6519560209.
208.  See  Leslie  Cauley,  AT&T  Backs Proposed  Rules for Spectrum Auctions, USA
TODAY,  July  19,  2007, at  3B (noting that Martin had gone out on a limb and forced Veri-
zon  and  AT&T  to  support  limited  "open  platform"  rules  in  exchange  for avoiding  the
precedent  of  a much more restrictive wholesale access  requirement).
209.  Second Report and Order, supra note  1.
210.  Id.  202  ("To  promote  innovation  in  this  spectrum  band  from  the  outset, we
find it  is  reasonable  to impose  certain  conditions  on the  C Block  [22  MHz  of spectrum
licensed  on  a REAG  basis  (12  regions)]  ...  to  provide  open  platforms  for devices  and
applications."); see id.  205  (rejecting the "argument  that mandatory  wholesale and other
broad  regulatory  models  are  necessary  at  this time  to  provide  incentives  for new  entry
and innovation").
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Licensees  offering  service  on  spectrum  subject  to  this  section
shall not deny, limit,  or restrict the ability  of their customers to
use the devices and applications of their choice on the licensee's
C Block network, except:
(1) Insofar as  such  use would  not  be  compliant with  published
technical  standards reasonably necessary  for the management  or
protection of the licensee's network, or
(2) As required to comply with statute or applicable  government
regulation. 211
The no-locking, no-blocking requirements  were hedged in by substan-
tial limitations:  the winning licensee  would be able to  lock and block de-
vices  and applications  as  long as  they could  show that their actions  were
related to  "reasonable  network management  and protection,"  or "compli-
ance  with  applicable  regulatory  requirements."  212  The  license  winner
would not be required to adhere to open-platform  requirements  on its other
spectrum  bands,  would  be  allowed  to  continue  to  use  its  own  (non-
standardized)  certification  standards  and processes  to approve  uses of de-
vices and applications  on their networks, would be allowed  to protect the
"safety  and  integrity"  of their  networks  against  non-carrier  applications
and  devices,  and  would be permitted to restrict  use of its  network to  de-
vices  "compatible  with  [the  carrier's]  network  control  features. 213  Addi-
tionally,  carriers would have  the  ability  to deny  interconnection  to hand-
sets and applications that were unable to provide  location information via
the  carrier's  E9 11  system  (a  system  that  is  controlled  by  the  carrier  it-
self).214 In other words, as long as the discrimination could be shown to be
connected  (however indirectly)  to some vision of "network management,"
it would be permitted. 215 These exceptions  arguably provided Verizon, the
winner  of the  C  Block  auction,  with  ample  slow-roll  capability.  It  will
likely  be  very  difficult  for non-carrier  application  providers  and  device
manufacturers to work through the incumbent's certification  processes.
2.  No Wholesale Access
Importantly,  the  key  condition  that  would  have  made  it  possible  for
new entrants to provide highspeed Internet access  in competition with  in-
cumbents  was rejected by the  Commission. In the  view of public interest
211.  Id.  230.
212.  Id.  222.
213.  Id.  223.
214.  See generally Susan P. Crawford,  The Ambulance, the Squad Car,  and the Inter-
net, 21  BERKELEY  TECH. L. J. 873 (2006) (analyzing E911 rulemaking).
215.  Second Report and Order, supra note  1,  223.
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groups,  Google,  Frontline,  a  gaggle  of economists,  Commrs.  Copps  and
Adelstein,  several other countries, and 250,000 Americans,  that key condi-
tion  was  mandating wholesale  open  access.216 The  Commission  took  the
view that the wireless  voice market was "effectively competitive"  and that
therefore no government intervention  to require resale  or wholesale provi-
sion  was  necessary. 217 At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  avoided  the
question of whether  the wireless highspeed Internet access market, or the
highspeed  Internet  access  market  as  a  whole,  was  sufficiently  competi-
218 tive.
Chairman  Martin made  clear  that although  he would be  "troubled"  if
just  one incumbent  ended  up  with  a  large  portion of the  radio  spectrum
made available  in this auction, the limited no-locking,  no-blocking condi-
tions he had negotiated  would go "some  way to  'ameliorate'  his concerns
were  one  company to  acquire  a  significant  portion of [the  spectrum]. 219
Thus,  even  if these  extraordinarily  limited  openness  conditions  had  zero
effect on competition for highspeed Internet access or on the facilitation of
innovation  in  devices  and  applications,  and  resulted only  in  the  grant  of
another  license  to a  vertically integrated  incumbent,  the  Chairman  would
be content.
3.  Anonymous Bidding
The  Commission  decided to use "blind"  (anonymous)  bidding  for the
700 MHz  auction.  22  Prior auctions  featured  open bidding, which allowed
216.  See supra Section III.A. In Commissioner  Copps's words, "by  declining to  im-
pose  a wholesale requirement on the 22 MHz C-block, the Commission misses an impor-
tant  opportunity to  bring a robust and badly-needed  third broadband  pipe into  American
homes."  Second  Report  and Order,  supra note  1 (Copps,  Comm'r, concurring  in  part,
dissenting  in part). See also John  Dunbar,  Questions Raised over Broadband Plan, AS-
SOCIATED PRESS,  July  12,  2007, available at WestLaw,  7/12/07 APWIRES  23:35:53  (re-
porting  that  although happy  with  the  move  to  free  devices  from  carrier  control,  Gene
Kimmelman  of Consumers  Union said  the agency  was wasting the  "best opportunity  in
modem  history to jump-start Internet competition and bring new players to challenge the
dominant telephone and cable companies").
217.  Second Report and Order, supra note  1, at  200 (citing In re Implementation  of
Section 6002(b) of the  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Act of 1993,  21 F.C.C.R..  10947
(Sept.  29,  2006));  Eleventh  Report,  21  F.C.C.R.  10947,  10950  11 2-3  (2006)  (Eleventh
Annual Commercial  Mobile Radio  Services (CMRS) Competition Report).
218.  Second  Report  and  Order,  supra note  1,  201  &  n.462  ("[T]he  competitive
characteristics of the wireless  voice market  may not be the same  as those of the  wireless
broadband market").
219.  FCC's Martin Says Auction Rules  Will Benefit Competition, CELLULAR-NEWS,
July  11,  2007, http://www.cellular-news.com/story/24878.php.
220.  Second Report  and Order, supra note  1,  274-280  ("Based on the  current re-
cord, we  conclude  that the  public interest will  be  served if the upcoming  auction  of 700
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bidders  to know the names of their competitors  and (allegedly)  collude  to
exclude particular  third parties by making  a competitive  package of spec-
trum  licenses  expensive. 221 This decision  to use  blind bidding  was  a vic-
tory for new entrants and public interest groups. The fact that the "foreclo-
sure  value"  to  individual  incumbents  of the  upper  band  C  and  D block
likely exceeds  the market value of these blocks  lessens the  importance  of
this decision; the threat that incumbents  will make these licenses unrealis-
tically  expensive  will  deter bidding  by new  entrants.222 Nonetheless,  this
"anonymous  bidding"  step  by the  Commission  was  viewed as  undermin-
ing the incumbents'  power to dominate the auction.
4.  Package  Bidding
In another victory for new entrants, the Commission  adopted "package
bidding" for the upper band C block: 223
With package  bidding,  a bidder may place  an all-or-nothing  bid
on multiple  licenses,  and thereby  avoid the risk of winning  less
than all the licenses needed to justify its bid. For example, a bid-
der  whose  business plan  is  premised  on realizing  economies  of
scale may need to win a  large number of licenses  in order to jus-
tify the bid that  it would make  if it could win  all  of them. The
risk  of winning  less  than  all  the  licenses  needed  to  support  the
amount  of the  aggregate  bid  is  sometimes  known  as the  "expo-
sure problem.,
224
Package  bidding is particularly  helpful  for a new entrant that is seek-
ing to  put together  nationwide  coverage  and does  not want  to be  caught
with a set of less-than-nationwide  licenses. Absent this rule, a new entrant
might be blocked by competitors over a single license that was essential to
its business model.
MHz  Band  licenses  for  which  we  establish  service  rules  today  is  conducted  using
anonymous  bidding procedures....").
221.  See  Rose,  Tacit Collusion,  supra note  180;  Rose,  How  Incumbents  Blocked,
supra note  180; Rose,  supra note  177,  at 3 (noting that, in prior  auctions, major incum-
bents  tacitly or  explicitly  "bid  as  a coalition  against  every  attempt ...  targeted  bidders
make  to acquire  licenses").  The FCC  asserted that there were  methodological  shortcom-
ings  in  these  studies, and that their shortcomings  meant that  the studies  "do  not demon-
strate  that  incumbents  engaged  in  retaliatory  and  blocking  bidding  behavior."  Second
Report and Order, supra note  1, n.644.
222.  See Rosston & Skrzypacz, supra note 95,  at 2.
223.  Second Report and Order, supra note  1,  287-292.
224.  Id.
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5.  Reserve Prices
The  Commission's  establishment  of limited no-locking,  no-blocking
rules governing  the upper band C block  was accompanied by a novel  es-
cape clause:  if the licensed block, as a whole, failed to sell for at least $4.6
billion,  it would  be  reauctioned  in  smaller  chunks  to  the  same  bidders
without any conditions  applied. 225  The FCC, by setting an aggressive  "re-
serve  price"  for this spectrum block, was trying to comfort both Congress
and the  incumbents.226 If limits  on the  licenses'  use  had generated lower-
than-expected  revenues  for  the  Treasury,  the  limits  would  have  been
abandoned.
This  move  created  interesting  incentives  for the  incumbents  and  for
Google.  For  the  incumbents,  it  would be  useful  to hold  back  in  the  first
auction in the  expectation that the second time around they would be able
to  obtain the  spectrum  without  any limitations  (or any threat  to  the  cell-
phone model of Internet  access).  Or they could proceed  to  win the  spec-
trum  and  work  around  the  limited  openness  conditions  imposed  by  the
Commission. For Google and other new entrants,  it would be useful to en-
sure  that the  reserve price was  met in the  first  auction so that the limita-
tions would stay in place  (and  the Internet model of Internet access would
be  encouraged).  Overall,  the  "reserve  price"  tactic allowed  the  Commis-
sion  to  equivocate  as  to  the  desirability  of any  openness  limitations  at
all-in effect putting these modest limitations up for purchase.
6.  Public  Safety Network
The FCC paired the upper band D block  (a single  10 MHz nationwide
license)  with  10MHz  of  public  safety  spectrum  located  next  to  the  D
block. It also conditioned the D block license on an obligation to negotiate
225.  Id.  299.  Commissioner  Copps  disagreed  with  this  "reserve  price"  approach,
saying:
The procedure  in this  Order  carries  chilling  risk to  the  success of the
auction. If some of these blocks  do not fetch the bid prices  stipulated,
perhaps  because of gaming of the worst sort, they will  be re-auctioned
with  weaker build-out  requirements.  If the  22 MHz  [C]  block,  where
we hope for Carterfone  open access principles,  fails to elicit a $4.6 bil-
lion bid, it will  be re-auctioned  without Carterfone  open  access.  In the
end,  all  of this  micro-managing  virtually  hands  industry  the  pen  to
write the  auction  rules  and to constrict  all the opportunities  this  spec-
trum  held forth.  The  end result  could  be:  same old,  same  old.  What a
pity that would be!
Id.  298 (statement of Comm'r. Copps).
226.  See Rosston  & Skrzypacz,  supra note  95,  at 4  ("The FCC  set  very  aggressive
reserve prices,  close to  the expected value  of the spectrum.  Such high reserve prices are
unprecedented  in FCC auctions . ").
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with public safety representatives  towards the construction, by the D block
licensee,  of a  nationwide  public  safety  network.227 The  idea  is that  a ro-
bust, dedicated public  safety network will be built to the specifications  of
the public safety community.  In exchange,  the commercial  licensee of the
D Block will be  permitted to use the  public safety  spectrum  (in addition,
of course, to the D Block spectrum) when it is not otherwise  needed.  Ab-
sent this private  participation,  funding  for a  shared  public safety network
was unavailable.228
Frontline  Wireless,  a privately  held company  headed by former  FCC
Chairman Reed Hundt,229 had submitted a proposal along the lines eventu-
ally adopted by the FCC for the upper band D block. 23 ° In the event of an
emergency,  Frontline  proposed that public  safety would have  immediate,
preemptive  use of the  entire  network.23' Frontline  won  a  substantial  vic-
tory when the  FCC decided to allow the  D Block  licensee  to obtain "des-
227.  Second Report  and  Order, supra note  1,  365-66,  383.  This  is  an elaborate
plan with many opportunities  for tangles along the way:
The  single nationwide  10-megahertz  D  Block commercial  license  will
be awarded to a winning bidder only after it enters into a Commission-
approved Network Sharing Agreement  ("NSA") with the Public Safety
Broadband Licensee ....  'the  Commission will oversee the negotiation
of the NSA,  and  will  play  an  active  role in  the resolution  of any dis-
putes among  the  relevant  parties  ...  both  resulting  from  the  negotia-
tions and once the parties are operating  under the terms of the NSA.'
Order, In re Waiver  of Section  1.21 10(b)(3)(iv)(A)  of the  Commission's  Rules  for the
Upper 700 MHz Band D  Block License, FCC 07-197,  2 (Nov.  15,  2007), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-07-197A1  .doc.
228.  See The  700 MHz Auction: Public Safety and Competition Issues: Hearing  Be-
fore  the  S.  Comm.  on  Commerce,  Science  and Transportation,  10th  Cong.  (2007)
(statement  of Wanda  McCarley,  Ass'n of Public-Safety  Commc'ns  Officials-Int'l  and
Nat'l  Public  Safety  Telecomms.  Council),  available at http://www.apcointl.org/news/
2007/McCarleyJunel4TestimonySenate.pdf,  at 4-5. McCarley stated:
Our support for [ ] a public-private  partnership  flows from our realiza-
tion that there  is simply no  other viable  method  to pay for  a national
broadband  network  that  will  meet  public  safety  requirements ...
[M]ost agencies around the country will not have similar  funding avail-
able to build their own broadband networks, and there is no way to pool
funds beyond state or regional systems.
Id.
229.  Reed  Hundt was  the  first  chairman  of the  FCC  to conduct  spectrum  auctions.
Reed  Hundt,  Reed  Hundt  Biography,  http://www.reedhundt.com/biography.html  (last
visited June  11,  2008).
230.  Letter from Jonathan  D. Blake, Frontline Wireless, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y,
FCC (July 3, 2007) (ex parte communication  regarding In re Serv. Rules for the 698-746,
747-762 & 777-792 MHz Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150) (on file with author).
231.  Id.
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ignated entity" small business bidding credits even  if the licensee  planned
to  operate  on  a wholesale  basis.1 32 Frontline  dropped  out  before  the  auc-
tion, however, apparently  unable to convince  investors  of the certainty  of
the enterprise.
233
The  reserve price  for the D Block  was not met  in the  700  MHz  auc-
231 tion.23  If the D Block is eventually auctioned off successfully, this will be
a  fascinating experiment  in public-private  partnership.  The fact that com-
mercial uses will be secondary  to emergency  public uses  in the combined
spectrum  will  undoubtedly  lead  to  some  complex  issues.  What  will the
trigger be for public  preemption of private uses?  Will private  users under-
stand this preemption? How will this preemption affect private users'  will-
ingness  to pay for services  provided by this licensee?  How will  the Com-
mission play the role of champion  and protector of public safety,  as well
as licensor of commercial  spectrum?  Will Congress  establish  some sort of
congressionally  chartered  corporate  structure  to govern this shared public
safety  network?235 But  these  questions  are  for another  article  to  explore,
not this one.
232.  47 CFR Section 1.21 10(b)(3)(iv)(A)  (2007) provides that:
An applicant or licensee that would otherwise be eligible for designated
entity benefits under this section...  shall be ineligible for such benefits
if the  applicant  or  licensee  has an impermissible  material  relationship.
An  applicant  or  licensee  has  an  impermissible  material  relationship
when it has  arrangements with one or more entities  for the lease or  re-
sale (including under a wholesale agreement)  of, on  a cumulative  basis,
more than 50 percent  of the spectrum  capacity of any one of the appli-
cant's or licensee's licenses.
Frontline  took the  position that this  rule was aimed at preventing  sham small businesses
that  were  merely  fronts  for  established  incumbents  from  taking  advantage  of bidding
credits.  The Commission eventually  agreed, ruling that eligible  bidders  for Block D that
qualify as  small businesses under  existing rules  will be  entitled to  a bidding credit (a  re-
duction in  the amount due  on the winning bid) of between  15%  and  25%, depending on
the bidder's  annual  revenue, even  if the bidder planned to  offer services  on a wholesale
basis. Order, In re Waiver of Section  1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A)  of the Commission's Rules  for
the Upper 700 MHz  Band D  Block License,  FCC 07-197  (Nov.  15,  2007),  available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs  public/attachmatch/FCC-07-197A  I  .doc.
233.  See  Blair  Levin,  Rebecca  Arbogast  &  David  Kaut,  Frontline Out:  Limited
Chance of  New  Entrant Winning in Auction Even Lower, WASH.  TELECOMM.,  MEDIA  &
TECH. INSIDER  (Stifel,  Nicolaus & Company, Balt., Md.),  Jan. 8, 2008.
234.  Chole  Albanesius,  FCC,  Congress  Spar  Over  Public  Safety  Spectrum,
PCMAG.CoM,  April  15,  2008, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2284009,00.asp.
235.  See LINDA  K. MOORE,  CONG.  RES.  SERV.,  PUBLIC-PRIVATE  PARTNERSHIP  FOR  A
PUBLIC SAFETY  NETWORK:  GOVERNANCE  AND  POLICY  17-18 (2007)  (suggesting  such  a
structure).
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B.  The Response
Reaction  to  the  proposed upper band  C  block rules  was  swift.  Com-
mentators  predicted  that without  the  strictures  of wholesale  access,  and
with  exception-riddled  openness  requirements,  incumbents  would  avoid
any  effect  on  their  businesses. 236  Consumer  advocates  worried  that  the
Commission had done  nothing to affect the concentrated market  for high-
speed  Internet  access.237  CTIA,  the  wireless  carriers'  trade  association,
expressed its pleasure at most of the proposed rules, while noting its con-
cern that conditions  had  been applied  to a portion of the  auction,  saying,
"We  remain  committed  to  the  principle  that  wireless  consumers  and
American  taxpayers  are  best  served when  such  a  valuable  commodity  is
auctioned  in  a  fair  and  competitive  manner  with  no  strings  attached
,,238
But most commentators  missed the larger  import of the C  block rules.
Although the Commission had gone far to placate consumer advocates and
new entrants (by, for example, adopting anonymous and package  bidding),
it had not limited the participation of the dominant wireless  carriers  or the
centrality of the cellphone model of Internet access in any substantial way.
The Internet model of access, or "common carriage"  and unbundling obli-
gations,  was  off  the  table.  The  Commission's  weak  no-locking,  no-
blocking rules did not undermine  the  carriers'  existing business  practices,
and indeed were (facially)  swiftly implemented by the  incumbents  before
the  auction began. In November  2007,  Verizon Wireless  issued press  re-
leases claiming  that it was opening  up its wireless  network to any device
236.  Testimony of Jason Devitt, Co-Founder and CEO of SkyDeck, FCC Open Meet-
ing,  July  31,  2007,  available at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/mt073107.ram;  see also
Posting of Michael  Arrington  to  TechCrunch,  FCC  Fails  to  Mark Its  Place  in  History,
available  at  http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/07/3  1/fcc-fails-to-mark-their-place-in-
history (July 31,  2007).
237.  See Ben  Scott,  Who Owns the Airwaves?, GUARDIAN,  Aug.  1, 2007,  (Comment
Is  Free  blog),  available  at  http://commentisfree.guardian.co.ukbenscott/2007/08/
publicairwavesearmarkedfor.html.  Scott remarked:
[T]he  FCC ignored the  broadband problem and gave  us unlocked  mo-
bile phones to carry between different wireless  networks. This decision
represents a small step forward for the  first issue of consumer choice in
mobile  phones, but a large step backward for the larger need for genu-
ine broadband  competition that could bring  the benefits  of the  Internet
to all Americans.
Id.
238.  Posting  of Peter  Suciu  to  MobileCrunch,  CTIA  Responds  to  Latest  Rules  for
700 MHz Auction,  http://mobilecrunch.com/2007/08/01/ctia-responds-to-latest-rules-for-
700-mhz-auction (Aug.  1, 2007).
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and any application,  and AT&T  quickly  followed suit.  239 These  feints to-
wards "openness"  were largely  meaningless:  Verizon  Wireless insisted on
retaining  the  ability  (1)  to  privately240  "certify"  applications  and  devices
for use on its network (a process  during which  a great deal  of mischief is
possible,  as  we  know  from  the  pre-Carterfone days),24'  (2)  to  sell  the
heavily  subsidized  handsets of its partners  in  its retail  stores  (which  will
make  it unlikely for competing, full-price  handsets to be popular),  and (3)
to prioritize its proprietary or charged-for  content over "ordinary"  Internet
traffic.  The cellphone  model of Internet  access continued  to triumph, with
occasional public-relations  nods towards the ethos of open Internet access.
C.  Comparison to 1920s Spectrum Policy
At  the  conclusion  of the Commission's  work, during  the  summer  of
2007,  on the  700  MHz  auction  rules,  the  FCC  emerged  from  the  brawl
with  a  negotiated  arrangement  that  largely  served  incumbents'  interests.
239.  Press Release,  Verizon, Verizon Wireless  to Introduce  "Any Apps, Any Device"
Option for Customers in 2008 (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://news.vzw.com/news/
2007/11/pr2007-11-27.html;  Posting of Om  Malik  to  Gigaom,  AT&T,  Verizon  ...  We
are All Open, http://gigaom.com/2007/12/06/att-verizon-t-mobilewe-are-all-open  (Dec.  6,
2007);  Posting of Ryan Block  to Engadget,  AT&T  Claims  Completely  Open Network,
Too-"The  Most  Open,"  Even!,  http://www.engadget.com/2007/12/06/atandt-claims-
completely-open-network-too-the-most-open-eve  (Dec. 6,  2007) (noting that USA Today
was taken in by AT&T's announcement).
240.  See  Tim  O'Reilly,  Op-Ed.,  Static on the Dream Phone, N.Y. Times,  Dec.  15,
2007,  at 23. AT&T's  quick follow-on assertion  that it had "flung  open its network"  was
similarly  baseless; applications  that need to  use AT&T's  network have to have  a "prior
business  relationship"  with  AT&T,  and  GSM  phones  from  other  networks  have  long
functioned  on the  AT&T network.  See Leslie  Cauley, AT&T Flings Cellphone Network
Wide  Open,  USA  TODAY,  Dec.  5,  2007,  http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
telecom/2007-12-05-att-N.htm;  Posting of Bryan  Gardiner to  Wired Blogs,  http://blog.
wired.com/business/2007/12/how-to-jump-on.html  (Dec.  6,  2007,  7:11:39  PM);  Posting
of Jason Chen to Gizmodo, USA Today Falls for AT&T Openness  Spin, http://gizmodo.
com/gadgets/cellphones/usa-today- falls- for-att-openness-spin-33  1028.php  (Dec.  6,
2007).
241.  See  Wu,  supra note  80,  at  8  (describing  AT&T  resistance  to  "foreign  attach-
ments" on the basis that they would threaten the quality of service  to be provided over its
network).  Carterfone was the  1968  FCC  case that  struck  down  AT&T's private  limita-
tions  on "foreign  attachments"  and rejected the argument  that "control over all equipment
on the network was necessary for the telephone system to function properly."  Id.; see also
In re Use of the Carterfone  Device in Message Toll Tel.  Serv.,  13 F.C.C.2d 420 (June 26,
1968).  In February  2007,  Skype filed  a petition with the FCC asking that the  Carterfone
rules be applied to the wireless industry. See Skype Commc'ns  S.A.R.L. Petition to Con-
firm a Consumer's Right to Use Internet Communications  Software  and  Attach Devices
to  Wireless  Networks,  RM- 11391  (Feb.  20,  2007), available at http://download.skype.
com/share/skype-fcc_200702.pdf.  As  of the preparation  of this Article  in January  2008,
the FCC had not acted in response  to this petition.
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The  incumbents  avoided  the  disruptive  effect  of  a  precedent-setting
wholesale  requirement  that  would  have  mandated  that  they  open  their
networks  to competition and to the Internet  model  (common carriage,  un-
bundling)  of Internet  access.  Even  though  some  limited  "openness"  re-
quirements were imposed on block  C, these requirements would be avoid-
able  and  litigable  and were well  worth the  tradeoff. Because  of the  fore-
closure  value  of this  spectrum  to  the  incumbents,  and  the  almost  insur-
mountable  barriers  to  entry that the  incumbents  had erected  against  new
competitors,  this  was  an auction  in which  the  incumbents  were  likely  to
242 win all, or virtually all, of the licensed  spectrum.
How did this deal compare to  1920s spectrum decisions? The compari-
son is not simple. During  the  1920s,  Secretary  Hoover (without  statutory
authority)  and  the  Federal  Radio  Commission  (with  statutory  authority)
assigned  and  reallocated  spectrum  on  a  bold  scale,  favoring  applicants
whose  "capital investment"  and existing spectrum use  suggested that they
would  be  successful  in using  additional  spectrum.  Hoover,  the  "political
champion  of major broadcasters,' 243  as well  as  the  Federal  Radio  Com-
mission,  used their powers to give  preference  to  corporate  giants who  al-
ready  held large  assignments  of spectrum. 244 Hoover  and the  commercial
broadcasters acted together to shape the transmission marketplace by regu-
latory  force.  Radio was  new,  it was  being used mostly  for entertainment,
and  other  stakeholder  interests  were  not  powerful  enough  to  be  heard.
Even  though amateurs  and nonprofits  had made  wide use  of radio  spec-
trum before  these  reallocations,  their voices  are not part of the  historical
record of these  1920s decisions.  Accordingly, the Federal Radio Commis-
sion could act in a "rather high-handed  way.' 245 In the  1920s, Hoover and
the FRC were asserting themselves as the masters of the airwaves, creating
a role for federal regulation  and thrusting  all other  interests aside;  having
the large commercial broadcasters  approve of their activities was arguably
essential to the very survival of federal communications  regulation.
The FCC's  institutional position  in  the  spectrum policy world is  now
arguably different. Rather than asserting itself as the master of a relatively
new  domain,  it  now  operates  within  an  elaborate  ecosystem  of existing
uses,  user preferences,  and policy  imperatives.  It  serves  several  masters,
242.  See supra  Section  IV.B.4;  see  also  Memorandum  from  Frontline  Wireless,
L.L.C. to Antitrust Div., Dep't. of Justice, supra note 22, at 3 (noting that barriers to en-
try include pre-auction  below-iGHz spectrum  holdings of Verizon Wireless  and AT&T,
and fixed costs of building out infrastructure  to service  nationwide network).
243.  Hazlett, supra note 45, at  152.
244.  KRATTENMAKER  & POWE,  supra note 40.
245.  Id. at 21.
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including Congress and public perception of its relevance  and authority.
At the same time, the separate  communications  silos that the FCC has
regulated  in the past are all converging. Broadcast has been swallowed up
by cable, and cable  services are indistinguishable  in many ways from tele-
phone services.  Cable and telephone providers  are also selling Internet  ac-
cess. Radio  is moving online.  Indeed, the  Internet could ultimately  be the
converged form of all of these communications modalities.
The role of the FCC itself is therefore in flux.  It is attempting to assert
itself as  the  key  rule-maker  for  converged  packet-switched  communica-
tions,  while  continuing to  please  the providers  of its traditional  regulated
services,  Congress,  and (at  least  to  some  limited  extent) the  public.  The
FCC's own bureaucratic  imperatives mandate  that it retain and expand its
role  in the  converged era. At Congress's urging,246 and under public pres-
sure, the Commission  is being forced to recognize  the potential and actual
economic  and social  effects of the Internet  ethos of openness and flexibil-
ity,  and  is  acting differently  as  a  result. It  cannot  ignore  the  benefits of
open Internet  access and the marketplace  successes  that are  dependent on
the  Internet  model of that  access.  It  cannot  ignore  the  effect  of Internet
communications  on its traditional  constituents,  including broadcasters and
telephone  companies. The idea that a key block of spectrum would be auc-
tioned  off with  limited  no-locking,  no-blocking  conditions  would  have
been  unthinkable even  a year  before the  700  MHz  auction rules were re-
leased, but now is part of the zeitgeist of the converged  era.
Yet the  700 MHz  auction rules, as a whole, protected the wireless in-
cumbents  against the  inroads  of the Internet  and the Internet  model of ac-
cess.  By rejecting  the notion that the market for highspeed Internet  access
was  sufficiently  concentrated  to  require  the  imposition  of  a  wholesale
mandate,  the  Commission  acted  to  shield  incumbents  from any  real  dis-
ruption  of  their  business  plans.  The  watered-down,  riddled-with-
exceptions  no-locking/no-blocking  rules  had  scarcely  any  impact  on  the
incumbents'  operations,  and indeed were  gleefully embraced  by these  ac-
tors for public  relations purposes  before the  auction began. The  Commis-
246.  For example, a key  July  11,  2007 hearing  in  front of a House subcommittee  ex-
plored the promise and problems of the wireless  industry, and focused media attention on
the wireless  carriers'  success  in  crippling  innovation  in devices  and  applications.  Chair-
man  Markey  urged  the  FCC  to  "foster  innovation  in  the  upcoming  auction,"  and  Rep.
Pickering said that the auction provided an opportunity to create a wholesale  marketplace
for access.  Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection  and the Internet: Hearing  Be-
fore the Subcomm.  on  Telecomm. of the H. Comm.  on  Energy and Commerce,  110th
Cong.  (2007),  available  at  http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmtemtgs/I  10-ti-
hrg.071107.ConsumerProtection.shtml.
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sion's  actions  in this  arena  are  in  sharp contrast  to  policy  steps taken  in
other  concentrated  communications  marketplaces  around  the  world.247
While  providing  some  concessions  to  new  entrants  and  online  policy
voices  (anonymous  and  package  bidding,  no-locking/no-blocking  man-
date),  the Commission  sought to avoid unduly troubling  Verizon Wireless
and  AT&T--even  as  the  global  marketplace  moved  towards  open  plat-
forms  for communications.  As an  institution, the Commission  is still-as
it was  in the  1920s-fundamentally  in the  business  of remaining popular
with  large  regulated  incumbents  that  already  have  extensive  spectrum
holdings.
VI.  SPECTRUM AND  THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Chairman Martin frequently  invoked the  importance of the "public  in-
terest"  in setting the rules  for the 700 MHz  auction, noting that it was not
the same  as "what one company advocates.,,248 The  Commission's Second
Report and Order, setting forth the 700 MHz rules, mentioned the "public
interest"  at  several  key junctures.  The  Commission  maintained  that  "it
would not  serve  the  public  interest  to  mandate  broader  [openness]  re-
quirements, such as a wholesale requirement for the unauctioned 700 MHz
spectrum,'' 249 that providing  for a  large  block  (as  requested  by  both the
incumbents  and  Google)  "serves the  public  interest,"250 that  "restricting
eligibility for licenses [through spectrum caps and the exclusion of incum-
bents]  without  adequate  justification  could  harm the  public  interest, 251
and, finally,  that  "[t]he  use of competitive  bidding to  assign  licenses  ...
serves the public interest by assigning licenses to the parties that value the
licenses the most."252
Nothing  about the  choices made by the  Commission  in the  700  MHz
auction was  inevitable,  and taken together  these  choices present  a useful
case  study of telecommunications  policy in the 21  st century. With the 700
MHz rules, the political economy of spectrum auctions seemed to be func-
tioning  well;  no  one  party  was  either  entirely  irritated  or  entirely  satis-
fied.25' But what was the  "public  interest"  in this auction?  What question
247.  See supra Section IV.B. 1.
248.  John  Markoff &  Matt Richtel,  F.C.C. Hands Google a Partial Victory,  N.Y.
TIMEs,  Aug.  1,  2007,  at C3  (quoting  Martin saying that "[t]he  Commission needs  to de-
cide what is  in the public interest, not what one company advocates.").
249.  Second Report and Order, supra note  1,  7 (emphasis added).
250.  Id.  80 (emphasis added).
251.  Id.  259 (emphasis added).
252.  Id. (emphasis added).
253.  See SNIDER,  ART OF SPECTRUM  LOBBYING,  supra note  10,  at 22 (describing  the
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was  the  Commission  trying  to  answer?  What  should  we  as  a  nation  do
with spectrum policy?
A.  The Public Interest in Spectrum Auctions
The  hope  for spectrum  auctions  generally  had  been  that they  would
usher  in  an  entirely  new  telecommunications  sector,  unlike  the  cellular
telephone  market, in which consumers  would have "access  to an array  of
voice, data, and video communications  services regardless of where a sub-
scriber  may  be  located., 254 Along  these  lines,  the  700  MHz  auction was
initially  envisioned as the key opportunity to encourage  improved Internet
access  for  Americans.  The  Second Report and Order itself  stated  that
"[r]apid  deployment  and  ubiquitous  availability  of broadband  services
across the country are among the Commission's most critical policy objec-
tives.2 55 This fit with numerous Bush Administration announcements  dur-
ing the period from 2000-2007  in which President Bush and other officials
stated  that universal  highspeed  Internet  access  by 2007  was  a  key prior-
ity.256 The FCC's stated belief was that "[w]ireless  service  is becoming  an
increasingly  important  platform for broadband  access"  and the  700  MHz
auction would help facilitate the growth of this platform.257
In the  estimates  of some  commentators,  the  auction rules  established
by the Commission  at the beginning of August 2007 did not create  the op-
portunity  for  competition  to  the  incumbent  regional  duopoly  (DSL  and
cable) providers of highspeed Internet  access.258  The wireless  incumbents,
who are themselves controlled by the DSL incumbents, will likely use this
700 MHz spectrum to offer packaged  video and audio content to handheld
devices  that  they  certify  in  accordance  with  the  limited  no-locking,  no-
blocking  rules established  by the  Commission.  This kind of service  will
"political  economy  of an FCC license"  and pointing out that the "big payoff'  for a spec-
trum lobbyist comes in  the license modification  phase, after a license  has been awarded).
We can  expect that the incumbents will seek modifications  even of the very  light Carter-
fone requirements set forth in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order.
254.  Allard, supra note  138, at  17 n.14.
255.  Second Report and Order, supra note 1,  196.
256.  See Mike Allen, Bush Sets Internet  Access Goal, WASH.  POST, Mar. 27, 2004, at
A04  (reporting that Bush  endorsed  the goal of universal broadband  access  by 2007); see
also Declan  McCullagh,  Bush:  Broadband  for the People by  2007, ZDNET,  Apr.  26,
2004, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5200196.html.
257.  Second Report and Order, supra note  1,  197.
258.  See  Molly  Peterson, FCC Chief  May Fall Short of Wireless Market Shakeup,
BLOOMBERG,  Aug.  3,  2007,  http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=a.GC2KLzdRSY  ("'The biggest question  mark is: will this auction produce any  new
entrants  into  either  the  wireless  market  or the  broadband  market?'  said  [analyst  Blair]
Levin ....  'I don't think it will."')
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not introduce competition into the market for highspeed Internet  access or
increase  the  penetration  of highspeed  Internet  access  in  this  country.259
They were  likely  to  win  the  auction,  26  and they  did  indeed win.261 Veri-
zon Wireless  won all the  C Block  licenses  needed  for  a nationwide  foot-
print, and spent $9.63 billion in total, while AT&T paid $6.64 billion for B
Block licenses.262 Together,  AT&T and Verizon  accounted  for $16.3  bil-
lion of the $19.6  billion collected in the auction as a whole.263
But  even  if the  wireless  incumbents  had  not won  the  auction,  a  na-
tional, competitive "third pipe" to the Internet was  still an impossible  goal
given  the  narrowness  of the  bandwidth  allocated  to  the  upper  band  C
Block,  and thus the relatively  slow data rates (in  comparison to DSL  and
cable  connections)  that users  could  expect  from  that  spectrum. 264 What,
then, could the public interest element of this auction have been?
One  answer,  or  set  of answers,  lies  in  the  statutory  language  of the
Telecommunications  Act.  Among  the  objectives  of Section  3090)  of the
Act  are  "the  development  and  rapid  deployment  of new  technologies,
products, and services  for the benefit of the public,  including  those resid-
ing  in rural areas"  and the  "efficient  and intensive  use of the electromag-
netic  spectrum." 265 Other  public  policies  arguably  include  assisting  the
international competitiveness  of the United States and forwarding  the role
of wireless  technology  in  economic  growth.266 All  of these  objectives
could  have  been forwarded by  imposing  a  wholesale  access mandate  for
the upper band C Block. Such a mandate  could have encouraged  competi-
tion  in open  wireless  access  to  the  Internet;  even  if a  nationwide  "third
259.  See CFA Comments, supra note 4, at  134.
260.  See supra Section IV.B.4.
261.  Marguerite  Reardon,  Verizon  Wins  "Open Access"  Licenses in FCC Auction,
CNET  NEWS,  Mar.  20,  2008,  http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9899829-7.html;
Glenn  Chapman,  Verizon,  AT&T  Win  FCC Auction,  Google  Wins  Open  Spectrum,
AGENCE  FRANCE  PRESSE,  Mar.  20,  2008,  available at  Westlaw,  3/20/08  AGFRP
23:35:00.
262.  See supra note  24; see also Blair Levin,  Rebecca Arbogast  & David Kaut, FCC
Announces Winning Bidders; Verizon, AT&TBid 16Bfor Lion's Share, WASH. TELECOM,
MEDIA &  TECH INSIDER  (Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Balt., Md.), March 20, 2008.
263.  Levin et al., supra note 262.
264.  Sprint's  recent  announcement  of  a joint  venture  with  Clearwire,  funded  by
Google  and  others,  to  use  the  WiMAX  protocol  over  Sprint  and Clearwire's  licensed
spectrum,  may  change this landscape-but there  are many uncertainties  in this arrange-
ment and in the use  of the  protocol itself. See, e.g.,  Cecilia Kang  and Kim Hart,  Clear-
wire, Sprint Nextel Set Course for WiMax,  WASH.  POST,  May  8,  2008,  at  DOI  (May  8,
2008).
265.  47 U.S.C.  § 3090)(3)  (2000 & Supp. IV).
266.  MOORE, supra note  10, at 18.
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pipe"  was not possible, the  forced availability of a platform  that was neu-
tral towards  devices and applications  running on the  network would  have
encouraged  competition  in  those  devices  and  applications.  Wholesale,
open  availability  of spectrum  in  rural  areas  could  have  provided  a  way
around the bottleneck of scarce wired highspeed Internet connections, thus
making new ways  of making a living available  to those areas. Experimen-
tation in different forms of nondiscriminatory  Internet access would likely
have  also  led  to  helpful  investments  in  complementary  communications
equipment.  A  further step could have been  to exclude  the wireless  under-
IGHz  incumbents,  Verizon  Wireless  and  AT&T,  from  the  auction  alto-
gether--or at the least to impose spectrum caps on these actors.16  The risk
that these  vertically integrated  incumbents  will use this  spectrum to  con-
tinue  to  discriminate  against  their rivals  is very high.  These  steps  would
have made possible a proof-of-concept experiment  with the Internet access
model using this 22-MHz-wide  block, and would have provided  a needed
last-mile assist to rural areas that are inadequately  served by DSL and ca-
ble providers. 268
A wireless  experiment with the precedent of the Internet access model,
which separates  transport from content and allows  new applications  to be
introduced  without  the  permission  of  the  transport  gatekeeper,  would
likely be revelatory.  We might  have found that commodity transport pro-
viders can make enough money to survive without charging for use of par-
ticular applications  and devices under the  cellphone model of Internet ac-
cess.  We  might  have  found  that  spectrum  can  be  used  much  more  effi-
ciently  through  spot-auctions-auctions  for  access to  spectrum  on an as-
needed  basis  through  an  online  clearinghouse. 269  We  might  have  found
that devices  equipped to act "smart"  would have emerged  to be connected
to  this dynamic,  real-time  auction for spectrum. 27 0  This opportunistic  use
of spectrum,  managed by way  of the  Internet  by a  central  auction clear-
inghouse, would likely have been a substantial  improvement over the  cur-
rent command-and-control  cellphone  model  of Internet  access. 271 Finally,
we  might  have  found  that  increasing  the  availability  of open  wireless
Internet  access  increases  Internet  access  generally,  given the  competitive
pressures  created by easily available (even if slow) wireless  access.
267.  The  FCC  has  in  the  past  imposed  spectrum  caps,  prohibiting  wireless  incum-
bents in the PCS auction  from purchasing  licenses in areas in  which their combined hold-
ings would exceed 45 MHz.  Wilkie, supra note  21,  at  1.
268.  See supra Section IV.B.3.
269.  See infra Section VI.B.
270.  Id.
271.  Id.
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While all of this experimentation might have been deeply destabilizing
for the  wireless  carriers'  business  plans,  encouraging  increased  access  to
the  Internet  should  now  be  a  central  public policy  goal.272 The  link  be
tween  experimentation  and  increased  access  is  clear:  the  results of such
experimentation may make  it possible for hybrid wireless/fiber  systems to
be  stitched together in  imaginative  ways  that  will  avoid  the current  last-
mile  wireline bottleneck.  Even  a minor increase  in U.S. broadband pene-
tration  will  have  large  positive  impacts  on  the  U.S.  economy. 273 Both
mainstream mass media and academic commentators  have been persuaded
that increased  highspeed Internet  access  is in  the  public  interest.274  Tom
Friedman's  "flat world"  is upon us,  and a key element of American  com-
petitiveness  will be improved highspeed Internet access.275 American  pol-
icy statements often acknowledge this fact, with Rep. Rick Boucher saying
that  "[e]nsuring  that the United States has  a robust broadband  infrastruc-
ture ...  is as important  today as building the electrical  grid was a century
ago.
276
In sum, there  are  several  potential public  interest goals  for  spectrum
auctions  in  the  age  of converging  Internet communication,  including  in-
creasing  competition,  encouraging  development  of new technologies,  en-
couraging  efficient use of the  spectrum,  and economic  growth.  Chairman
Martin focused on the only one of these that was impossible given the data
272.  I explored these ideas in Crawford, supra note  110.
273.  See generally TURNER, supra note  79; see also Robert Crandall, William Lehr &
Robert  Litan,  The  Effects  of Broadband Deployment on  Output and Employment:  A
Cross-sectional  Analysis of U.S. Data, BROOKINGS  INSTITUTION  ISSUES  IN  ECON.  POL'Y,
June  2007,  available  at  http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2007/
061aborcrandall/200706litan.pdf  (estimating  that a one-digit  increase  in  the U.S.'s per
capita broadband penetration equates to an additional 300,000 jobs).
274.  See, e.g.,  Moyers On America: The Net At Risk (PBS  television broadcast Oct.
2006),  transcript  available  at  http://www.pbs.org/moyers/moyersonamerica/print/
netatrisktranscript-print.html;  OECD,  supra note  15  (U.S.  has  fallen  to  15th place  in
broadband  penetration  among  the  30 member  nations;  annual  U.S.  penetration  growth
ranked  20th  out of 30;  semi-annual  growth  24th  out  of 30);  TURNER,  supra note  79
("Each  spot the  United  States  slips  [in broadband  penetration  rankings]  represents  bil-
lions  in lost producer and  consumer surplus,  and potentially  millions  of real jobs  lost to
overseas workers.").
275.  THOMAS  L.  FRIEDMAN,  THE  WORLD  Is  FLAT:  A  BRIEF  HISTORY  OF  THE
TWENTY-FIRST  CENTURY  (2005)  ("[I]t is our ability to constantly  innovate new products,
services  and companies  that has been the source of America's horn of plenty and steadily
widening  middle  class  for  the  last  two  centuries.");  see  generally REED  HUNDT,  IN
CHINA'S  SHADOW:  THE  CRISIS  OF  AMERICAN  ENTREPRENEURSHIP  (2006)  (arguing  that
U.S. needs to reform  its legal, technological,  and leadership  architecture in order to renew
American cultural commitment to entrepreneurship).
276.  Tessler, supra  note  15.
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rate  limitations  of the  22  MHz  C  Block:  competition  in  the  form  of a
"third  pipe."  The  other  public  interest  goals  would have  been  served  by
different auction rules that treated the C Block as more of an experimental
space.  Given  the  predilections  and  incentives  of the  current  carriers,  the
only possibility for experiment  lay in mandating wholesale open access.
The  idea of treating  highspeed  Internet  access  as a utility would have
been anathema to Herbert Hoover. He was anxious  about the terms "public
convenience  and necessity" being added to the  1927 Act, which had tradi-
tionally been  used in connection  with public utilities.  277 But the  reality is
that we have a highly concentrated,  slow-to-innovate  set of Internet  access
providers  serving  us,  at  a  time  when highspeed  access  to  the  Internet  is
effectively  an  essential  facility.  The  public  interest,  as  expressed  in the
Telecommunication  Act's instructions  to  the  FCC,  arguably  dictates  that
we experiment with wholesale and other mandates that facilitate the Inter-
net model of access.278
The  next  such  opportunity  is upon us:  white  spaces.  When the  DTV
transition described in this Article is complete,  channels 2 through 51 will
remain allocated for television transmission. Few of the nation's television
markets  actually  use  49  channels.  Indeed,  some  use  only half that  num-
ber.279 The  "white  spaces"  are  these  unused  television  channels,  which
amount  to  approximately  300  MHz  of frequencies.  According  to  Blair
Levin,  "[e]stimates  vary,  but most of the  population  (between  73%  and
97%)  lives in areas with access to 24 MHz  or more of white  space.  Rural
areas in particular, have a great deal of white space as they generally have
fewer television broadcasters.' '280 Rules for the "white  spaces" are now on
the Commission's agenda.281 The fight over who  should be allowed to use
277.  See supra note 48.
278.  Another key moment for the public interest will  come when  the FCC decides to
act (or not) in response to the Skype Petition, described supra in note 241.
279.  See  Dibya  Sarkar,  Vacant Airwaves Spur  TV-Tech  Turf Battle, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 7, 2008, available at Westlaw, 4/7/08 APWIRES  19:24:54.
280.  Blair  Levin,  Rebecca  Arbogast  & David  Kaut,  Tech Drive To  Use Broadcast
White Spaces Hits Bump, WASH.  TELECOM,  MEDIA & TECH  INSIDER (Stifel, Nicolaus  &
Company, Balt.,  Md), Aug. 3,  2007.
281.  Oversight of the  Federal Communications Commission: Hearing before  the
Subcomm.  on  Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm.  on Energy and Commerce,
10th  Cong.  (2007)  (prepared  statement  of  Robert  M  McDowell,  Comm'r,  Fed.
Commc'ns  Comm'n),  available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte  mtgs/1 10-ti-
hrg.072407.McDowell-testimony.pdf  ("[T]he  Chairman  intends  that  the  Commission
finalize  rules  [for  the  white spaces]  this  fall."); see also Public  Notice,  FCC,  Office  of
Engineering  and  Technology  Announces  Projected  Schedule  for  Proceeding  on  Unli-
censed  Operation  in  the  TV  Broadcast  Band  (Sept.  11,  2006),  available  at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-06-1813AI.pdf  (projecting  release
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the white spaces, and under what conditions, is just beginning.
B.  Onward: White Spaces
Rather  than  being  sold  at  auction  to  the  highest  bidder,  unlicensed
spectrum is usable by anyone with wireless equipment that has been certi-
fied by  the  FCC  for unlicensed  frequencies.282 A  key  advantage  of unli-
censed spectrum is that experiments in new technology can be  carried out
without  asking  the  permission  of spectrum  licensees.  To  date,  we  have
made  very  little  spectrum  available  for unlicensed  use  and  experimenta-
tion.283 The FCC has the discretion to decide whether the digital television
"white  spaces"  may be used on an  unlicensed  basis.284 Its  own  Spectrum
Policy Task Force recommended  in  2002 that such  a step be  taken.28 5  In-
deed, in trying to stave off an auction rule in the 700 MHz proceeding that
would have  dedicated non-built-out  spectrum to unlicensed uses,  Verizon
affirmatively  argued that the  Commission would be opening up the  white
spaces  on an unlicensed basis-thus making  such a rule  for the  700 MHz
auction unnecessary.286
of Second Report and Order in October 2007). No rules were issued for the  white spaces
during the fall of 2007.
282.  Kenneth Carter,  Ahrned Lahjouji  & Neal  McNeil,  Unlicensed and Unshackled:
A Joint OSP-OET White Paper  on  Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues 4-5
(FCC, OSP Working Paper  Series No.  39), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch!DOC-234741A1  .pdf.
283.  According  to  the  White  Spaces  Coalition,  comprising  Dell,  Google,  Hewlett-
Packard,  Intel, Microsoft, and Philips,  "of the 'beachfront'  spectrum below 2  GHz,  only
26 MHz  is available  for unlicensed broadband use, as  opposed to  1,974 MHz for federal
or licensed use. Indeed, there is absolutely no unlicensed  spectrum available  for wireless
broadband in the spectrum below 900 MHz...  ." Reply  Comments of Dell, Inc., Google,
Inc., Hewlett-Packard  Co.,  Intel Corp.,  Microsoft  Corp.,  & Philips  Elecs.  N. Am. Corp.,
In  re Unlicensed  Operation  in  the  TV  Broadcast  Bands,  ET Docket No.  04-186,  at  30
(Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n Mar.  2,  2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native-or  pdf=pdf&iddocument-6518909731.
284.  See supra text  accompanying  notes  279-280  (describing  the  television  white
spaces);  Jon Van,  TV Group Sees Dark Time If White Space Opened Up, CHICAGO  TRIB-
UNE,  Dec.  26,  2007, at  Cl  ("Called  'white  space,'  over-the-air  channels  like 6  and  8 in
Chicago  are left vacant to prevent signals  broadcast on Channels  5, 7,  and  9 from inter-
fering  with one another.").  In most of the  country, most of the  TV spectrum is  not being
used. See supra note 279.
285.  SPTF-RR,  supra note  130,  at 54-63.  The  Spectrum  Policy Task Force  recom-
mended  continuing  to  rely  primarily  on  licensed  spectrum,  but  also  advocated  "co-
existence between  licensed and unlicensed."  William Lehr, Economic Case for Dedicated
Unlicensed  Spectrum Below 3GHz  14  (May  17,  2004)  (unpublished  manuscript),  avail-
able at http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/2004/wlehrunlicenseddoc.pdf.
286.  Verizon  argued  in  the  700  MHz  proceeding  that  it  would  not  make  sense  to
make  a license winner's  failure  to "build out"  its network trigger an  FCC order turning
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Beginning  in 2004,  the FCC asked for comments  on uses of the white
spaces,  itself suggesting  that broad unlicensed  uses of these  white spaces
would be appropriate.287 The Commission  recognized that the "significant
growth of and consumer demand  for unlicensed  wireless  broadband appli-
cations"  supported opening  up the  white spaces  for broad ranges  of unli-
censed  use.  88 Two  years  later,  the  FCC  backtracked  somewhat  from  its
earlier wholehearted  endorsements  of unlicensed uses of the white spaces,
saying  (1) that,  at  the  most,  only  "fixed"  (non-portable)  unlicensed  uses
should be allowed, and, even more disconcertingly,  (2)  that it is not confi-
dent  any unlicensed uses  are  appropriate  in the  white spaces."'  The  FCC
is concerned about the possibility of interference among the transmissions
of various users of the white spaces. 290
The  television  white  spaces  are  arguably  even  more  important  as  a
the  purchased spectrum  over to unlicensed  uses. "As  a threshold matter,  abundant  spec-
trum  already  is  available  for  unlicensed  services  in  the  2.4  [Wi-Fi]  and  5 GHz bands.
Moreover,  the Commission  likely will make  additional  spectrum available  for unlicensed
services  as  a  result  of the  TV  white  spaces  proceeding."  Reply  Comments  of Verizon
Wireless, supra note  183,  at 16.
287.  See Unlicensed  Operation  in the TV  Broadcast  Bands,  19 F.C.C.R.  10018 (pro-
posed  May 25,  2004) ("[W]e propose to allow unlicensed radio transmitters to operate in
the  broadcast television  spectrum at  locations  where  that  spectrum  is  not being used.").
This proceeding is still pending.
288.  White Spaces NPRM, supra note  116,  7.
289.  See Unlicensed Operation  in  the TV Broadcast  Bands,  19 F.C.C.R.  10018;  First
Report and Order and Further  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket Nos. 04-186,
02-380,  FCC 06-156,  Oct. 2006,  at  18  [hereinafter  FNPRM]  (concluding that portable
devices  "generally  pose  a  greater  risk  of harmful  interference  to  authorized  operations
than  fixed devices"  and "[w]hile  we  continue to  focus  on devices  operating  on an  unli-
censed  basis, we also  ask  whether such  devices  should  instead  operate  on a licensed  or
hybrid basis"). The National  Association  of Broadcasters  supports  this position. See Let-
ter from Nat'l  Ass'n of Broadcasters  to Marlene  H.  Dortch, Sec'y, FCC (July 26,  2007)
(ex  parte communication  regarding  ET Docket No. 04-186)  (on  file with  author);  Reply
Comments  of MSTV  & NAB,  In re Unlicensed Operation  in  the  TV  Broadcast  Bands,
ET  Docket No.  04-186  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  May  15,  2007),  available at http://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&id-document=6519411508
("[A]t  a  minimum,  the  Commission  must ...  (3) prohibit  all  personal/portable  devices
from  operating  within  the  spectrum.  Without these  protections,  television  viewers  will
experience  harmful  interference  which  will severely  and  unacceptably  disrupt DTV ser-
vices.").
290.  According  to Benkler, "interference  is a degradation  of the  fidelity of reception,
caused  by transmissions  from  different  sources that  are  detectable by  a receiver,  which
the receiver cannot  sufficiently differentiate  to be able  to translate  into  intelligible  infor-
mation."  Benkler, supra note 50, at 322. Interference  is manifested at the receiver and is a
contingent  property of that receiver;  a perfectly "smart"  receiver,  capable of detecting  all
possible modulated  signals, would  never experience  interference.
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spectrum policy matter than the 700 MHz spectrum, because there is much
more bandwidth available:  almost  300 MHz of spectrum will be available
at  the conclusion of the digital television  transition.29 1 It will  be in "swiss
cheese"  (non-contiguous)  form, but there will be  a great deal  of it.292 Us-
ing  white space  spectrum  as  a way to  provide "last-mile"  connectivity  to
wired  Internet  access  nodes  would  be  especially  valuable  in  rural  areas
where  those wired nodes are scarce  and there  is a great deal of vacant TV
spectrum. 2 93
Unlicensed  spectrum  is  already used  to provide  highspeed  but short-
distance  wireless  access  (Wi-Fi)  to  local  area  networks,  with  enormous
success. 294 The  explosion  of Wi-Fi  surprised  almost everyone.  Manufac-
turers raced to  provide  certified equipment  for hotspots  and users quickly
became  accustomed to finding opportunistic wireless  connections in stores
and airports. Use of Wi-Fi "created a multi-billion dollar industry at a time
when  most  telecommunications  businesses  were  in  a  downturn,  almost
indisputably creating  substantially  greater value than if the band had been
allocated  for exclusive  use., 295 But the  short range  of current  Wi-Fi,  and
its  limitations  to  low-power  devices,  have  constrained  its  use  for  non-
urban  settings.  Making  unlicensed  longer-range  uses  of wireless  access
widely available would likely lead to a similarly explosive narrative,  creat-
ing  uses  where  none  were possible  in  the  past  and  creating  markets  for
new devices.
291.  See  MICHAEL  CALABRESE,  NEW  AM.  FOUND.  &  BEN  SCOTT,  FREE  PRESS,
MEASURING  THE  TV  "WHITE  SPACE"  AVAILABLE  FOR  UNLICENSED  WIRELESS  BROAD-
BAND  (2006),  http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/measuring-tv-white_
space-available  for  unlicensedwirelessbroadband  (mapping  available  white  space  in
sample TV markets).
292.  Id. The "swiss  cheese,"  noncontiguous nature  of the white  spaces also  counsels
against auctioning  off licenses to them;  these would be "junky" licenses,  but useful unli-
censed areas.
293.  See Jon  Van,  TV  Group Sees Dark Time If  White Space Opened Up, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE,  Dec.  26, 2007,  at Cl.  (quoting  Brian Peters,  Information  Technology  Industry
Council).
294.  Werbach, supra note  61,  at 958-59.  The salient  difference between  unlicensed
and licensed spectrum  uses is that unlicensed  devices are not legally protected from  inter-
ference  and  must  operate  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  licensed  uses.  Regulation  of unli-
censed  devices therefore  is  provided  in  the  form  of specifications  governing  equipment
design and use.
295.  Reply Comments of Dell Inc., Google, Inc., the Hewlett-Packard  Co., Microsoft
Corp.,  and  Philips  Electronics North  America  Corp.,  at  23 (Mar.  2,  2007) (citing  Kevin
Werbach, Former  Counsel for New Tech.  Policy,  FCC, Remarks at the  Stanford Univer-
sity  Spectrum  Policy:  Property  or Commons  Conference  (Mar.  1, 2003),  available at
http://werbach.com/docs/spectrum_conf  comments.html.
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If the white spaces  were made available  on an unlicensed  basis for use
by  opportunistic,  "smart,"  higher-power  mobile  devices,  entrepreneurial
engineers will  likely think of ways to use this wealth of spectrum to pro-
vide  longer-range  mobile  connections  to  whatever  fiber  installations  are
nearest.  This  would  make ubiquitous  last-mile  highspeed  Internet  access
(particularly  in  rural  areas  unreached  by  the  incumbents)  possible,  and
would  allow  for  innovative  mobile  Internet  connections  uncontrolled  by
the  incumbents.296 Free  Press takes  the  position  that "[u]sing  these  white
spaces,  the  wireless  broadband  industry  could  deliver  Internet  access  to
every  American  household  at high  speeds and low prices-for as  little  as
$10  a month  ....  ,297  Cooperative neighborhood  mesh networks  could use
the  white  spaces  to  share  a  single  fiber  connection  to  the  Internet  with
hundreds of people.298
Interference  remains  a  key  issue.  The  television  broadcasters  view
portable  unlicensed uses of the  white spaces as threats to their digital tele-
vision  signals.299 They have  launched a large public relations effort aimed
at consumers  and legislators,  arguing that any portable,  unlicensed use of
the  white  spaces  will  create  chaos  for  television  programming. 3 00  Pre-
296.  According  to  Blair  Levin,  "Some  have  suggested  that  the  white  spaces  could
even  provide  the  necessary  spectrum  for  a  last-hundred-feet  solution  for  delivering
broadband."  Blair Levin, Rebecca Arbogast & David Kaut, Tech Drive To Use Broadcast
White Spaces Hits Bump, WASH. TELECOMM.,  MEDIA &  TECH. INSIDER, Aug. 3,  2007.
297.  MICHAEL  CALABRESE,  NEW AM.  FOUND. & BEN SCOTT,  FREE PRESS,  MEASUR-
ING  THE  TV  "WHITE  SPACE"  AVAILABLE  FOR  UNLICENSED  WIRELESS  BROADBAND
(2005), available  at http://www.freepress.net/docs/whitespace-analysis.pdf.
298.  Comments  of Dell,  Inc.,  Google,  Inc.,  The  Hewlett-Packard  Co.,  Intel  Corp.,
Microsoft  Corp.,  & Philips  Elecs.  N.  Am. Corp.,  In re Unlicensed  Operation  in  the  TV
Broadcast Bands, ET Docket No. 04-186,  at 30 (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n Jan.  31,  2007),
available  at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or  .pdf=pdf&id_
document-6518724310.
299.  Id. The broadcasters  are assisted in this regard by wireless microphone manufac-
turers  who  also claim  that  their  services  will be interfered  with,  even  though  "the  vast
majority of wireless  [microphone]  systems are unlicensed and operate  illegally." See Let-
ter  from White  Spaces  Coalition to Marlene  H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC  (July  16,  2007) (ex
parte  communication  regarding In re Unlicensed  Operation  in the  TV Broadcast  Bands,
ET  Docket  No.  04-186),  available at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or._pdf=pdf&iddocument-6519557961;  see also Ex  Parte  Comments  of Shure
Inc.,  In re Unlicensed Operation  in the TV Broadcast Bands, ET Docket No. 04-186, at 8
(Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  July 26, 2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native  or.pdf-pdf&iddocument=-6519560808  ("Shure strongly opposes the
view of a few parties  that wireless microphone  uses are trivial and  invalid. Undoubtedly,
the millions of Americans  who demand high-quality audio in news, entertainment, sports,
movies,  music,  theater,  religious,  political,  educational,  corporate,  and  other  contexts
would agree.")
300.  See Van, supra note 293  (quoting Dennis Wharton  of NAB that "[i]f we [broad-
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dictably, the broadcasters  also invoke "public  safety"  as a reason to avoid
any possible  interference with television transmissions.3 0 1
The central questions to be addressed by the Commission are: are there
portable  devices that can  operate opportunistically,  on an unlicensed basis
within the  white spaces,  without unduly interfering  with digital television
signals?  What is  the  right measure  of "undue"  interference  in  an  era  in
which television's  importance  is rapidly diminishing? 3 0 2 The  Commission
has not to date made any findings on these key questions  and is continuing
to  test portable  devices  submitted  by Microsoft,  Philips,  and Google  for
their  sensitivity  to  incumbent  signals.30 3 These  companies  take  the  view
that improved  spectrum sensing  by smart devices  will  avoid any interfer-
ence  with  digital  television  transmissions. 3 0 4 The  broadcasters,  portable
microphone  companies,  mega-churches,  sports  leagues,  and  (now)  cable
companies take the view that the potential  for any interference  by portable
wireless  devices with their transmissions must be avoided at  all costs, and
that  only  fixed,  licensed  wireless  uses  should be  permitted. But  because
fixed-location  devices  will  be too  expensive  to  be  widely  used  and  will
therefore  never  be manufactured  in large numbers,  Google and others  ar-
gue that  such  a  limitation  will  stifle the  marketplace. 305 Also,  consumers
casters] are right, implications for devastating TV are very real").
301.  Letter from National Association of Broadcasters  to Kevin J. Martin,  Chairman,
FCC (July  27,  2007)  (communication  regarding  In re Unlicensed  Operation  in the  TV
Broadcast Bands, ET Docket No. 04-186), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&iddocument=6519607853  ("Any  significant  interfer-
ence  is  an  unacceptable  outcome  from a public  safety  perspective-as  the  backbone  of
the public warning it is imperative  that Emergency Alert System warnings  and live news
coverage are ensured robust reception.").
302.  As  Ellen Goodman has  pointed out,  these  are key inquiries  on which spectrum
policy will be built. See Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41
SAN  DIEGO L. REV. 269, 288 (2004).
303.  Press Release,  FCC, The Office  of Engineering  and Technology  Announces the
Release of Reports of Initial  Measurements  on TV White  Space Devices (July  31,  2007),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-07-3457A  1  .pdf.
304.  See  Mark  A.  Sturza  & Farzad  Ghazvinian,  Can Cognitive Radio Technology
Operating in the TV  White Spaces Completely Protect Licensed TV Broadcasting? 1-2
(New Am. Found. Wireless  Future Program, Working  Paper No.  16,  2007), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaperl  6WhiteSpaceSensingSturza.pdf  (ar-
guing that  spectrum  sensing and cognitive  radio  can protect  existing  broadcasters  from
interference).
305.  Blair  Levin,  Rebecca  Arbogast  & David Kaut,  Tech  Drive To  Use Broadcast
White Spaces Hits Bump,  WASH.  TELECOMM.,  MEDIA  & TECH.  INSIDER,  Aug.  3,  2007.
During 2007, Senator Kerry  proposed legislation that would require the FCC  to allow for
portable as well as  fixed unlicensed  uses of the white spaces.  Wireless Innovation Act of
2007,  S.  234,  110th  Cong.  (2007)  (requiring the  Commission  to  establish  certification
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obviously cannot  communicate over a wired network while driving or rid-
ing in a vehicle,  which gives mobile  devices using wireless  connections a
key advantage.  The  fight over the use of personal,  portable  devices using
unlicensed spectrum in the white spaces is just beginning.
The  strong  public  interest  in  highspeed  Internet  access  and  general
technological  exploration  points  clearly  towards  granting  permission  for
portable unlicensed uses of the white spaces.  In a sense, we  will have two
case studies to choose  from:  the 700  MHz auction rule experience,  which
is likely to do nothing for increased highspeed Internet  access, and the Wi-
Fi experience,  which has  triggered  an explosion  of innovation in  devices
and uses of spectrum for Internet access.
The underlying question is one that has been the subject of a great deal
of scholarly  inquiry  over  the  last  ten  years,  beginning  with  work  by
Yochai Benkler:  should we always  propertize  spectrum?3 06 The  argument
in  favor  of propertizing  spectrum  is  that  the  existence  of interference
makes spectrum scarce and therefore  makes propertizing it sensible.3 0 7 We
assume  that,  given  the  possibility  of interference,  allowing  transmitters
standards for both fixed and portable  unlicensed  devices  in the  white spaces).  An identi-
cal  companion  bill,  Wireless  Innovation  Act of 2007,  H.R.  1597,  110th  Cong.  (2007),
was introduced in the House by Representatives  Jay Inslee  and Nathan Deal.
306.  Benkler, supra note 50 (suggesting unlicensed  use of spectrum subject to simple
"rules  of the  road,"  similar to  TCP/IP protocol);  Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless
Communications, supra note  131;  see also Noam  supra note  133,  at  768;  Comments  of
David  P.  Reed, In re Spectrum  Policy  Task Force  Report,  ET  Docket 02-135  (July  10,
2002),  available  at  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeor.pdf=pdf
&iddocument=-6513202407.  Benkler,  in  turn,  was  responding  to  calls  for  complete
propertization  of spectrum through the auction mechanism.  See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston
& Jeffrey  S. Steinberg,  Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public In-
terest, 50  FED.  COMM.  L.J.  87  (1997).  For  a  more  recent  expression  of this  view,  see
Thomas  W. Hazlett & Matthew  L.  Spitzer, Advanced  Wireless Technologies and Public
Policy, 59  S.  CAL. L. REV.  3 (2006). Ronald Coase made  the first argument that spectrum
should be treated like any other  form of property. Ronald Coase,  The Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.  1 (1959).  Responding to Benkler, Stuart Minor Ben-
jamin  has argued that efficiency  considerations  favor private  ownership of spectrum. Stu-
art  Minor Benjamin,  Spectrum Abundance and the  Choice Between Private and Public
Control, 78  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  2007  (2003).  Kevin  Werbach  has  argued  in  favor  of the
commons approach but with a focus on wireless  equipment usage rights. Werbach, supra
note  61.  The unlicensed position arguably achieved  its high-water mark  (in terms of FCC
policy)  in the 2002  Spectrum  Policy  Task Force  report, which  suggested that unlicensed
use  should be  treated as  an approach  whose  merits  are equal  to licensed  use.  See SPTF-
RR, supra note  130, at 35-37. In the  six years since then,  the FCC has apparently  forgot-
ten its own arguments  as to the good reasons to leave some spectrum unlicensed.
307.  See  Arthur S. De Vany et  al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the
Electromagnetic Spectrum:  A  Legal-Economic-Engineering Study,  21  STAN.  L.  REV.
1499 (1969).
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exclusive property rights against such interference will encourage bargain-
ing  among  transmitters  that  will  result  in  having  spectrum  used  for  its
highest and best purpose.
But if users  have  portable  wireless  devices  that  can  sense  and  avoid
legacy  signals-and  thus  avoid  interference  altogether-the  important
questions change. Instead of allocating  spectrum among  a small number of
well-funded actors who are willing to pay the most to (presumably) put the
economic  good of spectrum  to its  highest and best use, we  can  focus  our
attention on defining the "rules of the road" that will best allow users with
relatively low-cost, interference-avoiding  equipment to cooperate  with one
another.  This user-owned-devices-taking-advantage-of-available-spectrum
business model  is  a challenge  to the  business models  of incumbent  spec-
trum  holders-who  rely  on  "owned"  spectrum  and  infrastructure  being
used for a fee by subscribers.
The  upside  potential  of  devices  using  unlicensed  television  white
spaces  spectrum to improve Internet access  in this country, particularly in
rural areas where the cost of laying fiber is prohibitive,  is enormous.3 08  We
are  operating  in  a  context  in which  scarcity  is clearly  a  regulatory  arti-
fact,  309 in which incentives to invent and invest in spectrum-efficient  tech-
nology  would  be  greater  for  unlicensed  than  licensed  spectrum,  and  in
which interference  is no longer the problem it used to be. At the very least,
we should allow experimentation  in the manufacture  of opportunistic  de-
vices that are capable  of using white  spaces  spectrum without causing  in-
terference,  and this will only happen if some portion of the white spaces is
allowed to be used on an unlicensed basis by portable  devices.  There will
still be plenty of licensed spectrum on the books.
VII.  CONCLUSION
It is now a wireless world. The radio is becoming  the Internet, and the
Internet  is becoming  the radio. Many people see a future characterized  by
open, opportunistic access, explosive innovation, and a wide choice of de-
vices. The wireless  industry in America is, however, controlled by heavy-
handed  cellular carriers.  The history  of the  development  of the  700 MHz
308.  As several scholars have pointed out, the case for dedicated unlicensed  spectrum
includes  multiple economic benefits  in addition to assistance with Internet access. Avail-
ability of unlicensed  spectrum will promote  innovation in  and investment in wireless ser-
vices  (including  devices  and applications),  and encourage  the development  of new busi-
ness models for access.  See, e.g.,  Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications,
supra note  131,  at 25; Lehr, supra note 285.
309.  See  Comments of David Reed,  In re Spectrum  Policy  Task Force Report,  ET
Docket 02-135, at 2-10 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n July  15,  2002) (on file with author).
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auction rules makes  it clear that these cellphone  model incumbents  would
do almost anything to hang onto their market power and avoid the Internet
model  of  online  access,  including  feinting  towards  "no-locking,  no-
blocking"  rules  in order to  avoid the  greater  evil of wholesale  mandates.
These  incumbents  were  ably  assisted by  the  Commission.  Congress  had
attempted to give substance  to the "public interest"  standard  in its auction-
related  statutory  language,  which emphasized  new  entrants  and  competi-
tion. But  in creating  the rules  for the  700 MHz  auction,  the  Commission
(while  giving  lip  service  to  these  statutory  exhortations)  returned  to  the
early, pre-comparative  hearing  days of the  Federal Radio  Commission.  It
found that deep-pocketed incumbent access to exclusive rights in spectrum
should not be limited in any serious way.
Now  we  are  facing  another  FCC  proceeding-the  television  white
spaces-and  another chance  to get the public  interest right. The Commis-
sion needs  to  solve its "public interest" problem.  We must recognize  that
protecting  one-way,  broadcast  television  will  not assist job  growth,  eco-
nomic  growth,  or  any  other  broadly  socially  beneficial  growth  for  the
United  States.  Internet  access,  on the  other hand, has  enormous  potential
to  facilitate  these  developments.  The  FCC  needs  to  recognize  that  the
communications  ecosystem  of which  it is  a part  is increasingly  adopting
the  Internet ethos  of open, no-permission-needed,  neutral transport  but is
being  held back by the  actions of incumbents  wedded  to  their own busi-
ness models. The Commission should not be assisting these incumbents.
This  is  a moment  for  substantial  U.S.  telecommunications  policy re-
flection. Both the FCC and Congress  need to take  steps to  liberate swaths
of spectrum from licensing and the control  of incumbents in order to serve
future  Internet  access  needs.  Mobile,  unlicensed devices  that make Inter-
net access available  even in remote locations  will be  crucial. For the  21st
century,  innovation  and  creativity  are  our  comparative  advantage.  If we
get this wrong, the consequences  will be severe.
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